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ABSTRACT
Cumulative culture is rare, if not altogether absent in non-human species. At the foundation of
cumulative learning is the ability to flexibly modify, relinquish or build upon prior behaviours to
make them more productive or efficient. Within the primate literature, a failure to optimize
solutions in this way is often proposed to derive from low-fidelity copying of witnessed
behaviours, sub-optimal social learning heuristics, or a lack of relevant socio-cognitive
adaptations. However, humans can also be markedly inflexible in their behaviours, perseverating
with, or becoming fixated on outdated or inappropriate responses. Humans show differential
patterns of flexibility as a function of cognitive load, exhibiting difficulties with inhibiting sub-
optimal behaviours when there are high demands on working memory. Here I present a series
of studies on captive chimpanzees which show that not only is inhibitory control compromised
in chimpanzees, but indicate ape behavioural conservatism may be underlain by similar
constraints as in humans; chimpanzees show relatively little conservatism when behavioural
optimization involves the inhibition of a well-established but simple solution, or the addition of
a simple modification to a well-established but complex solution. In contrast, when behavioural
optimization involves the inhibition of a well-established but complex solution, and especially
when the alternative solution is also complex, chimpanzees show evidence of behavioural
conservatism. I propose that conservatism is linked to behavioural complexity, potentially
mediated by cognitive resource availability, and may be an important factor in the evolution of
cumulative culture.
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  CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1. CULTURE, CULTURAL TRANSMISSION AND CUMULATIVE CULTURE 
The unparalleled achievements and evolutionary success of humans is widely attributed 
to our ability for cumulative culture: to take the discoveries, behaviours and technologies of 
others and further building on these, to create complex reserves of socially heritable knowledge 
and technology. Broadly speaking, culture may be termed as “group-typical behaviour patterns 
shared by members of a community that rely on socially learned and transmitted information” 
(Laland & Hoppitt, 2003, pg151). Without accumulation, culture will be limited to simple 
behaviours which are within the innovative capabilities of at least some individuals (Tomasello, 
Kruger & Ratner, 1993; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, 
& Hopper, 2009). Such simple culture may confer survival or reproductive benefits over and 
above genetic endowment (Boyd & Richerson, 1985) but the ability to build upon, or ratchet up 
on (Tomasello et al., 1993), existing behaviours can often lead to substantial gains in productivity 
or efficiency (Boyd & Richerson, 1996). Whilst the ability to socially learn behaviours (defined 
as “learning that is influenced by observation of, or interaction with another animal (typically a 
conspecific) or its products” (Heyes, 1994, p. 207) may be common across taxa (Heyes & Galef, 
1996; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; Reader & Biro, 2010; Zentall & Galef, 1988) the ability to build 
on existing socially acquired behaviours is limited or absent in non-human animals. Seemingly, 
the most powerful form of this ‘second inheritance system’ (Whiten, 2005), cumulative culture, 
is uniquely highly developed in humans (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Tomasello et al., 1993). This 
is most striking when we compare our culture to that of arguably the second most cultural species, 
our closest living relative, the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) (Whiten et al., 1999; Whiten, 2011). 
The application of interdisciplinary research toward understanding the origins and 
evolution of culture in humans has proved powerful. Research focused on modern humans 
allows us to understand the processes through which we acquire cultural knowledge. Given how 
ubiquitous complex culture is within our species, the acquisition of culture in humans is most 
likely governed by phylogenetically endowed potential, that co-acts with a long developmental 
period to absorb, integrate and generate cultural practices, behaviours and technology. However, 
although we can learn much from studies of modern humans, to understand the origins of 
culture, research necessarily turns to comparative and evolutionary perspectives. This 
complementary research not only furthers understanding of the processes underlying acquisition 
of culture, but also when, why and how culture evolved. 
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A large corpus of work examining the origins of culture utilises both modelling and the 
experimental study of agents in simulated environments. In these two kinds of virtual worlds, the 
emergence, evolution and adaptiveness of behaviours are tracked, and the ensuing fitness of the 
agents assessed. Models thus act to reconstruct the environments that select for the correlates of 
culture, such as particular social learning mechanisms and strategies. However, modelling is, by 
necessity, over-simplified; to capture the processes underlying the evolution of one trait, noise 
within the environment must be drastically reduced to allow the systematic investigation of how 
specific environmental variables impact upon selection. In reality, agents are faced with an 
extremely complex environment, with many variables likely impacting upon their behaviours. It 
is therefore important that through the study of animals who share varying degrees of relatedness 
to us, we can examine the selection pressures and cognition that promote the emergence and 
maintenance of adaptive correlates of culture within complex and relatively ecologically valid 
environments. Much of my thesis will draw on comparative methodology to examine the 
cognition and cultural capacities of one of our two most closely related primate cousins, the 
chimpanzee. Given that we have shared much of our ancestral past with chimpanzees, 
comparison allows us to determine shared characteristics that may have been present in our 
common ancestors, and potentially phylogenetically endowed. It may also help delineate the 
origins of inter-species differences which impact profoundly on complex cognition and cultural 
capabilities. 
1.1 ATTRIBUTING CULTURE 
To say a species has culture, behaviours must not be attributable to genetic or ecological 
variables (Laland & Hoppitt, 2003). Somewhat akin to culture is the notion of a tradition. A 
tradition, as defined by Fragaszy and Perry (2003, p xiii) is ‘a distinctive behaviour pattern shared 
by two or more individuals in a social unit which persists over time and that new practitioners 
acquire in part through socially aided learning’. Although there is some overlap between 
traditions and culture, some authors would be reluctant to label any species which shows the 
social learning of a single behavioural tradition as cultural. Instead, it is suggested that culture can 
be thought of as consisting of multiple and behaviourally diverse traditions (Whiten & van Schaik, 
2007). Alternatively, it has been argued that only when social learning takes the form of human-
like social transmission, notably imitation or teaching, may culture be attributed (Galef, 1992). 
Other forms of social learning may not provide high enough levels of fidelity to allow faithful 
transmission of cultural knowledge ( Tennie et al., 2009, but see Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Franz 
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& Matthews, 2010). In sum, culture may be thought of as the existence of multiple and diverse 
traditions and which are socially transmitted with a sufficiently high level of fidelity. 
1.2 WHY HAVE CULTURE? 
The cognition underlying the propagation and maintenance of culture is expensive, 
involving a substantial investment of resources (Isler & Van Schaik, 2014). However, the ability 
to learn from others may reduce or circumvent the costs of innovation, and endow some species 
with a ‘second inheritance system’ (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Whiten, 2005, pg 52). Although 
behaviours may be transmitted through genetic inheritance, this system may be informationally 
limited (Enquist & Ghirlanda, 2007) and, in many circumstances, slow to facilitate adaptation to 
relatively rapid changes in the local environment (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Whilst in stable 
environments, genetically guided behaviour alone may suffice, the ability to both innovate and 
socially learn can afford an individual an adaptive advantage to adjust and survive in more variable 
environments (Boyd & Richerson, 1985, 1995, 1996). Culture has thus been proposed to 
underlie encephalization in the most intelligent animals, with expensive socio-cognitive 
mechanisms affording the perpetuation and acquisition of cultural knowledge (van Schaik & 
Burkart, 2011; Whiten & Erdal, 2012; Whiten & van Schaik, 2007; Whiten & van de Waal, 
2017). However, dependence on cultural knowledge can also be non-adaptive or maladaptive 
(Rogers, 1988), whereby, for example, a suboptimal variant may spread through a population via 
social learning processes. To optimise utility in an information rich environment, we must 
implement mechanisms and heuristics which guide our behaviour and decisions (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1995; Enquist & Ghirlanda, 2007; Laland, 2004).  
1.3 SOCIAL LEARNING MECHANISMS 
Social learning may be accomplished through various mechanisms, each likely involving 
differing levels of socio-cognitive complexity. When attempting to define a specific social learning 
mechanism, there is a plethora of definitions to be found within the literature. This issue has 
been addressed in depth elsewhere (e.g. Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & Marshall-Pescini, 2004), 
so I will briefly operationalise social learning mechanism based on previous discussions.  
The transmission fidelity of cultural behaviours in a species may be very much dependant 
on the social learning mechanisms employed (Tomasello et al., 1993 but see Caldwell & Millen, 
2009; Franz & Matthews, 2010). On one end of the social learning spectrum, where most non-
human animals are expected to lie (Galef, 1992), learning from others is facilitated incidentally 
through local or stimulus enhancement; for example, individual B may leave a tool near a 
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foraging site which individual A then picks up and through personal exploration, learns how to 
forage successfully. Further along the spectrum lies emulation, where the learner observes and 
replicates outcomes; A does not copy the actions performed by B to achieve their goal, but only 
the end result of those actions. Although this social learning mechanism may result in the re-
enactment of processes that the original practitioner (B in this case) was using to achieve the same 
outcome (Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Zwirner & Thornton, 2015) A will be effectively re-inventing 
(or reverse engineering) the process through personal exploration and trail-and error learning. 
However, when tasks are not constrained in the number of different ways an outcome can be 
realised, it is very likely that much variation will be seen in the processes utilised by individuals 
in a population (Caldwell, Schillinger, Evans, & Hopper, 2012; Derex, Godelle, & Raymond, 
2012). This variation typically means that behaviours will be transmitted through a population 
with relatively low fidelity, which is considered a constraining factor on the spread, maintenance 
and advancement of complex culture (Enquist, Strimling, Eriksson, Laland, & Sjostrand, 2010; 
Galef, 1992; Lewis & Laland, 2012; van der Post, Franz, & Laland, 2017; Tomasello et al., 1993). 
Much information may be lost if the process underlying the outcome of interest is not replicated, 
and the behaviour is thus unlikely to be maintained in a population (Enquist 2012). In turn this 
affords less opportunity for the behaviour to be modified in a cumulative fashion (Lewis & 
Laland, 2012 but see Youn, Strumsky, Luis, Bettencourt & Lobo, 2015 who found use of a 
variant in modern humans was not correlated with how long that technology has been registered 
in the patent system); that is, modified to become more productive or efficient  (Flynn, 2008).  
However, even if accumulation was to occur, this more productive or efficient innovation is 
unlikely to spread within the population due to a lack of process copying. As behaviours become 
increasingly more complex, they become difficult to re-invent and are practiced by only the 
innovator, disappearing from the population once the innovator emigrates or dies.  
Approaching the other end of the spectrum, Imitation involves attending to and copying 
B’s bodily movements or object manipulations (Whiten et al., 2004;  see also Byrne & Russon, 
1998), that is, attention is primarily focused on the process of achieving a result (Tomasello et 
al., 1993). This is a form of high fidelity copying: the imitator attempts to capture and replicate 
the technique used by practitioner, thus reducing variation of behaviour within the population, 
and allowing the acquisition of complex behavioural routines. Imitation is seen as the primary 
social learning mechanism underlying cumulative culture (Derex et al., 2012; Tennie et al., 2009; 
Tomasello et al., 1993; Wasielewski, 2014). However, imitation may have limits when behaviour 
becomes too complex: not only would an individual, with limited cognitive resources, find it 
Chapter 1  5 
 
difficult to remember every witnessed component of an observed behaviour, but the learning 
environment may be too noisy to allow extraction of all the relevant information needed (Brass 
& Heyes, 2005; Nehaniv & Dautenhahn, 2002; Subiaul & Schilder, 2014). The observer may 
thus rely on either repeated learning attempts (Enquist et al., 2010; Whiten, 2015) incorporating 
both social and trial-and error learning (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Galef, 2015; Henrich & 
McElreath, 2003; Whalen, Cownden, & Laland, 2015), and/or pedagogical cues from the 
practitioner, signalling the need to learn, and the salience of particular actions (Csibra & Gergely, 
2011). This sensitivity to pedagogy, as opposed to an ability to imitate per se, has been suggested 
to account for the high levels of fidelity in the learning and practice of complex human behaviour 
(Castro & Toro, 2014; Csibra & Gergely, 2011; Morin, 2016), and is often synonymously used 
with ‘teaching’. Caro & Hauser (1992) attribute teaching when i) individual B changes its 
behaviour in the presence of individual A; ii) B receives no benefit from their own behaviour; iii) 
A acquires relevant knowledge that it otherwise would not have acquired or acquires this 
knowledge at a faster rate than would otherwise be expected (a much broader view has been 
offered by Kline, 2014). However, teaching, while perhaps the most faithful and effective form 
of transmission (Morgan et al., 2015), reflects the sophisticated psychology of the teacher, whilst 
relying on potentially quite simple learning mechanisms within the learner (Thornton and 
Katherine McAuliffe, 2006; Franks & Richardson, 2006; Hoppitt et al., 2008).  
1.4 SOCIAL LEARNING HEURISTICS 
Although social learning capabilities are a vital prerequisite for culture, they are not 
sufficient to produce culture in itself. Indiscriminate social learning is unlikely to be adaptive in 
the long run and can lead to sub-optimal, if not maladaptive, behaviours (Boyd & Richerson, 
1995; Enquist & Ghirlanda, 2007; Giraldeau, Valone, & Templeton, 2002; Mesoudi, 2011; 
Rogers, 1988). It is for this reason that social learning is most likely under the influence of certain 
biases (or strategies) such as from whom to copy and when to do so (Boyd & Richerson, 1995; 
Laland, 2004). Although there are a host of potential social learning biases that are employed 
across the animal kingdom (Rendell et al., 2011), I will here focus on those which have received 
much attention in developmental, comparative and model based investigations.  
Mathematical models have shown that there exist a range of circumstances under which 
a bias towards copying the behaviour exhibited by the majority of the group will be adaptive 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Nakahashi, 2007; Nakahashi, Wakano, & 
Henrich, 2012 but see Eriksson, Enquist, & Ghirlanda, 2007). Copying the majority not only 
allows an individual to acquire information relatively safely but also serves to homogenise 
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behaviours within populations, creating community specific behavioural patterns (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985). Whilst the former of these two functions suggests a learning strategy employed 
by naïve individuals to avoid the costs of individual learning, the latter function may emerge from 
a desire to conform, and thus serves some social function (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955).  
Other biases that may be employed, although not mutually exclusive of majority biases, 
include copy-successful-individuals or copy-the-most-successful behaviour (Henrich & Boyd, 
2001; Nakahashi et al., 2012). The former may be linked to prestige or dominance biases 
whereby the most prestigious or dominant individual is used as a model from whom others copy 
(Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Laland, 2004). Intuitively, it would make sense to copy such 
individuals as their success may be an indicator of specialised knowledge (e.g. Mesoudi, 2008; 
Mesoudi & Brien, 2008); however, it is not always clear why an individual is successful and this 
could potentially lead to pitfalls (Laland, 2004; Mesoudi, 2011). Alternatively, one could employ 
the copy-the-most-successful-behaviour strategy which, although it avoids the incidental spread 
of sub-optimal behaviours and may be highly adaptive, would require the observer to evaluate 
behavioural pay-offs, a cognitively sophisticated capability (Laland, 2004; Nakahashi et al., 2012; 
Schlag, 1998).  
As highlighted above, the types of learning biases employed may have a major impact on 
the cultural evolution of a species (Caldwell, 2015; Enquist & Ghirlanda, 2007; Laland, 2004; 
Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Mesoudi, 2015; Schlag, 1998). For example, Mesoudi (2011) 
found that a strategy that biased learning towards copying the most successful behaviour led to 
the greatest levels of cultural complexity. 
1.5 CUMULATIVE CULTURE 
Without accumulation, culture will be limited to simple behaviours which are within the 
innovative capabilities of at least some individuals. Such simple culture may confer survival or 
reproductive benefits but the ability to build upon existing behaviours can often lead to increased 
gains or efficiency.  As discussed in section 1.1.3, the ability to accumulate (or ratchet) on a 
socially transmitted behaviour over time is thought to be reliant upon highly faithful transmission 
processes (Derex et al., 2012; Lewis & Laland, 2012; Tomasello et al., 1993 but see Caldwell & 
Millen, 2009; van der Post et al., 2017). A behaviour building upon its predecessor would 
presumably be more complex in nature and only within the capabilities of a ‘rare innovator’ 
(Whiten et al., 2009). The resultant behaviour or artefact would be a multi-generational 
innovative process and not within the innovative capabilities of a single individual (Tennie et al., 
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2009). It is because of this increasing complexity that imitation (and/or teaching) is necessary to 
allow other individuals to adopt the additional processes resulting in cumulative behaviours or 
artefacts. Cumulative culture is thus dependent on a multitude of factors: innovative capability, 
high fidelity social transmission, appropriate social learning mechanisms, and ultimately, the 
behavioural flexibility needed to relinquish, modify or build upon behaviour.  
2.   CULTURE IN HUMANS 
As our ancestors moved out of their ancestral habitats, selection likely favoured the 
evolution of the psychology needed to occupy what has been dubbed the “socio-cognitive niche”, 
and ultimately culminated in the hunter gatherer way of life (Tooby & Devore, 1987; Whiten, 
1999a). The transition to hunting and gathering would have required not only selection for 
increased cognitive capabilities, but also the advancement of the social capabilities beyond that 
of our shared ancestors with extant great apes, likely inclusive of heightened group co-operation 
and tolerance, along with theory of mind advancement (Herrmann, Call, Hernández-lloreda, 
Hare, & Tomasello, 2007; Whiten & Erdal, 2012). 
The trajectory of the socio-cognitive path our ancestors carved is evidenced by the 
artefacts they left behind (see Whiten, 2015 for a recent review). Historically, the manufacture  
of stone tools dates back to around 2.5 million years ago (Semaw et al., 2003),  or potentially 
even further (de la Torre, 2011; Harmand et al., 2015; Lewis et al., 2016; McPherron et al., 
2010). Although these Oldowan artefacts show stone knapping skill beyond that of other great 
apes there is little evidence of further accumulation in technology until the Acheulean phase 
some 1.6 million years ago (Stout, 2011). Although in relatively recent years our species has 
grown exponentially in population size and now exhibits a vast amount of cultural behaviours 
and artefacts, it must be considered that most of humans’ evolutionary history took place before 
the advent of agriculture and settlements; it is the hunter-gatherer way of life that our genetic 
systems have primarily evolved to perpetuate and it is this endowment that we still likely capitalise 
on today.   
From the first steps of hominids into the realm of cumulative culture, it is suggested that 
selection favoured cultural capabilities, resulting in an autocatalytic spiral of gene-culture co-
evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Laland, Odling-Smee, & Myles, 
2010; Morgan et al., 2015). These increased capacities afforded our ancestors the social-cognition 
necessary for creating and propagating more complex knowledge and technology, increasing the 
adaptiveness of culture, which would again act selectively on the genome. Whilst there is a large 
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literature on the extent to which genes and developmental processes affect the maturing 
phenotype, from a gene-culture perspective, it seems likely that modern humans, born amongst 
the most altricial of primates, inherit a unique potential to learn complex knowledge (Herrmann 
et al., 2007; Hopkins, Russell, & Schaeffer, 2014; van Schaik & Burkart, 2011; Karmiloff-Smith, 
1998; Wobber, Herrmann, Hare, Wrangham, & Tomasello, 2014). Thus whilst many animals 
must rely on domain-specific cognition that emerges in relatively deterministic developmental 
processes, humans are born with the ‘expectation’ that they will be culturally inducted, acquiring 
extraordinarily complex knowledge and technology throughout development (although see 
Cosmides & Tooby, 2013).  
The extent of such preparedness of the human mind for culture is unclear. Evidence 
from atypical developing populations suggests that emerging modularity in the adult brain is 
underlain by what may originally have been domain-general mechanisms (or building blocks), 
which were then co-opted by many brain functions (Baron-Cohen, 1998; Karmiloff-Smith 2009a, 
2009b). This indicates that modularity emerges over development and is likely heavily influenced 
by the developmental environment. This is most vividly shown by cases of extreme neglect (such 
of that of Genie), where children show severe learning difficulties not easily explained through 
any genetic abnormality. Cross-cultural comparisons between developing children also hint at 
differences between the social-cognition of human populations, and warn on the pitfalls of 
ascribing culturally relevant behaviours as universal in  humans (Berl & Hewlett, 2015; Clegg & 
Legare, 2016; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). Whilst it may be that humans 
are born with some basic preparedness, it should be considered that from almost the moment 
humans are born, they are engaged by cultural agents who interact with them in ways atypical of 
any other species, marking the beginning of their enculturation. This makes it very difficult to 
disentangle the extent to which gene-culture co-evolution has prepared the brain to acquire 
culture through a propensity to employ certain social learning mechanisms and heuristics 
(Tomasello, 2016), or through the potential to allow the cultural environment to reliably 
influence the development of these skills  (Barrett and Kurzban, 2006).  
2.1 SOCIAL LEARNING MECHANISMS 
Whilst humans are capable of many forms of social learning, and employ a portfolio of 
these mechanisms to socially acquire cultural behaviours (Whiten, 2017) it has been argued that 
high fidelity social learning mechanisms are at the heart of human culture (Galef, 1992; Tennie 
et al., 2009; Tomasello et al., 1993).  
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Imitation is apparent in human social learning from an early age, with preverbal infants 
showing imitative abilities (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002). With development, the degree 
of imitation exhibited by children (and adults) becomes even more pervasive such that is has 
been termed ‘overimitation’ (Horner & Whiten, 2005; McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011; 
Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010).  When presented with novel tasks and shown how to solve these by 
adults, children are prone to copying not only relevant behaviours demonstrated but also 
functionally redundant ones as well, despite task transparency. In attempting to understand why 
children employ this apparently inefficient and ostensibly maladaptive learning strategy, it has 
been proposed that overimitation might be an extension of a typically adaptive learning process 
which allows the acquisition of complex culture without high cognitive demands (Kenward, 
Karlsson, & Persson, 2011; Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 
2007; McGuigan, Gladstone, & Cook, 2012; McGuigan et al., 2011).  
Linked to high fidelity transmission, and children’s impressive acquisition of knowledge 
and skills, is ‘natural pedagogy’ (Csibra & Gergely, 2011). These authors noted that children are 
very sensitive to cues which indicate an opportunity (or expectation) that they should attend to 
and learn the actions of another. This substantially reduces the noise in the learning environment, 
allowing more targeted learning. Notably, reports from modern hunter-gatherers suggest that 
transmission of skills relies heavily on observational learning, with the inference that natural 
pedagogy may guide the learning process (Hewlett, Fouts, Boyette, & Hewlett, 2011; Kline, 
2014). However, in many countries, as children get older, they are in modern times provided 
with a ‘formal education’, where they are actively taught by members of the community. Given 
the opaque and increasingly complex cultural world we occupy, explicit teaching may be 
necessary to ensure that we acquire skills such as reading, writing and mathematics, inherent to 
modern Western culture.  
2.2 SOCIAL LEARNING HEURISTICS 
Social learning heuristics are the rules, biases and strategies used by the learning 
individual to guide when, and from whom to copy (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Laland, 2004). 
Given the complexity and vastness of human cultural behaviour, we expect both modern 
humans, and our ancestors to have employed adaptive learning heuristics.  
As previously discussed, the ability to recognise a more successful behaviour or individual 
is critical in cultural accumulation (Laland, 2004).  A bias based on this ability would fit well with 
the progression of lithic technology: In a virtual simulation of the transmission of prehistoric 
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projectile points, Mesoudi & Brien (2008) found that the pattern of transmission suggested in 
Nevada’s archaeological record was most likely generated from a copy-successful-individuals 
social learning bias.  It was found that such a bias offered significant benefits over individual 
learning (Mesoudi & Brien, 2008) in environemnts were there were no costs to social learning, 
when participants flexibly switched between social and asocial learning, and where there existed 
several optimal projectile designs (Mesoudi, 2008). This is supported by Chudek, Heller, Birch 
and Henrich, (2012) who found children had a  preference for more prestigious models (see also 
Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012), as well as by Muthukrishna, Shulman, Vasilescu and Henrich 
(2014), who found that when multiple models existed in the population, individuals preferentially 
copied the most successful model’s aretefact design. Interestingly though, participants here 
(Muthukrishna et al.) were observed to additionnally copy some aspects of other, less-successful 
models’ behaviours, indicating that individuals may have been combining elements of multiple 
designs to generate their own novel ones  (Derex et al., 2012; Enquist & Ghirlanda, 2007; 
Morgan, Rendell, Ehn, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2012).  
Human social learning and decision-making appears to be heavily suscepetible to 
majority influences (Asch 1956), and interestingly Tomlin, Nedic, Prentice, Holmes and Cohen 
(2013) found that neural activity in the brain increased in areas typically associated with response 
uncertainty when human adults detected their behaviour differed from others.  In line with 
models which predict the evolution of majority influences in virtual environments potentially 
reflective of those of our ancestors (e.g. Henrich & Boyd, 2001), experiments with children also 
suggest that we may have a culturally and/or genetically endowed tendency towards conformity 
(that is, adopting the views or behaviours of the majority despite contradictory personal 
information) (Haun and Tomasello (2011). That children are engaging in conformity as opposed 
to majority biased learning (that is, expressing responses based on perceived social expectations 
as opposed to responses based on true personal belief) is supported by Corriveau and Harris 
(2010), who found that children showed discrimination in the adoption of adult responses on a 
task depending on the consequences of their answers: no child adopted the incorrect adult 
response if the result was the drowning of a toy rabbit due to an inappropriately sized bridge.  
This is in line with Morgan, Rendell, Ehn, Hoppitt and Laland (2012), who found that conformity 
was also context dependent in adults.  
Whilst this is by no means an exhaustive accout, humans, equipped with advanced socio-
cognitive skills, appear to employ a multitude of social learning mechanisms and heuristics, and 
have the capacity to flexibly switch between these strategies (Derex, 2012; Laland, 2004; Morgan 
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et al., 2012; Whiten et al., 2004). It may be that this diverse repertoire, as opposed to reliance 
on any one social learning mechanism or rule, afforded our ancestors the capacity to maintain 
and build on their knowledge and technology. 
2.3 CUMULATIVE CULTURE 
The high fidelity social transmission processes of humans, along with the social learning 
strategies we employ, are thought to be responsible for allowing us to continually build upon the 
innovations of previous generations (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Laland, 2004; Lewis & Laland, 
2012; Mesoudi, 2011).  When and how our ancestors acquired the ability to ratchet is still 
unclear. Although Oldowan technology exceeded the capabilities of extant wild great apes (cf 
Toth, Schick, Savage-Rumbaugh, Sevcik & Rumbaugh, 1993), it was not for another million years 
that we began to see significant advances in technology, with the advent of Acheulean technology. 
Yet still, it was not until around 160,000 to 40,000 years ago that we really see an explosion, at 
an unprecedented speed, in cumulative culture (e.g. Bar-Yosef, 2007; d’Errico & Stringer, 2011). 
It is likely that before this time, our ancestors, although perhaps capable of simple ratcheting, 
had reached some technological ceiling. What, then, changed?  
Although there are several hypotheses, it has been suggested that the relatively advanced 
Oldowan technology overtook that of other species due to changes in hominin social organisation 
and demographics (Henrich, 2004; Muthukrishna, Shulman, Vasilescu, & Henrich, 2014; 
Pradhan, Tennie, & van Schaik, 2012; see also Hill, Wood, Baggio, Hurtado, & Boyd, 2014).  
Whether the changes in hominin cultural capabilities were driven by socio-cognitive 
advancements which led to changing demographics or vice-versa is hard to disentangle (Caldwell, 
2015; Derex, Beugin, Godelle, & Raymond, 2013). Either way, the increasing sociality of 
hominins may have led to the advancement of already existent social learning skills such that, 
over time, stable and complex cumulative culture became possible, as evidenced by Acheulean 
and later technology (Pradhan, Tennie, & van Schaik, 2012; Whiten, 1999a; Whiten & van 
Schaik, 2007). This is consistent with models which suggest that cultural complexity is achieved 
when learners have access to large social networks of individuals (Enquist et al., 2010; Henrich, 
2004; Powell, Shennan, & Thomas, 2009; Vaesen, 2012) and is supported by experiments 
examining the effect of the number of available models on skill advancement and cumulative 
achievements (Derex et al., 2013; Kempe & Mesoudi, 2014; Muthukrishna et al., 2014). With 
increasingly sophisticated social organisation, our ancestors would have been in a position to 
donate technology (such that a learner could forego steps within the ratchet) and allow for 
specialisation and division of labour within groups. Increased network size also means greater 
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opportunities to learn from innovators, via increasing the pool of innovators available (e.g. 
Henrich, 2004), as well as to share and collaborate on knowledge and technology (Tomasello, 
Melis, Tennie, Wyman, & Herrmann, 2012). Recent work suggests that partially connected 
networks, perhaps typical of our nomadic ancestors (Hill et al., 2014), increase the variation in 
problem solving strategies (Derex, Feron, Godelle, & Raymond, 2015). In tightly connected 
groups, once one idea is converged on, this idea may be perfected to a local optimum; however, 
this reduces the likelihood of continued exploration to find the best possible solution, or global 
optimum (Mason, Jones, & Goldstone, 2008; Selman, Kautz & Cohen, 1994). In loosely 
connected groups, there is less efficient transfer of information, such that groups are likely to 
converge on different local optimums. When these groups come together, through social 
transmission and collaboration, solutions may be moved closer towards the global optimum 
(Derex & Boyd, 2015; Lazer & Friedman, 2007 but see Mason & Watts, 2012), either through 
abandonment of sub-optimal solutions in favour of better ones, or through combining different 
components of each group’s local solution (Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011). Indeed, 
multiple lines of evidence suggest that recombination of solutions from multiple models may be 
a key driving force behind cultural advancement (Derex et al., 2015; Youn et al., 2015). As such, 
demographic changes, increasing access to innovators, as well as increasing collaboration amongst 
different groups of hominids, could explain the explosion of cumulative culture seen in modern 
humans (Derex et al., 2013; Pradhan et al., 2012).  
2.4 HUMAN CULTURE: CONCLUSION 
Our ability to maintain, propagate and continually build on complex knowledge, skills, 
and technology has afforded our species with a highly advanced ‘second inheritance system’ 
(Whiten, 2005, pg 52). Our ability for cumulative culture has allowed us to far exceed the general 
intelligence of any other known species, to cultivate resources in an unprecedented way, and to 
modify our environment to fit our needs and convenience.  
While this chapter has so far explored the basic facets of human culture, and speculated 
on how and why culture emerged in our ancestors, I have thus far commented little on the 
growing research that suggests social learning, and culture itself, are far from unique to humans ( 
Whiten, 2017 for a recent review). While correlates of culture can be observed across a wide 
range of animals, the remainder of this thesis will focus on what we can learn from an animal 
with whom (along with the bonobo) we share our most recent animal ancestry: the chimpanzee.  
3.   CULTURE IN CHIMPANZEES 
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Attributing behaviours to culture in non-humans is often controversial. Some have argued 
that even if we accept that culture exists in other animals, these behaviours may be dependent on 
different governing processes and any similarities with human culture may be superficial (Galef, 
1992).  For example, it has been advocated that human culture is primarily transmitted through 
high fidelity social learning mechanisms, which may be dependent on uniquely complex cognitive 
capacities, such as theory of mind and an understanding of the goals of agents (Tomasello et al., 
1993; Galef, 1992). Other species capable of social learning are typically thought to use lower 
fidelity social learning mechanisms such as emulation or enhancement, which constrain the 
spread and maintenance of cultural behaviours (Enquist et al., 2010; Lewis & Laland, 2012), 
making animal culture qualitatively different from our own. Further, even if a species is capable 
of high fidelity social transmission, humans may be unique in their reliance on certain social 
learning heuristics, such as copying the most successful behaviours or conspecifics, or being 
susceptible to majority influences.  
It is perhaps by no coincidence that amongst the strongest of the candidate species to 
exhibit culture is one of our closest living relatives, the chimpanzee (Whiten et al., 1999). It may 
even be parsimoniously concluded that if chimpanzees display similar cultural correlates with us, 
or indeed any similarity with us in terms of cognition, developmental trajectories or brain 
functioning, that these may have been shared with, and potentially inherited in some form, from 
a common ancestor. The extent to which that form is genetically constrained in nature, or an 
inherited potential that with the right developmental environment, reliably emerges, remains to 
be seen. Importantly, comparative research with chimpanzees allows us to investigate the extent 
to which social and/or cognitive differences may have impacted upon our cultural capabilities, 
and specifically why humans may be unique in our capacity for cumulative culture; whilst 
evidence for culture in non-human species continues to grow, there are few candidate examples 
of cumulative culture outside of humans’ distinctively complex achievements. 
The first point I discuss here is whether chimpanzees possess culture. This depends in 
part on the definition of culture. Chimpanzees have the greatest number of known traditions 
outside of the human species, across foraging, tool use and social behaviours, with each 
chimpanzee group distinguished by their own particular cultural profile (Whiten et al., 1999). 
This would lead many, myself included, to consider chimpanzees as having culture. However, 
there is debate as to whether chimpanzees are capable of high-fidelity transmission, as well as the 
types of social learning heuristics they can employ. Although chimpanzees have been found to 
be capable of some degree of imitation (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; 
Chapter 1  14 
 
Horner & Whiten, 2005), these observations are often made of chimpanzees in captive 
conditions. This has led some to argue that when chimpanzees do display similarities with 
humans, it is most likely because they have been encultured by humans, and as such, their 
behaviour or cognition is not representative of a wild chimpanzee (Tomasello & Call, 2004). 
Additionally, although many accept that chimpanzees have group-specific behaviours, some have 
challenged whether these are underlain by culture, and argue that genetic or ecological 
underpinnings cannot be ruled out (Humle & Matsuzawa, 2002; Koops, McGrew, & Matsuzawa, 
2013; Langergraber & Vigilant, 2011). Finally, unlike human culture, chimpanzees do not appear 
to possess significant cumulative culture. I will address each of these issues, and conclude that 
although there are differences between chimpanzee culture and our own, chimpanzees do 
possess culture, but their ability for cumulative culture is limited. I will discuss the multi-faceted 
reason as to why this is, before homing in on one major limiting factor: chimpanzees are 
behaviourally inflexible. 
3.1 THE ENCULTURED CHIMPANZEE 
I first address the legitimacy and validity of using chimpanzees in captive rearing 
environments to better understand both the chimpanzees mind and our own. A term often seen 
in the literature is ‘encultured’ chimpanzees (e.g. Buttelmann et al., 2007; Tennie, Call and 
Tomasello, 2012). It is suggested (most likely correctly) that captive, particularly human reared 
chimpanzees can have superior culture relevant abilities (such as imitative skill) owing to human 
interaction; that is, captive chimpanzees may undergo an enculturation process whereby humans 
affect their developing socio-cognitive skills (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2012; Tomasello & Call, 
2004). It is critical to note that the ontogenetic experiences of any animal that has an extended 
developmental period (such as chimpanzees and humans) are extremely important (e.g. 
Bjorklund, 2006). In fact, no animal has as long a developmental period as human children, and 
perhaps no animal’s intelligence is as dependent or as sensitive to developmental processes as 
humans’. As discussed in section 2, from birth human infants are inducted into their cultures: 
We are encultured (Grusec & Hastings, 2007). We cannot take this for granted in comparative 
work, and assume that, as is often the case, abilities present in Western, Educated, Industrialized, 
Rich, Democratic (‘WEIRD’) children (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) are 
phylogenetically endowed. In this vein, when attempting to identify inter-specific socio-cognitive 
differences between humans and chimpanzees, it is perhaps not fair to compare a wild 
chimpanzee to a child who has been raised in a highly pedagogical environment where socio-
cognitive skills have likely been nurtured from birth. Perhaps more telling about chimpanzees’ 
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shared socio-cognitive abilities are the studies which do focus on ‘enculturated’ chimpanzees, 
those who have been raised in environments as similar as possible to that of a human child. As 
Boesch (2007) highlights, interspecies comparisons should only be made when the participants 
have faced the same “ecological-imprint”. Given that many developmental theories stress the 
importance of experience dependent organisation of the human brain, and ensuing cognitive 
functions (Baron-Cohen, 1998; Bishop, 1997; Karmiloff-Smith, 1998; 2009), it would seem 
unjust to call into question what studies on captive chimpanzee populations can really tell us 
about the origins of our own capabilities whilst selectively ignoring the effects of our own even 
more potent enculturation processes on children. 
3.2 CAN WE RULE OUT ECOLOGICAL AND GENETIC EXPLANATIONS FOR 
REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN BEHAVIOUR? 
The attribution of culture is not only dependent on sufficiently advanced social learning 
mechanisms and strategies, but also through the ruling out of both ecological and genetic 
explanations of behaviour (Laland & Hoppitt, 2003; Laland & Janik, 2006; Langergraber et al., 
2011).  As van Schaik (2012) highlights, behaviours that are shared within communities but 
divergent between communities, may be due to independent but convergent genetic 
predispositions and/or behavioural plasticity in response to ecological cues. Whilst there are 
those who argue that genetic explanations cannot be ruled out when comparing chimpanzee 
populations (Langergraber & Vigilant, 2011; Langergraber et al., 2011), there is evidence to 
suggest that genetic explanations do not seem to be able to explain divergent behaviours between 
populations (Gruber et al., 2011; Luncz & Boesch, 2014; Luncz, Mundry, & Boesch, 2012). 
However the ruling out of subtle ecological causes of behaviour is perhaps more difficult (Humle 
& Matsuzawa, 2002; van Schaik, 2012a).  That being said, there is evidence to suggest that at least 
some behaviours are also not explicable in terms of ecological influences alone and that some 
behaviours may be shaped by both ecological and cultural processes (Humle, Snowdon, & 
Matsuzawa, 2009; Koops et al., 2013); for example, migrating chimpanzees will sometimes adopt 
the local nut-cracking technique of their new group, relinquishing their own variant despite 
availability of the appropriate tools (Luncz & Boesch, 2014; Luncz et al., 2012). Overall, it would 
appear that an account of behaviour that incorporates culture may have more explanatory power 
than a genetic or ecological one alone. 
3.3 SOCIAL LEARNING MECHANISMS  
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How do chimpanzees acquire socially available information? It has been strongly argued 
that chimpanzees primarily rely on lower-forms of social transmission mechanisms, such as 
emulation and enhancement. If true, this could explain a great deal of the cultural divide between 
our two species. Whilst like humans, there is little argument that chimpanzees are capable of 
emulation (e.g. Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2010), there is more debate over investigations which 
suggest they can employ multiple mechanisms of learning, including imitation. For example, 
chimpanzees may rely on emulation on simple tasks (Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Whiten, 
2008), but on harder tasks, which have solutions outside of the innovative capabilities of most 
chimpanzees, they may also focus on and use process information (Fuhrmann, Ravignani, 
Marshall-Pescini, & Whiten, 2014; Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Whiten, 2015; Horner & 
Whiten, 2005; Horner, Whiten, Flynn, & de Waal, 2006; McGuigan & Whiten, 2009). Other 
studies have arrived at the opposite conclusion, that chimpanzees have somewhat limited or non-
existent imitative capabilities (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2013; Call, Carpenter, 
& Tomasello, 2005; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2012). These studies, in the very least, show 
there are marked differences between chimpanzee and human reliance on process information, 
with children being far more prone to imitate than chimpanzees. Whether they show a lack of 
imitative ability in chimpanzees is open to interpretation and debate. Interestingly, Buttelmann 
Carpenter, Call and Tomasello (2007), following Gergely et al. (2002)), found results consistent 
with chimpanzees having the capacity to understand the intention of another: chimpanzees 
appeared to be able to distinguish between actions which were incidental to a physical constraint, 
versus those which appeared to be purposefully selected as a rational course of action to achieve 
a goal. When actions appeared purposeful, chimpanzees were significantly more likely to imitate 
(Buttelmann et al., 2007). Of note here is that the authors consistently highlight that these 
chimpanzees were ‘encultured’ and that in a similar study conducted with non-encultured 
chimpanzees, there was no evidence of this sort of ‘rational imitation’ (Buttelmann, Carpenter, 
Call, & Tomasello, 2008).  It is suggested that whilst all chimpanzees may be capable of 
understanding the intentions of others (e.g. Marsh & Legerstee, 2016) only some (the encultured) 
possess suitable motivational levels to attend to human actions, and this is a result of extensive 
human interaction (Buttelmann et al., 2008). This fits well with the observation that studies which 
find imitation (e.g. Horner & Whiten, 2005) are typically conducted with captive or semi-wild 
chimpanzees, and that those raised predominantly by humans tend to have socio-cognitive 
capacities well beyond those raised by their conspecifics (Tomasello, Carpenter & Hobson, 
2003). However, the argument that only captive chimpanzees are imitators is offset by anecdotal 
observations of imitation in the wild; for example, Hobaiter and Byrne (2010) observed several 
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chimpanzees imitating the somewhat redundant method of using a liana to scratch their backs 
(instead of their hands) after observing a paralysed adult male using this technique to overcome 
his handicap. 
Imitation, although thought to be one of the primary modes of cultural transmission in 
humans, is not the only high fidelity transmission mechanism available to us: we also teach. The 
occurrence of teaching in chimpanzees is limited and controversial. It has been suggested that 
young apes are already well equipped with other forms of social learning that negate the need for 
teaching (Hoppitt et al., 2008; Whiten, 1999b). That being said, there have been some putative 
cases of rare teaching displays in the wild; for example, Boesch (1991) reports cases in which a 
mother demonstrates correct technique after having noticed her infant struggle with nut cracking 
(see also Musgrave, Morgan, Lonsdorf, Mundry, & Sanz, 2016). Perhaps whilst not routine 
educators, some apes may have the socio-cognitive capabilities required for teaching (Whiten 
1999b). Although such teaching may not fall strictly within Caro and Hauser’s (1992) definition 
of teaching, Byrne and Rapaport (2011) have argued that it is this intentional, targeted teaching 
that is most insightful in understanding the evolution of teaching in humans.  
Another consideration is that chimpanzees do not rely on social information as much as 
humans do ( van Leeuwen, Call, & Haun, 2014 but see Clement, Koenig, & Harris, 2004; Ma & 
Ganea, 2010). For example, Horner and Whiten (2005) showed that while chimpanzees can 
copy actions, they chose not to do so when they could instead emulate. Children on the other 
hand, copied wholesale all relevant and ostensibly irrelevant actions. This may due to childrens 
heavy reliance on social information (cf Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello, 2014), with children 
potentially employing an adaptive learning rule, such as copy-all/refine later (Horner and 
Whiten, 2005). This reliance/over reliance on social information to guide actions may be linked 
to children’s sensitivity to pedagody (discussed in section 2.1). Chimpanzees may not be as 
susceptible to cues signalling an opportunity to learn as children are (although see Buttelmann et 
al., 2007), and are thus faced with a far noisier learning environment. If this is the case, the ability 
to parse relevant actions from social information may be harder for chimpanzees, which may 
explain that even if they are capable of imitation, emulation may be a more reliable form of 
learning. 
In summary, findings are in line with the conclusion that chimpanzees possess a portfolio 
of social learning mechanisms (Price et al., 2016; Whiten et al., 2009) the use of which may be 
governed by certain parameters such as complexity and transparency of task; however, there are 
clear differences between the use of these mechanisms in humans and chimpanzees, with 
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humans having a greater tendency to not only use social information (Haun et al., 2014; van 
Leeuwen et al., 2014), but to predominantly rely on high fidelity mechanisms, such as imitation.  
3.4 SOCIAL LEARNING HEURISTICS 
The strategies employed by chimpanzees with respect to when and from whom they learn 
may also reveal important inter-species differences. Given the importance of majority based 
learning in the maintenance of cultural behaviours (Henrich & Boyd, 1998), it may be of 
significance that chimpanzees do appear to exhibit conformity to what may be perceived of as 
group norms, both within captivity (Bonnie, Horner, Whiten, & de Waal, 2007; Hopper, 
Schapiro, Lambeth, & Brosnan, 2011; Whiten, Horner, & de Waal, 2005) and in the wild (Luncz 
& Boesch, 2014; Luncz et al., 2012). For example, migrant females have recently been observed 
to relinquish their established nut cracking technique in lieu of a variant used by their new group 
to (Luncz & Boesch, 2014). However, this view of the conforming chimpanzee is not 
unchallenged (Vale et al., 2017; van Leeuwen & Haun, 2013); for example, when looking at the 
behaviour of a ‘minority’ group of chimpanzees after being exposed to an alternative ‘majority’ 
behaviour, van Leeuwen, Cronin, Schütte, Call and Haun (2013) found no evidence of 
conformity on a token deposit task. Although this may appear at odds with prior findings, it is 
worth noting that the behaviour of the majority was essentially the same technique as that of the 
minority. The majority either deposited tokens in a spatially separate location, a dimension within 
foraging where we might expect some necessary variability in group living animals who compete 
for resources, or the majority used visually different types of tokens. The visual differences 
between tokens may have been quite arbitrary to chimpanzees, who may not initially sub-
categorise different types of tokens. This task may also be considered to be quite simple in nature. 
As such, a lack of conformity may draw parallels with findings in humans which suggest 
conformity is more likely to be seen on difficult tasks (Morgan et al., 2012). Also of note is that 
in humans the strength of conformity is positively correlated with the degree of consensus 
amongst demonstrators (Morgan et al., 2012). As chimpanzees in the minority group were 
exposed not only to majority behaviours but also the token solutions of other minority group 
members, we might expect a weakened propensity to conform. 
Although chimpanzees may share other social learning strategies with humans, such as a 
preference to copy behaviours exhibited by the majority of conspecifics (Haun, Rekers, & 
Tomasello, 2012), and a proclivity to copy high prestige individuals (Horner, Proctor, Bonnie, 
Whiten, & de Waal, 2010) or dominant individuals (Kendal et al., 2015 but see Watson 2016), 
there do appear to be important inter-species differences. For example Marshall-Pescini and 
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Whiten (2008) speculated that chimpanzees might employ a copy-when-dissatisfied social 
learning strategy (cf Laland, 2004; Schlag 1988), after finding chimpanzees did not build on their 
behaviours to achieve greater rewards when they had a simpler solution which produced some 
payoff. However, recent studies have found contrary evidence that chimpanzees will relinquish 
a working solution (i.e. one that reliably produces reward) to adopt an alternative, higher pay-off 
solution (Hopper, Kurtycz, Ross, & Bonnie, 2015; van Leeuwen & Call, 2016; van Leeuwen et 
al., 2013; Vale, Flynn, Hopper, Lambeth, Shapiro & Kendal, in prep). Another explanation for 
Marshall-Pescini and Whiten’s findings is that chimpanzees are conservative learners; that is, 
when chimpanzees have mastered a sufficiently rewarding behaviour, they lack the behavioural 
flexibility to modify that solution. This would have far reaching consequences for the cumulative 
capabilities of chimpanzees.  
3.5 DO CHIMPANZEES’ POSSESS CULTURE? 
In summary, chimpanzees exhibit the greatest number of traditions outside of the human 
species, across foraging, tool use and social behaviours, with each chimpanzee group 
distinguished by their own particular cultural profile (Bonnie, Horner, Whiten, & de Waal, 2007; 
Gruber, Muller, & Reynolds, 2011; Hashimoto, Isaji, Koops, & Furuichi, 2015; Hobaiter, Poisot, 
Zuberbühler, Hoppitt, & Gruber, 2014; Humle, Snowdon, & Matsuzawa, 2009; Koops, 
McGrew, & Matsuzawa, 2013; Luncz & Boesch, 2015; Luncz, Mundry, & Boesch, 2012; van 
Leeuwen, Cronin, & Haun, 2014; Whiten et al., 1999; Whiten et al., 2007; Whiten, Horner, & 
de Waal, 2005). The social learning processes observed in chimpanzees do appear to be 
sufficient to transmit behaviours not only within, but between communities and then to maintain 
them (Biro, Inoue-Nakamura, Tonooka, Yamakoshi, Sousa, & Matsuzawa, 2003; Bonnie, 
Horner, Whiten, & de Waal, 2007; Gruber et al., 2011; Whiten et al., 2007; Whiten et al., 2005; 
van Leeuwen 2014), with some evidence that chimpanzees may employ similar social learning 
mechanisms and heuristics which underlie human culture (Price et al., 2016; Whiten, 2017; 
Whiten et al., 2009).  These considerations strengthen the suggestion that the pattern of regional 
behavioural variants in wild chimpanzees is best explained by culture (Whiten et al., 1999). 
However, chimpanzee culture is not only quantifiably far more limited than our own, but it 
relatively simple in nature, with little evidence of knowledge, skill or technological accumulation 
(Henrich, 2015; Tennie et al., 2009). That being said, it is plausible that some behaviour 
exhibited by wild chimpanzees is the result of a cumulative process. For example, Boesch (2003) 
argues that nut cracking with the use of an anvil and stabilising stones is an elaboration on an 
ancestral hammering method.  Similarly, Sanz, Call and Morgan, (2009) argue that simple, 
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unmodified tools were the precursors of more complex tools with design features such as brush 
tips. Further, complex tool kits are also employed by wild chimpanzees involving the use of 
several, multi-functional tools in sequential order, indicative of some form of cumulative build 
up (Boesch, Head, & Robbins, 2009; Sanz, Schöning, & Morgan, 2010). However, there is a lack 
of direct evidence that modern chimpanzees’ forebears used any less elaborate methods than 
those seen today and thus this argument remains speculative (Dean, Vale, Laland, Flynn, & 
Kendal, 2013). Further, experiments attempting to look directly at the cumulative capabilities of 
chimpanzees have also not found promising evidence of such abilities (Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, 
Thierry, & Laland, 2012; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008). What is then constraining the 
evolution of chimpanzee culture? 
3.6 WHAT IS LIMITING CULTURAL EVOLUTION IN CHIMPANZEES? 
Section 1.2.4 provides something of an ultimate explanation as to why humans have 
cumulative culture: the choice undertaken in our evolutionary past to leave the familiarity of our 
ancient habitats, introducing the need to adapt to varied and novel environments. Unlike our 
own nomadic hominin ancestors, chimpanzees (and likely their own distinct ancestors) live in 
relatively stable environments, perhaps mitigating against the pressures needed for the expensive 
cognitive machinery underlying complex cultural evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Henrich 
& McElreath, 2003). However given that the beginning of cumulative culture in hominins may 
not have been due to changes in socio-cognitive capabilities per se (e.g. Pradhan et al., 2012) it 
may be that simple cumulative abilities were already within the socio-cognitive capacities of an 
ancestor shared with chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 2009). The question as to why chimpanzees 
have no or limited cumulative culture may, in this sense, be better addressed from a proximate 
perspective.   
Chimpanzees do possess some of the  ‘raw ingredients’ for cumulative culture, such as 
innovative capability (Nishida, Matsusaka, & McGrew, 2009; Reader & Laland, 2001), defined 
as “the discovery of novel information, the creation of new behaviour patterns, or the 
performance of established behavioural patterns in a novel context” (Reader & Laland, 2001, pg 
788; Arbilly & Laland, 2017 for a recent discussion); however, long term field studies of wild 
chimpanzees indicate that while innovation may be common, most behaviours fail to spread 
throughout the rest of the population (Nishida et al., 2009; Yamamoto, Yamakoshi, Humle, & 
Matsuzawa, 2008; but see Hobaiter et al., 2014). This may be linked to the understanding that 
although chimpanzees potentially possess relatively advanced social learning mechanisms 
(Fuhrmann, Ravignani, Marshall-Pescini, & Whiten, 2014; Hopper et al., 2007; Horner, Whiten, 
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Flynn, & de Waal, 2006), and adaptive biases for using social information (Van Leeuwen et al., 
2013), it is likely that they employ these under far more limited circumstances than humans, with 
less intrinsic motivation to engage in social learning on the whole (Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, 
Thierry, & Laland, 2012; Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello, 2014; Herrmann, Call, Hernández-
lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007; Horner & Whiten, 2005; can Leeuwen, Call, & Haun, 2014; 
Nishida et al., 2009; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2012; Tomasello et al., 1993). As such, the 
persuasiveness of the argument that chimpanzee culture is constrained by how they use social 
information is a powerful one. However, it is unlikely to be the whole story. 
I end this chapter by highlighting what may be an important consideration when 
examining the limitations of cultural evolution. Notwithstanding the constraining impact of other 
core-prerequisites on chimpanzee culture, with relatively limited social learning mechanisms and 
heuristics resulting in a lack of behavioural upgrading, cumulative culture ultimately requires the 
ability to change established behaviours in order to adopt more efficient or productive ones; that 
is, in order to upgrade solutions, an individual must possess the behavioural flexibility to 
relinquish, modify and build on prior solutions. Behavioural flexibility has been defined as “the 
continued interest in and acquisition of new solutions to a task, through either innovation or 
social learning, after already having mastered a previous solution” (Lehner, Burkart, & Schaik, 
2011, pg 447). Behavioural inflexibility (or conservatism) may therefore in and of itself limit the 
evolution of culture. For example, imagine an agent solves a problem using Solution A. However, 
there is a better, more optimal way to solve the same problem by using Solution B. Solution B 
may be a completely different solution, a variant of solution A, or may build upon solution A. 
Despite the availability of B, the agent continues to use A. We can form two principal hypotheses 
as to why this might be:  
Hypothesis 1: behavioural optimisation (use of Solution B) is hindered by having 
knowledge of a prior solution (A) i.e. behavioural inflexibility limits cultural evolution 
Hypothesis 2: behavioural optimisation (use of solution B) is hindered by some other 
factor that prevents learning of solution B, but not solution A i.e. another factor limits cultural 
evolution  
Within primatology, Hypothesis 2 is often adopted to explain why chimpanzees do not 
have cumulative culture. For example, when chimpanzees failed to relinquish a low-payoff 
solution in favour or a better one, Marshall-Pescini and Whiten (2008) suggested that 
chimpanzees did not build on Solution A because they were employing a copy-when-dissatisfied 
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social learning strategy. Similarly Dean et al. (2012) concluded that a lack of accumulation in 
chimpanzees was because of limited or absent socio-cognitive adaptations. While these accounts 
do have explanatory power, they also tend to be used in what is essentially a mediated relationship 
with behavioural inflexibility (Dean et al., 2013), overlooking that conservatism can be a cause in 
and of itself of sub-optimal behaviour (Hypothesis 1).  
In order to distinguish between these two hypotheses, there needs to be some baseline 
measure of what behaviours we would observe if an individual had no prior experience of 
Solution A. Say our experimental group is trained to use Solution A. In subsequent testing, the 
more optimal Solution B is open to innovation, or may be socially learnt, but the experimental 
group continue to use Solution A. Here, we can reasonably say this group has failed to optimise 
their behaviour. This could be explained by Hypothesis 1 or 2. However, if we have a control 
group, who are not initially trained on Solution A, but are exposed to the same testing conditions 
as our experimental group, then we can infer some effect of having a prior solution on behaviour 
(as this is the only manipulated variable). If our control group all converge on A, the control 
group and the experimental group will be indistinguishable from one another, and thus we cannot 
say there was an effect of having a prior Solution A. Instead, we must attribute behavioural 
conservatism as an outcome of another factor which is affecting the adoption of solution B, for 
example, lack of innovation or social learning abilities (Hypothesis 2 supported).   However, if 
our control group all converge on B, then we can conclude that there was an effect of prior 
solution A (Hypothesis 1 supported). 
Tasks or observations which measure chimpanzees’ ability to accumulate through 
modification, relinquishment or building upon prior solutions are essentially behavioural 
optimisation paradigms, which tap into cognitive and decision-making processes. By considering 
accumulation within the framework of “behavioural optimisation” and “decision-making”, there 
is huge potential for understanding why chimpanzees do not have cumulative culture by 
comparing them to another often conservative species: our own. 
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CHAPTER 2: BEHAVIOURAL FLEXIBILITY 
Behavioural flexibility has been defined as “the continued interest in and acquisition of 
new solutions to a task, through either innovation or social learning, after already having mastered 
a previous solution” (Lehner, Burkart, & Schaik, 2011, pg 447). In chapter 1 I proposed: -  
Hypothesis 1: behavioural optimisation (use of Solution B) is hindered by having 
knowledge of a prior solution (A) i.e. behavioural inflexibility limits cultural evolution 
Hypothesis 2: behavioural optimisation (use of solution B) is hindered by some other 
factor that prevents learning of Solution B, but not Solution A i.e. another factor limits cultural 
evolution  
 
 Given the clear adaptive advantage of behavioural flexibility in solution optimization, that 
is, convergence on the best available solution, it remains something of a mystery as to why any 
species would exhibit highly conservative tendencies. Strikingly though, inflexibility in action or 
thought is not at all unique to chimpanzees, and is well documented in various forms and in 
varied degrees in human children (e.g. Carr et al., 2015; Defeyter & German, 2003; Jordan & 
Morton, 2012; Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003; Zelazo, Müller, Frye, & Marcovitch, 2003), 
as well as in human adults (e.g. Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008a; Bilalić, McLeod & Gobet, 
2008b; Chrysikou et al., 2013; Diamond, 2005; German & Barrett, 2005; Gopnik, Griffiths, & 
Lucas, 2015; Luchins, 1942; Pope, Meguerditchian, Hopkins, & Fagot, 2015; Wiley, 1998). 
More often though, within the human literature, it is referred to as perseveration, functional 
fixedness or mental set (aka Einstellung). Notably, more distantly related species have at times 
shown greater flexibility in their behaviour than both chimpanzees (e.g. Huebner & Fichtel, 2015; 
Lehner et al., 2011), and humans (e.g. Pope et al., 2015; Vlamings et al., 2009).  
1. PERSEVERATION, FUNCTIONAL FIXEDNESS AND SET 
While I know of no formal distinction between different types of behavioural flexibility, 
I propose that perseveration, as used in development literature, and behavioural conservatism, 
as discussed within the non-human primate (hereafter primate) literature, draw close parallels 
with one another: both are linked to the continued use of outdated responses despite knowledge 
of a more appropriate alternative. Typically, studies with humans involve explicit instructions 
about the benefits of altering a response (or costs of maintaining the old one), whereas primate 
research often employs use of visual demonstrations. Functional fixedness, or mental set (also 
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referred to as cognitive set or Einstellung), may be more closely linked with innovation and 
creative thinking, specifically getting ‘stuck’ on the common usage of a tool or behaviour pattern, 
blocking solutions which would otherwise be easily generated (Defeyter & German, 2003); 
however this blockage should be overcome once knowledge of an alternative becomes available. 
The key distinction I draw is thus that cases of conservatism/perseveration involve information 
that a prior solution (A) is suboptimal, and there exists a specific solution (B), which is optimal. 
I will expand on these different types of flexibility below, and how we might relate this research 
to primate behaviour and cumulative culture. I will conclude that much research within the 
human literature indicates that behavioural conservatism, or perseveration with Solution A 
despite B, may be underlain by at least two determinants: availability of cognitive resources and 
heuristics guiding decisions. 
1.1 FUNCTIONAL FIXEDNESS AND SET 
 Functional fixedness refers to becoming stuck (‘fixated’) on one common use of an 
artefact or tool. This fixedness blocks the creative thinking needed to innovate a new way of using 
the artefact, which without prior knowledge of function, would be easily discovered (Knoblich, 
Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001). Defeyter and German (2003) noted that this emerged during 
development in children (around age six), and was linked to children’s maturing ability to 
conceive of objects as having a design. Cross cultural evidence suggests this ‘design stance’ may 
reliably emerge in humans, with evidence of functional fixedness in ‘technologically sparse’ 
cultures (German & Barrett, 2005; Margolis, Laurence, & Barrett, 2008). While usually this 
reliance on function may be adaptive when solving problems for which the artefact is relevant (cf 
DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008), when faced with situations where novel uses of an artefact must be 
generated, it can become a hindrance.  
Interestingly, functional fixedness may not be unique to humans: Hanus, Mendes, 
Tennie and Call (2011) found evidence for functional fixedness in chimpanzees. When first 
faced with the floating peanut task (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2010), chimpanzees failed to 
solve the task despite the availability of water from their drinking source. Oddly though, when 
presented with the task again, but this time provisioned with a new water source (i.e. one not 
previously associated with another function, such as drinking), some chimpanzees were able to 
solve the task. The authors suggest that prior knowledge of function (i.e. “this is for drinking”) 
blocked the creative thinking needed to solve the task, which otherwise would have been solvable. 
It should be noted that only five out of the 24 chimpanzees tested were able to solve this task 
even when the new waterer dispenser was available, indicating that regardless of fixedness, the 
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task itself may have been rather difficult. This finding of fixedness is somewhat mirrored in the 
wild, where Gruber, Muller, & Reynolds (2011) found chimpanzees unfamiliar with using sticks 
for ‘dipping’ were unable to innovate this foraging strategy to dip for honey. In contrast, 
chimpanzees who were already adept at dipping with stick tools solved the problem readily. It 
was argued that chimpanzees’ cultural knowledge shaped their foraging behaviour. This could 
tentatively support the hypothesis that functional fixedness is phylogenetically endowed in some 
form from a common ancestor, who may have also used tools and benefitted from this adaptation 
in some way.  
Functional fixedness draws parallels with another type of fixedness, often referred to as 
‘set’ or less commonly, ‘Einstellung’. Here, knowledge of a prior solution (not necessarily of a 
prior function of a tool or artefact), prevents the creative thinking required to generate alternative 
solutions. Luchins (1942) originally studied this using a water jug task, where participants (adult 
humans) had to use three different sized water jugs to obtain a specific quantity of water. Having 
been previously exposed to a complex strategy for solution, participants rigidly stuck to this, as 
opposed to adopting a relatively simple alternative solution. Although Luchins (1942) originally 
reported that extensive practice does not contribute to the inability to flexibly think of new 
solutions, Crooks and McNeil (2009) found evidence to the contrary, with a correlation between 
response practice and flexible responding. Similarly, prior knowledge has been found to stall or 
delay convergence on the best game solution in chess experts (Britton & Tesser, 1982; Wiley, 
1998), who become stuck on a local optimum. This curtails exploration of the problem space 
(see also Selman, Kautz & Cohen, 1994 for related discussions in artificial intelligence). Novices 
on the other hand, are able to outperform experts when global optima are easily found.  
1.2 PERSEVERATION 
Perseveration is a term widely used within the developmental literature, often referring 
to young children who having learnt one method of solving a task (Solution A), are encouraged 
or instructed to use another method (Solution B), but yet persevere with their initial solution (A). 
This mirrors the general methodology used when investigating cumulative abilities in apes (e.g. 
Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008), with the exception that primates are necessarily provided with 
information of the alternative solution through visual demonstrations.  
Tasks commonly employed to study perseveration are the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task 
(WCST), the dimensional change card sort task (DCCS), and Go/No-go. In DCCS, children are 
first asked to sort cards using a rule such as “sort cards by colour” (Solution A), then later asked 
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to sort the cards along another dimensions, such as “sort cards by shape” (Solution B). When 
the participant fails to relinquish Solution A, and switch to using the appropriate Solution B, they 
are classed as perseverating. Importantly, this is not because perseverators cannot learn solution 
B. In fact, when asked what the new sorting rule is, perseverators can correctly identify it 
immediately before proceeding to sort cards incorrectly. This finding is robust when 
counterbalancing for solution presentation. This strongly suggests that Hypothesis 2 cannot 
account for perseveration with solution B in these instances; rather there appears to be an effect 
of having a prior solution to the task (Hypothesis 1). Most telling though is that perseveration is 
associated with age. Quite robustly, three year olds perseverate with their old solution A, but five 
year olds are typically successful in switching to using solution B (Carlson, 2005; Zelazo, 2006; 
Zelazo et al., 2003). This is mirrored in another task designed to measure perseveration: Go/No-
go. Here, individuals learn to respond to stimuli presented on a screen (go trials). On a minority 
of trials, generally after a string of go trials, a stimulus is presented which indicates that a response 
should be withheld (no go). Again, children commit more perseverative errors on this task than 
adults do (e.g. Cragg & Nation, 2008). It is this developmental trajectory that strongly indicates 
that perseveration is underlain by limited cognitive resources in key executive functions 
(Diamond, 2013). 
2.   BEHAVIOURAL FLEXIBILITY AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS 
Executive functions are “a set of general-purpose control mechanisms, often linked to 
the prefrontal cortex of the brain, that regulate the dynamics of human cognition and action” 
(Miyake & Friedman, 2012, pg 2). Changing behaviour is a multi-faceted cognitive process 
dependent on these functions, requiring attention to appropriate extrinsic or intrinsic cues 
indicating a change is required, the inhibition of the now outdated or inappropriate response, 
and the ability to switch from the old to the new response, which must be held in working 
memory; that is, information held in mind (For a review see Bari & Robbins, 2013; Diamond, 
2013). While there is some disagreement concerning both the nature and distinctiveness of 
executive functions, commonly identified components within the literature include inhibition, 
working memory and switching (definitions are from Diamond, 2013, pg137): 
Inhibition: “involves being able to control one’s attention, behaviour, thoughts, and/or emotions 
to override a strong internal predisposition or external lure, and instead do what’s more 
appropriate or needed”  
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Working memory: “holding information in mind and mentally working with it (e.g., relating one 
thing to another, using information to solve a problem)”  
Switching/shifting: “changing perspectives or approaches to a problem, flexibly adjusting to new 
demands, rules, or priorities (as in switching between tasks)”  
 Tasks such as the WCST and DCCS tap into several executive function components, 
making it somewhat difficult to disentangle which components are underlying perseveration (e.g. 
Nigg, 2000). Importantly however, from this executive function perspective of behavioural 
flexibility, we expect flexibility of response to be affected through two mechanisms: response 
prepotency, and working memory load; respectively, the extent to which behaviour has been 
practiced, and the complexity of the behaviour involved (Grandjean & Collette, 2011; Roberts, 
Hager, & Heron, 1994; Roberts & Pennington, 1996). Extensive practice with behaviour is 
thought to cause it to become a predominant or prepotent response, that is “reflexive actions, 
either innate or well established through a great deal of experience” (Miller, 2000), making it 
more difficult for this behaviour to be subsequently relinquished through inhibitory processes 
(e.g. Crooks & Mcneil, 2009).  Research also highlights how increased taxation or load on 
working memory affects the ability to adopt solutions (Beilock & Decaro, 2007; See also 
Gathercole et al., 2008). Crucially, not only might these two factors affect behavioural flexibility, 
but they may share some neural and cognitive resources (Barber, Caffo, Pekar & Mostofsky, 
2013; Bunge, Ochsner, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 2001; Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 
2009 (for a review); Hester, Murphy, & Garavan, 2004; McNab et al., 2008; Mostofsky et al., 
2003); for example, it has been found that working memory load (linked to complexity of task) 
is associated with differential effects on inhibition, with increased load on working memory 
associated with greater difficulties in successfully inhibiting behaviours or adopting alternatives 
(Berger, 2004, 2010; Boudreau, 2000; Chmielewski, Mückschel, Stock, & Beste, 2015; Conway, 
Cowan, & Bunting, 2001; Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006; Grandjean & Collette, 
2011; Hester & Garavan, 2005; Roberts et al., 1994; Stahl & Pry, 2005; Stedron, Sahni, & 
Munakata, 2005; see also Kane & Engle, 2003; Marton, Kelmenson, & Pinkhasova, 2008; 
Redick, Calvo, Gay, & Engle, 2011). Taken together, these studies indicate that the more 
complex the behaviours involved, the greater the difficulty in relinquishing an established 
response and adopting another, especially if an existing response is highly prepotent  (Houghton 
and Tipper, 1994; Munakata, 2001). Importantly, this research strongly suggests that behavioural 
flexibility is a function of cognitive resource availability: perseveration is underlain by limited 
Chapter 2    28 
 
 
cognitive resources in key executive functions, with high demands on working memory likely 
detracting from the resources needed for inhibition. 
This ties in with a long running debate about how separable some executive functions are 
(Collette et al., 2005; Herd et al., 2014; Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Munakata 
et al., 2011), and whether inhibition reflects a separable component of executive function, or 
whether inhibitory failures are a result of limited working memory. This can be roughly 
summarised as whether inhibition involves the active suppression of irrelevant information (i.e. 
an inhibition mechanism) versus the amplification of relevant information in working memory 
(i.e. inhibition as an expression of working memory) (see Bari & Robbins, 2013; Best & Miller, 
2010 for reviews). For example, Miyake and Friedman (2012) examined inhibition, working 
memory and switching on a series of nine tasks which are thought to tap into each of these. These 
authors found that variability in tasks was underlain by three components: ‘Common EF’, 
‘Updating-Specific’, and ‘Shifting-Specific’. Here, there is no specific component unique to 
inhibition. Note that while perseveration is most often associated with inhibition problems (either 
through poor suppression or amplification of information), the lack of creative problem solving 
inherent to set and fixedness is more closely linked to the shifting, or task-switching, component 
of executive functions (Diamond, 2013). 
2.1 WHAT DO WE MEAN BY LIMITED COGNITIVE RESOURCES? 
 Allocation of resources, or top-down governing of executive functions, is generally 
referred to as cognitive control, which encompasses the processes and mechanisms underlying 
the assessment of the problem environment, the extraction, retrieval and inhibition of 
information, and ultimately the behaviour required to achieve goals  (Botvinick & Cohen, 2014).  
Due to its unique patterns of connectivity with many key regions of the brain, the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) is thought to have “the ideal infrastructure for synthesising the diverse range of 
information needed for complex behaviour” (Miller, 2000, pg 59) and is ultimately seen as being 
at the centre of cognitive control. Allocation of resources to executive functions comes 
increasingly under PFC guidance with age (Best & Miller, 2010; Braet et al., 2009; Thompson-
schill, Ramscar, & Chrysikou, 2009), with PFC maturation linked to both increases in working 
memory capacity and inhibition (Diamond & Doar 1989). For example, Thomason-schill et al. 
(2009), found adolescents were poorer at maintaining large volumes of information in working 
memory than adults, and that this correlated with less neural activity in key regions associated 
with working memory. Similarly, Braet et al. (2009) found key neural differences between adults 
and adolescents on a response inhibition task, with adults showing not only less errors, but 
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comparatively greater activity in frontal regions (see also Bunge, Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya, 
& Gabrieli, 2002). Taken together, much of this research suggests that children have less cognitive 
control than older adults, with differential patterns of neural activity, especially in the PFC (Baird 
et al., 2002; Bell, Wolfe & Adkins, 2007). 
Interestingly, increased cognitive control is likely associated with a reduced ability to 
generate novel ideas to problems. For example, Chrysikou et al. (2013) while asking adult 
participants to state aloud uncommon uses of artefacts, used inhibitory transcranial direct current 
stimulation over the PFC to disrupt neural activity. Those with diminished PFC activity (and thus 
cognitive control) were better at generating novel uses, displaying less functional fixedness than 
those with fully functional PFCs. This fits well with the developmental trajectory of functional 
fixedness (Defeyter & German, 2003) and set (Pope et al., 2015), with increasing cognitive control 
likely responsible for directing problem solving strategies through reliance on prior knowledge 
(see also Mölle, Marshall, Wolf, Fehm, & Born, 1999; Reverberi, Toraldo, D’agostini, & Skrap, 
2005). This delayed maturation of cognitive control may be a highly adaptive strategy, allowing 
for flexible learning (Gopnik et al., 2015; Thompson-schill et al., 2009); for example statistical 
learning, that is extracting information from the environment or detecting patterns, although 
typically inefficient, may allow fluid thought and the flexible acquisition of extensive bodies of 
knowledge, such as is required for language (Romberg & Saffran, 2010). In line with this trade-
off between increased cognitive control and flexible learning, Doll, Hutchison, & Frank (2011) 
found human adults were overly influenced by prior instructions about the reward contingencies 
of a task, and would have performed better had they evaluated the outcome of their solutions 
without these biases. Importantly, evidence suggested the PFC likely guided learning through a 
confirmation bias, such that decisions were not made by overriding accurate encoded 
information, but by the disproportionate encoding of information that accorded with their prior 
beliefs.  
2.2 EXECUTIVE FUNCTION IN CHIMPANZEES 
Executive functions have also been proposed to underlie performance in chimpanzees 
on behavioural change tasks. For example, Vlamings et al. (2009) highlight how problems in 
inhibiting a behaviour, as opposed to any lack of conceptual understanding, may be reflected in 
poor task performance (see also Call, 2001). Importantly, a similar effect of cognitive load on 
inhibition processes as seen in children may also be observed in chimpanzees. Specifically, Seed, 
Call, Emery, & Clayton (2009) found that chimpanzees performed worse on a trap task, where 
participants had to avoid moving (and losing) food over a trap, when they were required to use a 
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tool to manipulate the apparatus as opposed to their hands. Seed et al. concluded this was most 
likely due to the need to hold additional relationships in mind when navigating the task with a 
tool. This indicates that, like humans, cognitive load may affect problem solving ability in 
chimpanzees (cf Seed, Seddon, Greene, & Call, 2012).  
Further supporting the differential effects of load on chimpanzee behaviour are studies 
which have found a correlation with flexibility and cognitive resource availability. For example, 
Manrique and Call (2015) tested how quickly chimpanzees could switch from pushing a handle 
in the opposite direction to that which they had been previously trained. The initial directional 
response was likely highly prepotent (trained to a criterion of 100 slides), but both A and B 
solutions were simple, with low demands on cognitive resources (Manrique et al., 2015). While 
all but three of the 23 chimpanzees were able to successfully switch direction, both older and 
younger chimpanzees were slower to do so than chimpanzees aged between 9-25 years. 
Importantly, the authors counterbalanced which side chimpanzees were initially trained on, 
which indicates that having a prior solution impacted on behavioural optimisation (Hypothesis 
1). The authors highlight how inhibitory control, as in humans (e.g. Bélanger & Belleville, 2009), 
may be compromised for both older and younger chimpanzees.  
Inhibition has been directly measured in chimpanzees using an A not B paradigm, where 
chimpanzees first learn to reach toward location A, before having to inhibit this response and 
instead reach toward location B. Although chimpanzees have been reported as having excellent 
inhibitory control, reaching ceiling levels of performance on A not B (Amici, Aureli, & Call, 
2008; Barth & Call, 2006; MacLean et al., 2014), the paradigm used (A not B) may not have 
adequately established solution A as being a prepotent solution. I suggest this weakens what we 
can say about inhibitory control from these studies and I address this issue in depth in Chapter 
4. Another aspect of inhibition may come under the rubric of ‘Self-control’. Overall, 
chimpanzees do not always perform well on tasks measuring self-control through delayed 
gratification, where participants must inhibit reaching for a reward to accumulate greater rewards 
(Beran et al., 2014). However, whether this measures inhibitory control per se, as opposed to 
some other variable, such as motivation (Padmala & Pessoa, 2010) or intertemporal choice, is 
unclear (Beran, 2015). 
3.   BEHAVIOURAL FLEXIBILITY IN CHIMPANZEES 
 Not-withstanding these studies, despite chimpanzees being our closest living relative, 
human models of executive function and cognitive control are not typically applied to explain 
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suboptimal performance (that is, the continued use of a lower payoff, or less efficient behaviour 
despite the availability of a better solution) in the highly intelligent chimpanzee. For the 
remainder of this chapter, I will review the literature on behavioural flexibility in chimpanzees. 
Throughout, I will place each study in the context of Hypotheses 1 and 2, and will conclude that 
very little research has included adequate controls for distinguishing between these. I will suggest 
that the degree of behavioural flexibility in chimpanzees is related to the nature of the solutions 
under investigation, which provides indirect support for Hypothesis 1. By drawing on literature 
investigating decision-making and cognitive control in humans, I will argue that we can better 
understand the context of behavioural flexibility by considering the underlying proximate 
mechanisms governing solution choice.  
As a small caveat, I would like to mention that I focus only on studies where Solution B 
involves a more efficient or productive outcome in terms of food reward than Solution A. A 
distinction perhaps needs to be drawn between these investigations, and those which focus on 
behavioural change when Solution A and B are equally optimal in (food) outcome, but may vary 
along another dimension, such as potential social payoffs. For example van Leeuwen, Cronin, 
Schütte, Call, & Haun (2013, study 1a and 1b) and Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello (2014), cite 
behavioural conservatism as a potential reason as to why chimpanzees stuck to Solution A despite 
conspecifics employing solution B; however, in these studies there was no incentive to change 
behaviours other than for social reasons. Whilst such work shows important comparative 
differences in the use of social information, whether we would say chimpanzees are acting 
conservatively may depend on how we define conservative behaviour. To me conservatism 
suggests some sub-optimality in solution choice, not necessarily sticking to one solution; after all, 
if an agent has found the optimum solution, it would be optimal to stick and suboptimal to 
change. Given this, in my thesis I define conservatism as “a reluctance to give up a well-grasped 
technique, even if a more efficient one is available and the individual knows it is available, and 
even after the mastered technique is made ineffective” (Hrubesch, Preuschoft, & van Schaik, 
2009, pg 216). However, to others conservatism may show closer ties to a preference for a first 
learned solution; for example a criticism of Whiten, Horner and de Waal (2005; as well as 
Hopper, Schapiro, Lambeth, & Brosnan, 2011), who found that chimpanzees  who discovered 
an equally optimum Solution B, reverted back to Solution A. This reversion was originally 
suggested to reflect conformity to a group norm (Solution A), but was later argued to potentially 
reflect a preference for a first learned technique (Solution A). How or why such a preference 
would exist is something of a puzzle. If an agent has abandoned solution A, and invested in 
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mastering Solution B, this agent has already demonstrated relatively low levels of behavioural 
conservatism, and arguably a relatively low level of attachment to A as a solution. More 
investigation would be needed to say why there is a natural preference for A if B has also been 
mastered, and should focus on ease of use, how many times and how long both A and B have 
been practiced, and if Solution A is being primed through social demonstrations that precede A.  
3.1 BEHAVIOURAL INFLEXIBILITY  
In one of the first experiments to look directly at chimpanzees’ cumulative culture 
capabilities, Marshall-Pescini and Whiten (2008) found that young chimpanzees failed to 
cumulatively build upon the successful but simple techniques they initially learned through 
observation. Five chimpanzees between the ages of 3 and 8 years first witnessed (from a human 
demonstrator) then practiced a probing foraging technique (Figure 1). Following mastery of this 
solution (median of almost 90 dipping solutions used across 4 days of training), participants 
witnessed a more productive technique; however despite 180 demonstrations of this more 
productive solution, all but one chimpanzee displaying marked behavioural inflexibility, 
persevering  with their established sub-optimal foraging technique over subsequent testing. Of 
note is that the one participant who did build on their behaviour had independently discovered 
the probing technique during a baseline control condition. Thus it appeared that although the 
more productive solution was within the innovative capabilities of at least some chimpanzees, 
having knowledge and/or experience of a suboptimal prior solution hindered behavioural 
optimisation. It was suggested that this inflexibility may be underlain by a copy-when-dissatisfied 
social learning heuristic (Laland, 2004; Schlag, 1998): as long as chimpanzees are gaining some 
payoff (and are thus not dissatisfied), they are unlikely to use social information despite potential 
gains in payoff (Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008). In contrast, had chimpanzees been employing 
a copy-when-better strategy, they would have been able to successfully build on their solutions, 
as is likely necessary for cumulative culture (Laland, 2004; Mesoudi, 2011). This suggests that 
behavioural inflexibility is an outcome of a suboptimal social learning heuristic, and not it and of 
itself a limiting factor on cultural evolution. However, as chimpanzees were not exposed to the 
same conditions during baseline as they were during the testing period (i.e. exposed to social 
demonstrations of Solution B both with and without prior Solution A; see section 1.3.4), we 
cannot easily distinguish between Hypothesis 1 or 2.  
As discussed in section 2.2, I also highlight here two important methodological 
considerations in Marshall-Pescini and Whiten’s study: solution prepotency, and solution 
complexity. Regarding complexity, there is no unitary concept of what makes one behaviour 
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complex and another simple, but I propose two metrics for which we might reasonably assume 
complexity. The first concerns the learning of new behavioural processes; for example, 
individuals familiar with simple mechanics, such as levers, or sliding doors, do not need to relearn 
how to pull or slide when confronted with novel problems requiring these responses. They must 
only learn the particular affordances of the new problem and then apply known behaviours 
(Byrne & Russon, 1998). In contrast, solutions which require novel action elements must be 
learnt through some form of process learning. Therefore, I class simple behaviours as those 
which are already well within the capabilities of the participants, and easily discovered by novices. 
Second, we might assume behaviours which require holding in memory several relations (or 
sources of variation) between objects, such as solutions involving multiple, non-arbitrary steps 
(i.e. steps which are not incidental to the task, such as walking to the apparatus, but which are 
deliberate manipulations), are more complex than behaviours which require fewer steps, and 
place higher demands on cognitive resources (Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998). I thus consider 
solutions which are not easily adopted by novices, and which require relatively long periods of 
learning before mastery, as relatively complex. While in reality solutions sit along a continuum 
of complexity, this dichotomy between simple and complex is a useful heuristic for facilitating a 
first attempt to look deeper into the underlying cognition of conservatism. 
While there is no benchmark I know of to say with certainty a response is a prepotent 
one, given the extensive practice chimpanzees in Marshall-Pescini and Whiten had with the 
dipping solution (median of almost 90 trials), it seems reasonable to assume that here Solution 
A was a highly prepotent response. It may also be reasonable to assume that the both Solution 
A and B were relatively complex. The dipping solution (A) was only discovered by two 
individuals (from 11) in a baseline control, and the probing solution (B) found only by one of 
these same individuals. Additionally, to better reflect cumulative culture, Solution B was 
methodologically designed to be more complex than the first learned dipping technique, 
involving additive, non-arbitrary steps for success. Overall, these results show that chimpanzees 
perseverated with a prepotent and complex Solution A in lieu of adopting a more optimal, 
complex alternative Solution B (Table 1). 
Hrubesch et al. (2009) likewise found evidence of behavioural inflexibility in 
chimpanzees on a tool based foraging task. Hrubesch et al. (2009) found that once chimpanzees 
had mastered one foraging technique (A), they failed to relinquish this solution in favour of a 
socially demonstrated more efficient alternative (B). In this instance, Solution B behaviour did 
not require building upon Solution A, but rather relinquishing it entirely, and was well within a 
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chimpanzee’s behavioural repertoire. Here, 13 chimpanzees were presented with tools to rake 
food towards them from a tray attached to the outside of their enclosures; however, some 
participants quickly realised that shaking the tray allowed them to acquire the food much more 
efficiently. Although 10 individuals initially employed the ‘raking’ method, most participants used 
this ‘rattle’ method. Overall, there were six generalists, who flexibly switched between both 
methods; there were three rattle specialists, and four raking specialists. As the authors had 
intended this to be a tool based foraging task, to prevent rattling, the tray was subsequently 
chained, disabling use of the rattle method. Despite raking being well within the repertoires of 
chimpanzees, the three rattle specialists were unable to flexibly switch to an alternative method; 
thus, so extreme was the behavioural inflexibility observed that even when an old technique 
became completely redundant (i.e. produced no reward), three chimpanzees perseverated in 
their obsolete behaviours rather than adopt an alternative solution. Given that chimpanzees 
persevered with their redundant technique without reward, the behavioural conservatism seen 
here is not easily explained by a ‘copy-if-dissatisfied’ social learning rule. Additionally, as the 
alternative solutions were within the behavioural repertoire of chimpanzees, it is unlikely that 
chimpanzees failed to upgrade their behaviours due to any deficiency in their ability to learn this 
behaviour. It is worth noting however that those who were rattle experts (all adult males) may 
have been less inclined towards raking in the first place as most other participants (N = 10) 
demonstrated an affinity for raking by using it either exclusively or concurrently with rattling. 
Indeed, the acknowledgement that there were six subjects who switched between raking and 
rattling suggests some behavioural flexibility.  
Overall, proficiency or mastery of one technique (rattling or raking) was found to 
negatively correlate with the use of the alternative technique. Thus the title of the paper “Skill 
mastery inhibits adoption of observed alternative solutions among chimpanzees”. However, as 
the authors note, the skill mastery of rattling between generalists and specialists was not 
significantly different. Additionally the proclivity to only rattle may actually be a result of being 
an adult male chimpanzee. Given this, I would suggest the finding of most interest in this paper 
concerns the raking specialists: despite rattling being more efficient in the first phase of the 
experiment (i.e. before the tray was chained), three individuals chose to exclusively rake. These 
three individuals became experts in raking, exceeding the raking productivity of the generalists. 
Thus we might consider skill mastery to be linked to behavioural conservatism only for the raking 
specialists, who persevered with a suboptimal Solution A despite the availability of a more 
efficient Solution B. While there is no baseline condition in this group, given the behaviours of 
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other group members, and the ease of rattling (evidenced through ready innovation and lack of 
variation in proficiency between participants), evidence could potentially support a Hypothesis 1 
interpretation of a failure to optimise behaviour: behavioural optimisation is hindered by having 
a prior solution. However, given that the rakers continued to accrue rewards, we also cannot rule 
out that they may have been following a copy-when-dissatisfied social learning strategy (cf Laland, 
2004; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008).  
Are these behaviours prepotent and complex? I would propose that we consider raking 
here to be a prepotent response, given both prior experience with this technique by these 
chimpanzees (as reported in Hrubesch et al.), as well as continued use over ten hours of testing 
(data were analysed at the end of testing, with no reports of when skill mastery was achieved). I 
would also suggest that the variation in success rates when using raking may indicate it was a 
reasonably complex method. This is supported by Seed et al. (2009), who found tool use placed 
a high demand on chimpanzees’ cognitive resources likely caused by having to co-ordinate tool 
use with the requirements of the task. Notably, unlike Marshall-Pescini and Whiten (2008), the 
alternative Solution B (rattle) for these conservative rakers was relatively simple. In contrast, the 
generalists, who were not as proficient as rakers, showed little conservatism. Importantly the lack 
of proficiency in raking suggests generalists had not mastered the complex nature of raking. 
Finally, we cannot argue that raking was a prepotent response for generalists, by way of their 
being generalists. I summarise these results and implications in Table 1. 
Price, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Whiten (2009) also found evidence of contextual flexibility: 
chimpanzees who acquired a complex foraging technique through personal innovation displayed 
a greater degree of behavioural conservatism than those who acquired the same technique 
through social learning. Specifically, captive chimpanzees who had watched video 
demonstrations of conspecifics constructing a raking tool perseverated (as measured by a 
combinatory score) with this combined tool as a means to access a reward (Solution A), despite 
the availability of a more efficient method (Solution B) in subsequent testing sessions. In contrast, 
those who had innovated Solution A were not seen to perseverate in testing. The authors 
conclude that social learning, but not independent innovation of a solution, may result in the 
persistent use of this solution even at the cost of efficiency.  It should be noted however that Price 
et al. considered (in statistical analysis at least) individuals who had been exposed to enough 
information to allow emulative social learning to not have socially learnt the solution. 
Reassignment of this group to the rubric of social learning is unlikely to result in any significant 
differences in the behaviour of socially and asocially acquired solutions. The method of analyses 
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used by Price et al. also perhaps makes interpretation of these results difficult: individuals were 
assigned a combinatory score on a scale from 0-14, meaning that combinations (the measure of 
perseveration) were scored relatively, and not absolutely.  Due to these considerations, I find it 
difficult to say whether chimpanzees displayed behavioural conservatism, and whether results 
can distinguish between Hypothesis 1 and 2. 
 In a follow up study to Price et al. (2009), Vale et al. (2016) found that although after 
three years individuals pooled from Price et al.’s subjects were still displaying some conservative 
behaviours on an opaque transfer task (as ranked on the same combinatory scale as the original 
Price et al. study), they switched to Solution B on an identical transparent transfer task. This 
suggests that having a causal understanding of a paradigm afforded flexible responding (Horner 
& Whiten, 2005). Relatedly, transparency may also reduce the need to hold in mind opaque 
associations (i.e. knowing that a particular action has an outcome, but not knowing how that 
action produces the outcome) needed to successfully complete the task, thus reducing task 
complexity. It may also allow for an assessment of the effectiveness of a behaviour, providing 
feedback which reinforces or extinguishes the solution (Völter & Call, 2012).   
Another study which has suggested elements of conservatism is Bonnie et al. (2012). 
Here, captive chimpanzees were faced with an artificial termite mound, from which they could 
fish for food rewards in holes. Despite depleting a number a holes, chimpanzees continued to 
return to these locations and attempt to forage. While this does suggest some conservatism with 
continual use of a suboptimal Solution A despite redundancy, it might be reasonable to assume 
that returning to sites that previously yielded rewards may be quite adaptive (Ban, Boesch, & 
Janmaat, 2014). Chimpanzees were also able to flexibly switch between foraging locations, 
suggesting that they were perhaps not displaying high levels of conservatism. While Bonnie et al., 
cannot disambiguate the cause of potential conservatism here, they give a considered discussion 
spanning both Hypothesis 1 and 2 explanations for their results.  
Lastly, findings of behavioural conservatism were somewhat mirrored by Dean, Kendal, 
Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland (2012) using an open diffusion paradigm (which looks at the spread 
of a behaviour seeded by one individual through a population of conspecifics and is thought to 
better simulate the spread of behaviours in a culturally relevant context (Whiten, Caldwell, & 
Mesoudi, 2016; Whiten & Flynn, 2010; Whiten & Mesoudi, 2008). It was found that whilst 
children would readily build upon their behaviours (although over 40% of children did not show 
evidence of accumulation on this task), chimpanzees would not upgrade to observed alternatives 
(Solution B) despite potential gains in productivity. The authors concluded that the ability to 
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build on behaviour was correlated with key socio-cognitive capacities, including prosociality, 
teaching, communication and observational learning. However we should consider that floor 
effects in both accumulation and some socio-cognitive measures in chimpanzees make this claim 
somewhat tenuous. Ultimately, whether this finding is driven by inter-species variation, or solely 
the intra-species variation within children is unclear. Here, again we see that behavioural 
inflexibility is suggested to be an outcome of what is considered to be the actual limiting factor 
on cultural evolution (these socio-cognitive adaptations), supporting Hypothesis 2. Dean et al. 
concluded that behavioural conservatism could not explain the lack of accumulation seen here 
as chimpanzees continued to manipulate and explore the puzzlebox (unsuccessfully) after reward 
extraction. While Dean et al. did not provide appropriate baseline conditions to disambiguate 
Hypothesis 1 or 2, I would be inclined to agree that conservatism here may be an outcome of 
another limiting factor: namely, the suitability of this puzzlebox. 
Dean et al. (2012) looked at chimpanzees’ ratcheting potential using a paradigm, which 
although it had a simple initial Solution A (which was practiced over 30 hours before social 
information regarding Solution B was made available, thus likely resulting in high prepotency), 
the alternative, cumulative Solution B involved rather complex elements, such as dial turning and 
sequential actions requiring coordinated manipulations with both hands. These behaviours may 
be relatively simple to a child, who through their already extensive enculturation at 3-5 years of 
age have likely gained much experience with such mechanisms as dials and buttons; however, to 
a chimpanzee, some elements may have been outside of most individual’s repertoires, requiring 
extensive training to master as a stand-alone behaviour, let alone a behaviour that must be 
combined in a causally opaque fashion with other elements in a complex sequence. Thus, I 
would conclude that it is likely chimpanzees displayed inflexibility because they could not learn 
the alternative solutions (Hypothesis 2), but without appropriate baselines, this remains 
speculative.  
Whilst there is certainly a place for complex and opaque behaviours in the comparative 
study of human culture (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; Tennie et al., 2012), by using tasks 
which require species atypical behaviours, such as dial turning, we may be underestimating 
chimpanzee potential for simple cumulative culture, the starting point for true cultural evolution 
(Enquist, Ghirlanda, & Eriksson, 2011; Pradhan, Tennie, & van Schaik, 2012). However, using 
behaviours that can be easily mastered by most individuals may hinder the extent to which we 
can extrapolate to cultural accumulation, given that cumulative culture is the building upon of 
socially acquired cultural variants that are presumably outwith the innovative capabilities of most 
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individuals (Tennie et al., 2009; Whiten et al., 2009). Interestingly though, it is these latter studies, 
those involving relatively simple solutions, which have produced the most evidence of 
behavioural flexibility in chimpanzees. 
3.2 BEHAVIOURAL FLEXIBILITY 
When solutions involve simple behaviours, chimpanzees have been found to modify 
their behaviours to improve productivity and efficiency. For example, Hopper, Kurtycz, Ross, & 
Bonnie (2015), Van Leeuwen et al. (2013) and Vale, Flynn, Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro, Kendal 
(in prep) found that chimpanzees in token deposit and token exchange tasks flexibly switched 
between solutions to maximise payoff. However, it is worth noting here that in these studies, the 
original solutions (A) and the new, more productive solutions (B) were conceptually very similar 
- both involved the same behaviours of Solution A, with the exception of changing the type of 
token exchanged or the location the token was exchanged.  This may, in part, explain the 
discrepancy with some of the work reviewed (Section 2.3.1), where the original behaviours (A) 
differed conceptually from the alternative more productive behaviours (B). As Yamamoto, 
Humle and Tanaka (2013) and van Leeuwen et al. (2013) highlight, behaviours might be easier 
to modify when alternatives are similar in “perceptuo-motor or cognitive complexity” 
(Yamamoto et al., 2013, pg 3).  
A closer look at the results of these studies may also raise some further considerations. 
Although van Leeuwen et al. found some modification of behaviour, this was only observed in 
three of the six chimpanzees studied; thus there is evidence here for both flexibility and 
inflexibility. In the Vale et al. study, while chimpanzees did eventually relinquish use of one token 
type to adopt another, in the critical test condition chimpanzees initially responded at random. 
This random responding makes it difficult to tell how well chimpanzees categorized tokens into 
different types, and further if they had formed an association between token type and differential 
payoffs. Further, Vale et al. did not find key significant differences between critical groups which 
would convincingly suggest that social information of an alternative solution with a higher payoff 
affected participant behaviour. In terms of disambiguating between Hypotheses 1 and 2, neither 
van Leeuwen et al., Hopper et al. nor Vale et al. provided adequate controls to do so, with no 
comparison within the same testing conditions of responses between those with and without prior 
training on Solution A. Further, while Hopper et al. did provide evidence for pay-off motivated 
behavioural change, van Leeuwen et al. did not run the necessary control groups to show that 
chimpanzees modified their behaviour to increase payoff. Instead, this was inferred from three 
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individuals who eventually started using Solution B during a condition which had differential 
payoffs. This change may have been underlain by a motivation to increase payoffs, or may have 
been due to prolonged exposure to the paradigm, which could have potentially seen similar 
response change regardless of payoff (cf van Leeuwen & Call, 2016). Indeed, Whiten et al. (2005) 
found chimpanzees modified their behaviours during long exposures, with little incentive to do 
so. Further, neither Hopper et al. nor van Leeuwen et al. showed a convincing effect of social 
information on behavioural change (nor did they claim such an effect).   
In summary (Table 1), these token tasks all start with an initial simple Solution A, which 
is well-practiced and likely highly prepotent: for example, van Leeuwen et al. trained 
chimpanzees to a criterion of 30 uses of Solution A, and further gave them another 10 hours 
over which to use A in a group setting (Study 1b). The alternative Solution B is a variant of 
Solution A, and so is also simple. Taken together, these studies suggest chimpanzees are not 
entirely rigid in their behaviour, but results are quite mixed, hinting both at flexibility and 
conservatism. This may be due to possible confounding variables, such as assumed categorization 
of tokens into types, as well unclarified effects of social information and payoff.   
Further evidence for behavioural flexibility regarding increasing efficiency in 
chimpanzees has been found by Yamamoto et al. (2013). Here, nine captive chimpanzees were 
provided with straws which could be used to access juice. Four participants independently 
innovated a straw sucking technique whilst five used the less efficient straw dipping technique.  
The dipping participants were then paired with one of the individuals who had innovated the 
sucking technique. Yamamoto et al. found that four of the five dipping (Solution A) subjects 
subsequently switched to the more efficient sucking technique (Solution B) demonstrated.  The 
authors suggest that the dipping subjects may have been dissatisfied with the relatively miniscule 
reward they were procuring and therefore may have been using a copy-when-dissatisfied strategy 
(Laland, 2004). This strategy would not involve an individual having to make any appraisal of 
their own actions’ efficiency against those of another (Laland, 2004) and is in line with the findings 
of Marshall-Pescini and Whiten (2008).  However, it may be observed from data provided by 
Yamamoto et al. (Table 2, pg 3), that only two subjects reliably or consistently used Solution A 
prior to the social learning phase of the study.  Although this adds support to the suggestion that 
subjects were dissatisfied with the returns of the dipping technique, it does somewhat detract 
from the degree of behavioural flexibility that may be inferred; that is, if the behaviour was not 
an established and reliable response to a problem, then an individual can be predicted to be less 
likely to show conservative tendencies.  This suggests that the initial response was not prepotent. 
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As for the complexity of the behaviours, I would consider both to be simple: Dipping is a species-
typical behaviour, and straw sucking was innovated by almost half of the participants in 
Yamamoto et al. (Table 1). 
Perhaps some of the strongest evidence for chimpanzee flexibility comes from a study by 
Manrique, Völter and Call (2013). Here captive chimpanzees readily relinquished old foraging 
techniques (A) when they became inefficient, and innovated new ones (B). As there was no social 
information available to participants, and as they quickly discovered solutions to the changing 
problem, I would suggest that these behaviours be considered simple. I would also tentatively 
suggest the behaviours are not prepotent, at they were only practiced 10 times in each case, over 
a 10 minute period at most. Here, as there is little evidence of behavioural conservatism, there 
is no evidence either way to support Hypothesis 1 or 2 directly: there is no indication here that 
Solution A hindered optimisation, or that any other variable did so either (Table 1).  
Many of the studies above were conducted in order to investigate behavioural flexibility; 
however, many other studies can also speak to chimpanzee flexibility. For example, Horner and 
Whiten (2005) found that chimpanzees who had learned to use an unnecessarily complex 
behaviour to solve a puzzlebox would cease to perform irrelevant actions when they realised 
these acts’ redundancy. Considering that here, both the initial and alternative solutions involved 
multiple elements which were socially demonstrated (perhaps taught), and perhaps not easy for 
a novice to discover (although there is no baseline information to corroborate this), I tentatively 
class these as complex solutions. However, as chimpanzees performed the original behaviour 
only three times before they modified it, these behaviours are not prepotent (Table 1). This study 
also highlights that children display remarkable inflexibility in ways chimpanzees do not. For 
example, Horner and Whiten (2005) found young children continued to perseverate with 
irrelevant actions despite their obvious redundancy. Such instances of perseveration may be best 
explained via Hypothesis 2: behavioural optimisation is hindered by an alternative factor. In these 
cases, it is likely humans are ‘overimitating’, employing what may usually be quite an adaptive 
social learning heuristic, affording high fidelity transmission. Support for Hypothesis 2 in these 
instances further comes from Wood, Kendal and Flynn (2013), who show that children will 
modify their behaviour on a puzzlebox when they are provided with demonstrations of an 
alternative solution (B) to their own prior one (A); however, when they are originally shown 
Solution A (as opposed to personally discovering A), they tend to copy Solution B wholesale, 
including irrelevant actions. In contrast, those who personally learn A are less likely to copy 
irrelevant elements. This fits with the framework of natural pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 2011), 
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and how pedagogy can hinder exploration of the problem space (Bonawitz et al., 2011). I return 
to this idea of how inflexibility may at times be a result of an adaptive strategy within the 
Discussion section (Chapter 7). 
3.3 SUMMARY 
While Dean, Vale, Laland, Flynn and Kendal (2013) have highlighted that behavioural 
conservatism may be a mechanism hindering cumulative culture (Hypothesis 1) or an outcome 
of another factor limiting culture (Hypothesis 2), to my knowledge no systematic review has 
tackled the reasons underlying the inconsistencies in chimpanzee behavioural flexibility. 
Considering the research reviewed above, I conclude that few studies have provided adequate 
controls to afford discrimination between Hypotheses 1 and 2, with many (barring Hrubsech et 
al., 2009) offering a Hypothesis 2 explanation somewhat by default.  I present evidence to suggest 
that these investigations use solutions which vary along two dimensions - solution prepotency and 
solution complexity - and that variation in these produces a pattern of flexibility and conservatism 
consistent with that of perseveration found in our own species. I suggest these dimensions are 
key to understanding the context of chimpanzee behavioural flexibility, and must be considered 
when we extrapolate findings to chimpanzees’ cultural capabilities. 
As cultural traditions are well-established and long held behaviours that require some 
investment, not only in their continual employment but in that they are also sufficiently complex 
to necessitate social learning to acquire, it is worth considering how these dimensions are 
reflected in investigations of culture. Behaviours which are not well-practiced may not capture 
the reliability and longevity of which many cultural behaviours are used (Lewis et al., 2016; 
Mercader et al., 2007). This is especially pertinent with research suggesting that longevity of 
cultural variants is key to accumulation (Enquist & Ghirlanda, 2007). Likewise, behaviours which 
vary along the spectrum of complexity may capture different components of cultural behaviour, 
but only those solutions which tap into the hard-learned techniques pertinent to complex skills 
reflect the nature of technological accumulation. In short, we must be careful in how we apply 
results from studies examining behavioural flexibility to chimpanzees’ capacity for cumulative 
culture. So far, we have some evidence that chimpanzees can use payoff related social 
information to flexibly adjust highly-practiced behaviour in token exchange ( Vale et al., in prep) 
and token deposit tasks ( Hopper et al., 2015;Van Leeuwen et al., 2013). We also have evidence 
to suggest that chimpanzees can modify simple behaviours to adopt alternative simple behaviours 
when prior solutions are somewhat practiced (Manrique et al., 2013; Yamamoto et al., 2013). 
However, the simplicity of these behaviours limits the extent to which we can evaluate the 
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complexities of behavioural flexibility that are important in the context of cultural evolution. The 
capability to flexibly modify and adopt new variants of the same functional behaviour is vitally 
important as it allows flexible foraging strategies to cope with spatially and temporally varying 
environments, as well as the complex social dynamics of chimpanzee communities; for example, 
migrating individuals may benefit from adapting their behaviours to the foraging strategies of their 
new community rather than persisting in old, and possibly outdated, variants (Luncz & Boesch, 
2014; Luncz et al., 2015 also see van de Waal, Borgeaud, & Whiten, 2013).  
On the other hand, we have evidence that chimpanzees can be highly conservative when 
confronted with both relinquishing well-established, complex, technical foraging strategies 
(Hrubesch et al., 2009), or building upon them (Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008). Further, 
simple prior solutions may be persevered with when the initial solution is prepotent, and the 
alternative solution is complex (Dean et al., 2012). These well-established, complex solutions 
may be the very behaviours which more closely reflect the intricacies of culturally transmitted 
skills and artefacts. 
4.   CONCLUSION 
Cultural behaviours, especially with regard to multi-stepped foraging patterns, or use of 
technology, are not only complex solutions, often requiring extensive socially facilitated trial and 
error learning (Derex, Feron, Godelle, & Raymond, 2015; Rieucau & Giraldeau, 2011; Whalen, 
Cownden, & Laland, 2015), but are so well-established that they persist over generations. 
Drawing from findings within human research, these might be the very types of behaviour we 
would expect to be the most resistant to change. Given this, we should be cautious about 
extrapolating results to chimpanzee (or any animal) culture from studies which find flexibility but 
which focus on behaviour that may not mirror complex foraging patterns or technology, the 
candidate behaviours for meaningful accumulation. Specifically, we need to consider how the 
cognitive processes underlying behavioural flexibility may be responsible for divergent findings, 
and how conservatism, and potentially culture stagnation, may be a function of cognitive resource 
availability.  
In this chapter I have shown that despite similarities in the pattern of contextual flexibility 
exhibited by chimpanzees and humans, explanations typically used to account for behavioural 
conservatism in humans have not been applied to chimpanzees. Specifically, much research in 
humans suggest suboptimal behaviours, marked by perseveration, are caused by having a prior 
solution in and of itself. Conversely, research in chimpanzees often suggests suboptimal 
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behaviours are caused by another, sometimes unmeasured, variable. In section 2.1 and 2.2 I 
have highlighted how explanations rooted in cognitive resource availability and cognitive control 
are typically employed to explain how having a prior solution hinders optimisation, with factors 
such as response prepotency and complexity being key causes of perseveration. In section 2.3 I 
have mapped out how well chimpanzee flexibility fits onto that framework, with results varying 
along the dimensions of both prepotency and complexity. I therefore contend that 
notwithstanding other limiting factors (Hypothesis 2), chimpanzee culture may be constrained in 
large part due to Hypothesis 1, in turn linked to cognitive resource availability: 
Hypothesis 1: behavioural optimisation (use of Solution B) is hindered by having 
knowledge of an alternative Solution (A) i.e. behavioural inflexibility limits cultural evolution 
In the remainder of this thesis, I will present empirical work that supports my contention. In 
Chapter 4, I will present evidence that contrary to prior work, inhibitory control is compromised 
in chimpanzees. In Chapter 5, I will present evidence which directly shows that like humans, 
chimpanzees show differential patterns of flexibility as a function of cognitive load, exhibiting 
difficulties with inhibiting sub-optimal behaviours when there are high demands on working 
memory. In Chapter 6, I will present evidence that chimpanzee exhibit yet higher levels of 
conservatism when behaviours closely match those of simple cumulative culture: optimization 
involves not only the partial inhibition of a complex solution, but also the addition of a complex 
element.
 
 Table 1  
Summary of research findings 
Paper Solution A 
A 
blocked 
Action on 
A 
Solution B Conservatism 
Author 
Hypothesis 
Manrique & Call (2015) Prepotent Simple Partially Abandon Simple Varied _ 
Marshall-Pescini & Whiten (2008) Prepotent Complex No Build Complex High 2 
Hrubesch et al. (2009)- Rakers Prepotent Somewhat complex No Abandon Simple High 1 
Hrubesch et al. (2009)- Generalists Not prepotent varied Yes Abandon varied Low 1 
Bonnie et al. (2012) Not-prepotent Simple No Abandon Simple low 1 & 2 
Dean et al. (2012) Prepotent Simple No Build Complex High 2 
Van Leeuwen et al. (2013) Prepotent Simple No Abandon Simple Low _ 
Vale et al. (In prep) Prepotent Simple No Abandon Simple Low _ 
Hopper et al. (2015) Prepotent Simple No Abandon Simple Low _ 
Yamamoto et al. (2013) Not prepotent Simple No Abandon Simple Low 2 
Manrique et al. (2013) Not prepotent Simple Yes Build Simple Low _ 
Horner & Whiten (2005) Not prepotent Complex No Streamline Complex Low 2 
Literature Review. Solution A: Original solution used with two levels, Solution A prepotency, and Solution A complexity;  A blocked: describes if 
A was still a viable solution once B became an alternative solution, or if it is was blocked off during testing. Action on A:  describes what action 
needed to be taken on A, either abandoning A, building on A, or omitting/streamlining elements of A.  Solution B: Solution B complexity; 
Conservatism gives a basic description of how readily chimpanzees changed behaviours, with low levels  of conservatism linked to high behavioural 
flexibility and high levels of conservatism linked with marked perseveration with Solution A. Author Hypothesis is which hypothesis authors 
interpret their results to lend support to 
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CHAPTER 3: INTRODUCTON TO EMPIRICAL METHODS  
1. COMPARING CHILDREN AND CHIMPANZEES 
One obvious methodological difficulty in comparing findings between species is that 
much research in children is based on relatively abstract problems, which often involve holding 
in mind arbitrary rules (sort by colour, shape etc.). Although such studies reduce experimental 
‘noise’, allowing for cleaner measures of cognitive processes, they may not adequately predict 
real-world problem solving strategies. In contrast, primate researchers within the field of cultural 
evolution often employ goal-oriented, behavioural problems, incorporating layers of personal 
and social information in complex group settings. While the former attempts to control for the 
potentially confounding effects of, for example, motor control and normative biases, the latter 
attempts to maximise external validity (and is more tenable for researchers working with animals 
such as chimpanzees who cannot be separated from their groups, or trained on computer 
interfaces). I do not attempt to tease apart what these differences in methodology may mean for 
comparison between these two different literatures; rather, I have taken the core findings from 
developmental research, and examined how these may explain the pattern of flexibility in 
chimpanzees using methods typical of primate cultural research (bar Chapter 4, which uses a 
simple executive function task).  
As an aside, to begin investigating how these differing methodologies may impact results, 
I am leading an ongoing, interdisciplinary project in collaboration with the University of Texas, 
Austin comparing adult chimpanzees and developing children on a behavioural optimization task 
involving a puzzlebox. Surprisingly, while preliminary results overall support a cognitive resource 
account of flexibility, solution choice on the first trial alone (total of seven trials are given to solve 
this task) shows younger children are often quicker to optimize their behaviours than older 
children. This is contrary to predictions generated by simpler tasks looking at flexible responding 
in developing children, and highlights the multi-faceted nature of decision-making in problems 
which better approximate real-world, goal-oriented behaviours. I report these preliminary results 
in Appendix 1.  
2. SUBJECTS AND HOUSING 
Chimpanzees were group housed at the Michale E. Keeling Center for Comparative 
Medicine and Research of The University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Bastrop, 
Texas, U.S.A. Groups size ranged from 5-10 individuals and were trained and tested in both 
their outside enclosures (ranging in size from corrals at 4,300 square feet to PrimadomesTM 
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measuring approximately 34 feet in diameter and 25 feet high) and indoor dens (ranging in size 
from 6 feet deep by 15 feet wide to approximately 8 feet and 8 inches deep by 9 feet wide). 
Individuals were given the opportunity to voluntarily participate and separate from their group 
for further training and testing purposes in their inside enclosures for a period of no longer than 
30 minutes. Participants were not food or water deprived during training or testing. 
3. ANALYSES 
In Chapters 4 and 5, data were analysed using Bayesian methods generated by the 
‘rethinking’ package in R (McElreath, 2016). The data reported in Chapter 6 were analysed and 
published using frequentist methods. This difference was due to the order in which data were 
collected, with the data of Chapter 6 analysed and published before data collection for Chapters 
4 and 5. While frequentist statistics remain the most commonly reported in psychology, there is 
a growing push to move to other forms of analyses, such as Bayesian.  
Frequentist statistics use data from a sample, for example the mean and standard 
deviation, to generate a sampling error. Typically, this error is multiplied by some value based 
on a sampling distribution (e.g. a z or t distribution) to generate a 95% confidence interval. This 
95% confidence interval represents the bounds between which, if one were to re-sample the 
population 100 times, in 95 of those cases, one would expect to find a parameter value (e.g. the 
mean) that has a confidence interval which overlaps with the true population mean. The 95% 
confidence interval is often erroneously thought of as being equivalent to meaning “the values 
between which we can be 95% sure the true value of the population parameter lies within”. This 
is not possible to state within a frequentist analysis, but more closely reflects what is possible with 
Bayesian analysis (reported below - although Bayesian methods do not assume there is any one 
true population value, but rather a range of values with different plausibility). Frequentist analyses 
are long-run analyses, which infer statistical difference from the likely frequencies with which we 
expect values to appear if we were to repeat the sampling procedure, and can only address the 
confidence of an interval, not the confidence of any one particular value being the most likely 
parameter value. For example, when testing for an effect of a condition, say the effect of prior 
Solution A on behavioural optimisation (converging on Solution B), we can run a t-test on two 
groups (one with prior Solution A and a naïve group who do not have experience with Solution 
A) to determine if these groups are statistically distinct. If our samples (groups) are drawn from 
the same population (i.e. null hypothesis: there is no effect of prior Solution A on time taken to 
converge on Solution B), we expect these samples to generate overlapping confidence intervals 
(although statistical tests are needed to verify a lack of a significant difference, as these confidence 
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intervals may only marginally overlap). Based on the differences between the variability of values 
within each of our samples, we can calculate a t-statistic, and, based on the t-distribution and our 
desired level of confidence (typically set at 95%), find the probability of getting that statistic if our 
samples are drawn from the same population. On the premise of being 95% confident that any 
difference did not occur by chance, if we were to re-sample each group, and again calculate the 
t-statistic (which takes into consideration the differences between groups), then in more than 5% 
of the cases we would find a t-statistic that crosses the boundary with 0 i.e. some samples indicate 
no difference between groups, some samples indicate those with prior solution took longer to 
converge on solution B, and some samples indicate those without a prior solution took longer to 
converge on B.  This would suggest that our samples are statistically indistinguishable and drawn 
from the same population, and that any differences between groups are due to chance. In 
contrast, if less than 5% of those cases cross the boundary of 0, then we would say there is a 
significant difference between groups, with only a small chance (P < .05) that if we were to 
resample the populations, we would not find this difference. It is also possible to then generate 
a confidence interval of the likely differences between these populations; however, again, this 
only allows us to generate an interval within which we can be 95% confident. It does not address 
how plausible specific parameter values within this interval are.  
Bayesian methods take into account the relative plausibility of parameter values to create 
a posterior distribution, which maps out the likelihood of a range of values the parameter could 
be. From this posterior distribution, thousands of samples can be drawn to produce the most 
likely value of a parameter, as well as a credible interval. To confuse matters, this credible interval 
is also commonly referred to as a confidence interval, and throughout Chapters 4 & 5, I report a 
95% confidence interval generated through Bayesian analyses. This is the interval between which 
95% of plausible values lie. The average value (or maximum a priori) reported is the most 
probable of all these. I chose to report results with this 95% confidence interval as these are 
conventional terms which are familiar to frequentist statisticians, and may be easier to interpret. 
While it is commonly known that the 95% significance level is based on an arbitrary value, failing 
to report this in the publication process may be seen as problematic. There is no test of 
significance within Bayesian analyses; instead, there are a variety of ways to interpret data, and 
following the advice given by McElreath (2016), I report my analyses in great detail and with 
transparency. This allows others to make their own inferences about what the data show. 
Bayesian methods allow powerful resampling of the data to generate predictions which take into 
consideration all plausible values of the parameter and attempt to capture population level 
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behaviours. How much these predictions deviate from the sampled data is reported. Model 
comparison techniques are also used to construct and choose between different models of the 
data. This involves inputting different combinations of parameters and seeing how well each 
predicts the data in comparison to the others. In my main analyses I report the models which 
carry most of the Akaike weight (i.e. best predict the data). So, for example, a model which does 
not include an effect of prior solution may better describe the data than a model which does 
include this effect, carrying more of the Akaike weight. This would indicate that there is no effect 
of prior solution. Alternatively, predictions can be generated for each group, with an average time 
taken to converge on Solution B for each. A confidence/credible interval can be generated 
around these and plausible overlaps between group times can be calculated. From this, we can 
quantify not only the differences between groups, but the probability of those differences 
occurring; for example, it would be possible to calculate the probability with which those in the 
naïve group took ten minutes less to converge on Solution B than the group who had prior 
experience with Solution A. Again, while there is no significance test, doing this allows the reader 
to determine what the data actually show. 
One key component of Bayesian methods is that the model needs to be defined using 
parameter ‘priors’. These are values (typically for the mean and standard deviation) of a 
parameter that the model is instructed to start with. So, to use an example from McElreath 
(2016), if I wished to know if there was a difference between the heights of men and women, I 
would likely construct a model based on a normal distribution, and include two parameters that 
reflect men and women’s heights 
Height = a + b (Female) 
Here, the ‘a’ parameter reflects the height of men, and ‘b’ the effect being female has on height. 
If these are credibly different, we would expect a model to show that including this b parameter 
improves the predictive power of the model, and would earn most of the Akaike weight. We 
would be able to say what the most likely value of this parameter is, and provide an interval which 
incorporates 95% of plausible values. However, this model assumes no known knowledge about 
the heights of men and women, where in reality, we do have some information that both men 
and women are typically over one metre tall, and typically below two metres. We can introduce 
this knowledge to the model in the form of ‘priors’, which act to nudge the model in the right 
direction. This is similar to the fitness landscapes often used in modelling work, where agents 
can get caught and stuck on local optimums, failing to execute the search pattern that would have 
allowed them to converge on the global optimum. 
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𝐻𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡~𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚( 𝑚𝑢, 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎) 
𝑚𝑢 < −𝑎 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 
𝑎~𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(150, 25) 
𝑏~𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(0, 10) 
This model reads that height is normally distributed with an average of mu, and standard 
deviation of sigma. Mu is equal to a for men, and a + b for women. The next two lines define the 
priors for a and b. In this example, a is normally distributed with an average of 150 and a standard 
deviation of 25. This captures the information we already know about heights falling within one 
to two metres. Here b is normally distributed with an average of 0, and standard deviation of 10. 
This informs the model to start by assuming there is no average difference between the heights 
of men and women, and that women’s heights may vary with a standard deviation of 10 from 
those of men. Providing prior information allows the model to begin its search for the most 
plausible values of the parameters. The model tests the plausibility of these parameter values 
against the sample, and then updates the prior information to reflect parameter values which 
better predict the data within the sample. The model continues to do this, sampling and updating 
until it converges on the range of parameter values which best describe the data (the posterior 
distribution). We can then sample from this posterior distribution to generate predictions, such 
as the probability that a woman is taller than a man, or what the probability is that a man is likely 
to be 10 centimetres taller than a women. When there is a lot of data for the model to sample 
from, the original defined priors are easily overwhelmed, and make little difference to the results. 
When there is less data, as with many of my own studies which often involve groups with fewer 
than ten individuals, priors need to be more tightly constrained to values that are reasonable 
assumptions about the data. These priors will have a stronger effect on results, which supports 
the need for greater transparency in analysis. Although this seems subjective, if we do not assume 
any knowledge, we are still inputting priors, but they are ill-informed and allow the model to 
spiral off in potentially suboptimal directions, producing spurious results. For example, if we had 
the heights of only five males and five females, and we assume no prior knowledge, we are 
instructing the model to start with the assumption that the average height of a male is zero. With 
such a small sample size, the model may potentially fail to reach a sensible result due to taking a 
‘wrong turn’ in the landscape, with less data to pull it in the right direction. To ensure consistency, 
my priors are based on the average and standard deviation of the naive group for each analysis.  
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In order to provide a thorough analysis, which is accessible to those with different 
statistical backgrounds, Chapters 4 and 5 are accompanied by supplementary material in 
Appendices 2 and 3, which not only describe how I analysed the data through Bayesian methods 
as outlined above, but include a frequentist analysis for each of the core results reported in these 
chapters. In chapter 5, I also provide results generated through Bayesian estimation and online 
software (http://www.sumsar.net/best_online/) for a Bayesian version of the t-test developed by 
John Kruschke (2013). I have included this as, unlike the Bayesian analyses generated through 
the rethinking package, these are based on objective priors, and assume no prior knowledge 
about the data. All these analyses are in basic agreement, except in one instance in Chapter 5: 
Pitfall Study 2.1, where the results of Bayesian Estimation differed from those of my main 
Bayesian (and frequentist) analyses concerning an effect of social information on behavioural 
optimisation. 
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CHAPTER 4: A NOT B 
BEHAVIOURAL FLEXIBILITY IN CHIMPANZEES ( PAN TROGLODYTES): 
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ABSTRACT 
The flexible adjustment of response is key to optimal exploitation of a changing environment, 
and at the foundation of cumulative culture. The ability to inhibit, or cease use of, a suboptimal 
response is a vital component of behavioural change. Here, we tested 38 captive chimpanzees  
on an A not B task designed to measure inhibitory control. Participants first searched for a reward 
they had witnessed hidden under a cup in location A (A trials). On a later trial, this location then 
changed (B trial). To successfully retrieve the reward, the individual had to inhibit a previous 
search pattern (at location A) and flexibly switch to searching at an alternative location (location 
B). Unlike prior studies, which typically use three A trials, this study used a minimum of 20 A 
trials before the B trial. A 15 second delay between the observation of the switching of location 
of reward (from A to B), and the option to search for the reward on the critical B trial, was also 
included, to look for effects of memory on response. Results show that while there was no effect 
of delay on search choice, chimpanzees only performed at chance on the critical B trials, in 
contrast to near ceiling performance on A trials. This indicates that chimpanzees have limited 
inhibitory control when they need to cease using a highly-practiced, or prepotent, solution. This 
may offer a partial explanation as to why chimpanzees sometimes perseverate with sub-optimal 
solutions, often referred to as behavioural conservatism.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Inhibitory control, the ability to suppress or override a known response, is a vital 
component of behavioural flexibility: the ability to flexibly relinquish, modify or build on known 
behaviours. It is perhaps not surprising that greater inhibitory control has been linked to greater 
intelligence, with  chimpanzees displaying evidence of being amongst the smartest of non-human 
animals (MacLean et al., 2014). Chimpanzees are known to be both highly innovative (Reader & 
Laland, 2001) and adept social learners (Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 
2009), with a relatively expansive repertoire of cultural behaviours (Whiten et al., 1999). 
However, chimpanzees at times display conservative behaviour, showing a marked tendency to 
stick to known behaviours rather than adopt more productive or efficient alternatives (Davis et 
al. 2016; Dean et al. 2012; Hrubesch et al. 2009; Marshall-Pescini and Whiten 2008). This has 
been proposed to limit their foraging strategies and technology to simple, non-cumulative 
behaviours. Yet, somewhat puzzling, chimpanzees typically do not show perseverative, or 
conservative, responding on tasks thought to reflect inhibitory control, at times even 
outperforming children (Vlamings, Hare, & Call, 2009). Here we report an experiment that may 
help resolve this apparent contradiction. 
1.1 INHIBITION IN CHIMPANZEES 
 One well-established test of inhibitory control is the A not B paradigm: participants have 
the opportunity to reach for a desirable object placed under a container in location B, after having 
previously reached for it several times in the spatially distinct location A.  Despite witnessing the 
object being placed at B, infant humans under one year of age (Diamond, 1985), and many non-
human species (MacLean et al., 2014), often erroneously search at the familiar A location, 
making a perseverative search error. Chimpanzees typically perform at ceiling level on this task, 
correctly inhibiting their prior search behaviour at A, and flexibly switching to searching at B 
(Amici et al., 2008; Barth and Call, 2006). Such findings indicate that chimpanzees have relatively 
strong inhibitory control. Chimpanzees were not seen to perseverate on the A not B task; as in 
older children, the task configuration thus appears not to challenge adult chimpanzees’ inhibition 
abilities. This suggests elements of chimpanzee executive function exceeds that of a young human 
infant, but we suggest the relevance of such findings to chimpanzee behavioural flexibility should 
be treated with caution (see also Beran, 2015).   
One reason for caution is that in these tasks, chimpanzees typically reach for the A cup 
only three times. Given the limited number of A reaches, it may be that the search behaviour at 
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A is not established well enough to have become a highly prepotent response (cf Marcovitch and 
Zelazo, 1999). As behavioural inflexibility is often found on tasks which focus on well-practiced 
solutions (Davis et al. 2016; Marshall-Pescini and Whiten, 2008), we cannot rule out that 
chimpanzees may perseverate with prior behaviours due to limited inhibitory control.  Here we 
present findings on a modified A not B task, which show that if the initial A response is highly 
practiced, chimpanzees perform at chance on the B trial. This suggests chimpanzees’ abi lity to 
inhibit highly prepotent responses has limits, with real implications for their everyday lives, such 
as potentials for cultural change.   
1.2 A NOT B: WHAT CAUSES PERSEVERATION? 
 The perseverative search error shown by young children in Piaget’s A not B paradigm 
was first thought to reflect a lack of object permanence (Piaget, 1954), and the infant’s belief that 
their actions affected the location of the object. However, more recent work suggests that this 
erroneous reaching is more likely linked to underdeveloped executive function. To solve the A 
not B task, “Children must inhibit their learned response to search at Location A, children must 
shift from the task of searching at A to searching at B, and update their working memory of the 
hiding event from Location A to Location B.” (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2009, pg 2). In line with 
different task demands of the paradigm, the exact cause of the perseverative response on the A 
not B task has been attributed to various mechanisms. 
Dominant theories hypothesize that the perseverative error may result from a lack of an 
inhibitory mechanism, such that there is no active suppression of the prepotent response, 
typically due to immature executive function (e.g. Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1990; Dempster, 
1992). The error may alternatively be due to limited memory functions (Beran, Beran & Menzel, 
2005; Morton & Munakata, 2002; Munakata, 2001; Pushina, Orekhova, & Stroganova, 2005). It 
is also possible that the error is due to a combination of both these executive functions: inhibition 
and working memory may work together to produce the perseverative error, with the need to 
hold the new representation in mind (B), while simultaneously inhibiting the old search location 
(A) (Diamond, 1988; Diamond et al., 1994; Espy et al., 1999). Yet other theories hypothesize 
that the motor demands of the task itself (reach to A or B) may cause the error (Berger, 2004; 
Berger, 2010; Boudreau and Bushnell, 2000; Clearfield et al., 2006; Thelen et al., 2001).  
Interestingly, introducing a time delay between the hiding of the object at B and the search 
response results in a marked increase in the rates of perseveration in young children (Clearfield 
et al.. 2009; Diamond, 1985; Pushina et al., 2005; Watanabe et al., 2012). With a delay, 
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individuals have to represent and store in memory the location of the reward over a  period of 
time, something which appears to challenge the limited working memory of infants under 10 
months of age. This thus indicates that working memory plays a key role in the perseverative 
response. However, increasing the motor demands on search tasks, while controlling for memory 
demands, has also been shown to have a detrimental effect on correct search behaviours, with 
increasing task complexity causing perseveration (Berger, 2004; Berger. 2010; Boudreau and 
Bushnell 2000). This indicates that the increased demands of the task (whether memory or 
motor) might detract from the resources needed for successful inhibition (Grandjean and 
Collette, 2011; Roberts et al., 1994; Roberts & Pennington, 1996). As children develop, so too 
does their cognitive capacity, potentially allowing for appropriate responding. 
2.   PRESENT STUDY 
 This study was not designed to further elucidate the cause of the perseverative error per 
se, but rather to re-examine inhibitory control in chimpanzees on the A not B paradigm in the 
context of increased prepotency of the A response. To heighten prepotency, participants 
searched at the A location a minimum of 20 times before presentation of the critical B trial. To 
examine the effects of task demand on perseveration, we introduced a time delay between hiding 
a reward at B and the opportunity to search, and compared results on the same task without a 
time delay.  
2.1 METHODS 
Participants  
 Thirty-eight chimpanzees completed the A not B task (11 males, mean age 31.67 years, 
range 13.21 – 50.59; participant demographics in Appendix 2 Table 1). Chimpanzees were tested 
in their indoor dens. Individuals were given the opportunity to voluntarily participate and 
separate from their group for a period of no longer than 20 minutes. Participants were not food 
or water deprived during training or testing. 
Apparatus  
A clear plastic sheet was attached to a black crate to form a horizontal surface. Three 
green squares (10 x 10 centimetres) were painted onto the sheet in a row. This ensured uniform 
placement of the cups throughout testing (two red ‘Solo’ ® cups were used). The crate could be 
manoeuvred back and forth from the mesh. The A location was on the right of the apparatus 
(from the participant’s viewpoint), and the B location on their left.  
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Procedure 
As prior research in both children and dogs has indicated that the perseverative error 
could be attributed in large part to pedagogical cueing from the experimenter (Gergely et al., 
2016; Topal et al., 2008), SJD positioned herself centrally behind the apparatus, occluded her 
eyes by wearing dark sunglasses throughout testing, and faced directly ahead, avoiding orientation 
towards either the A or B location, 
A tr ials  The apparatus was set up out of reach of the participants. The two cups (A and B) were 
initially set on their sides behind their respective A and B locations (marked by green squares). 
Participants watched SJD place one grape at the A location. The two cups were then placed 
simultaneously over their respective locations, hiding the contents (i.e. the grape as for A, and no 
reward as for B). The apparatus was pushed forward so that the participant could reach toward 
and/or touch the cups. If the participant chose correctly (searched at A), SJD pulled the apparatus 
back, removed the cup covering the grape, and awarded the grape to the participant. The cup 
covering the B location was also then removed. If the participant chose to incorrectly search at 
the B location, the B cup was removed first, followed immediately by the A cup (revealing the 
location of the grape). The participant was not given the grape in these trials. If a participant did 
not respond within 30 seconds, the apparatus was reset and the trial coded as a ‘fail’.  After 20 
consecutive correct reaches toward the A cup, the critical probe or ‘B’ trial was administered. If 
a participant did not reach correctly on 20 consecutive A trials, they were given up to 10 
additional A trials, with the secondary criterion for inclusion set at 20 successful trials out of 30.  
B tr ial  On the critical trial, the grape was initially placed under cup A as above; however, before 
the apparatus was pushed towards the participant, the grape was visibly removed from under cup 
A and repositioned under cup B.  
 Two versions of this task were administered: In condition 1, there was no delay between 
placing the grape under the B cup and the presentation of the apparatus to the chimpanzees to 
make their search choice. In condition 2, there was a 15 second delay between the observation 
of the switching of location of reward and the presentation of apparatus to the participant. These 
conditions were counterbalanced and presented at least three weeks apart to minimize any effects 
of prior experience with the task. The participant was awarded the grape only if they correctly 
searched at location B. 
Analyses 
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Records of the training and testing phases were both narrated and visually recorded using 
a HC-920 Panasonic camcorder, with responses coded through later video analysis. Reaching 
choices (A or B) were coded through movements toward, or direct contact with A or B cups. An 
analysis of interrater reliability using Cohen’s kappa found excellent agreement (κ = 1) between 
two coders’ judgement of reaching response on 10% of the critical B trials. Data were analysed 
using Bayesian binomial regression models, using the Rethinking package in R (McElreath, 
2016). Frequentist analyses are reported in Appendix 2. Throughout analyses, a 95% confidence 
(or credible) interval is reported (the interval between which 95% of plausible values lie). The 
average value reported is the most probable of all these. Predictions generated by modelling 
procedures are also reported. These predictions are based on the sample data and attempt to 
capture population level behaviours. How much these predictions deviate from the sampled data 
is reported in Appendix 2. Model comparison techniques were also used to construct and choose 
between different models of the data, through inputting different combinations of parameters, 
and discovering how well each model predicts the data in comparison to one another. We report 
here on the models which carry most Akaike weight (i.e. best predict the data); however, for 
transparency, details and effectiveness of different models are reported in Appendix 2. 
2.2 RESULTS 
Participant inclusion and training  
Meeting criterion for inclusion, there were 13 chimpanzees in the No Delay condition 
followed by the Delay condition, 18 in the Delay condition followed by the No Delay condition, 
four in the No delay condition only, and three in the Delay condition only (due to participant 
drop out). 
Behaviours during testing  
For those participating in both the Delay and No Delay conditions, eight chimpanzees 
always chose correctly on the B trial; six never chose correctly on the B trial; five improved their 
performance (i.e. did better on the second presentation of the task); twelve declined in 
performance (i.e. did worse on their second presentation). For those participating in only the No 
Delay condition, one did not choose correctly. For those in only the Delay condition, two did 
not choose correctly.  
Modelling responses  
Chapter 4  58 
 
No effect of delay on response  Binomial regression models indicate that there was no 
credible effect of condition (No Delay versus Delay), and no interaction between order (i.e. 1st 
or 2nd presentation of the task) and condition on the probability of a participant making an error 
on the B trial. Models which included these effects performed worse than models without (see 
Appendix 2 for details of models); however, there may have been an order effect, with 
participants more likely to make an error on the second presentation of the task (median of 0.21 
more likely to make an error on the second B trial, 95% confidence interval of -0.02 to 0.44; 
Appendix 2 Fig. 2). Given a potential effect of order, analyses were run including this effect. 
Additional analyses run without this order effect are available in Appendix 2. 
Performance on B trial    Performance on the B trial was found to be at chance (Appendix 
2 Fig. 1), with a 0.49 probability of committing a perseverative reaching error (mean; 95% 
confidence interval between 0.38 and 0.61). Considering the effect of order, it was found that 
performance on the second presentation was worse (i.e. a perseverative error was more likely) 
than that on the first (Table 1; Fig. 1; Appendix 2 Fig. 2). 
 
Table 1  
Model predictions for probability of error on A and B trials by presentation order 
Trial Type  Median 2.5% 97.5% 
1st Presentation A 0.06 0.04 0.08 
1st Presentation B 0.41 0.24 0.59 
2nd Presentation A 0.03 0.02 0.05 
2nd Presentation B 0.58 0.39 0.77 
The median is the predicted average probability of error on the A trials and B trial for 1st and 
2nd task presentations of the paradigm. 2.5% and 97.5% represent the 95% confidence interval 
of the probability of committing an error 
 
Trial Type  Median 2.5% 97.5% 
Presentation 1 A 0.06 0.04 0.08 
Presentation 1 B 0.41 0.35 0.59 
Presentation 2 A 0.03 0.02 0.05 
Presentation 2 B 0.58 0.39 0.77 
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Comparing performance on A tr ials and B tr ials It was found that chimpanzees 
performed credibly worse on the B trials (See Appendix 2 for further details), with a 0.45 median 
greater probability of making an error on a B trial than an A trial (95% credible interval of 0.31 
– 0.59). Including an effect of order and an interaction effect between order and trial type (A or 
B trial) better predicted performance than including trial type (A or B) alone. Participants 
performed slightly better on the A trials during their second A not B task presentation (0.02 
median reduction in probability of making an error, 95% interval of 0 – 0.05), but worse on their 
B trial (0.17 increase in probability of making an error, 95% interval of 0.07 – 0.41; Table 1; Fig. 
 
Fig. 1  
Posterior distributions of probability of error on 1
st
 and 2
nd
 presentation of the B trial. Light grey 
shading shows the 95% highest posterior density interval for each trial; that is, the 95% confidence 
interval of the probability of committing an error.  Dark grey shading shows the overlap in the 
marginal probabilities of error between presentations. The peaks indicate the most plausible 
probability of committing an error on the first task presentation (outlined in black) and the 
second (in pink)    
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2; Appendix 2 Fig. S5). This indicates that by the second presentation there was a greater 
tendency to reach for A, slightly reducing errors in A responses, but increasing the probability of 
an error on the B trial.   
 
 
Performance on first A trial  To investigate whether reaching on the B trial was a result 
of a lack of understanding of the contingencies of the task (participants may have learnt an 
associative rule such as “Reach to A location for a grape”, instead of “Reach for grape”), we 
compared within task performance on the first A trial to the B trial. If chimpanzees did not 
understand that they needed to reach for the cup under which the grape was hidden, then we 
would expect performance to be at chance on the first trial. If instead, erroneous reaching on the 
 
Fig. 2  
Model predictions for trial type (A or B), order (1st or 2nd presentation) and an interaction 
between trial type and order. Black circles represent the observed proportion of errors made by 
participants. The black line is the mean expected proportion of reaching errors for trial type and 
order. The dark grey area is the 95% confidence interval of predicted proportion of errors 
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B trial is due to a perseverative search error, we would expect to see a credible difference between 
reaching errors on the first A trial and the first B trial. 
 The probability of making an error was credibly lower for the first A trial than it was for 
the B trial, with 0.33 greater probability of an error on the B trial (95% confidence interval of 
0.18 to 0.48 greater probability of error on B than the first A trial; see Appendix 2 for further 
details). Including an interaction effect with order (which best predicted the data; see Appendix 
2), we found similar results (Table 2; Fig. 3). Performance between the first presentation of the 
task and second presentation was not credibly different when we consider only the first A trials. 
We thus report on the first A trial collapsed across presentations one and two.  While 
performance was credibly worse on both B trials than the first A trial, an interaction effect 
indicates performance was even poorer between the A trial and the second task presentation B 
trial (Table 2). Overall the difference between making an error on the first A trial versus the B 
trial was lower for the first task presentation (median 0.23 greater chance of making an error on 
B than A, 95% interval 0.06 – 0.41) than for the second presentation (median 0.45 greater chance 
of making an error on B than A, 95% interval 0.25 – 0.63). 
 
 
No effect of age   While those who committed preservative errors were predicted to be older 
(median of 4.2 years), this difference was not found to be credible (95% confidence interval of -
1.75 to 10.18 years; Appendix 2 Tables 10 and 11; Appendix 2 Fig.  9). 
 
 
Table 2  
Model predictions for probability of error on 1st A and B trials by presentation order 
Trial Type Median 2.5% 97.5% 
1st A (collapsed) 0.16 0.08 0.25 
Presentation 1 B 0.39 0.24 0.54 
Presentation 2 B 0.61 0.44 0.78 
The median is the predicted average probability of error on the A trials and B trial for 1
st
 and 
2
nd
 task presentations of the paradigm. 2.5% and 97.5% represent the 95% confidence interval 
of the probability of error 
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3.   DISCUSSION 
When chimpanzees had a well-established initial search pattern of reaching for A, they 
displayed difficulty inhibiting this response and flexibly switching to searching at the new B 
location. Chimpanzees performed near ceiling level on the A trials, but at chance on the B trial. 
Although delaying presentation between a hiding event and opportunity to search has been found 
to result in erroneous searching in chimpanzees (Barth & Call, 2006), we did not find an effect 
 
 
Fig. 3 
Posterior distributions of probability of error for first A and B trials. Light grey shading shows 
the 95% highest posterior density interval for each trial. Dark grey shading shows the overlap in 
expected marginal probabilities of committing an error between trials. The black outline reflects 
performance on first A trials (collapsed across presentations) and pink for B trials on 1st and 
2nd presentations 
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of delaying presentation on the B trial. This is perhaps because chimpanzees here had only a 15 
second delay, instead of the 30 seconds in the study of Barth and Call (2006). However in our 
own study, the high prepotency of the initial response alone was enough to reveal an inhibition 
issue without the additional taxation on working memory. Our finding no effect of delay on task 
performance suggests that the perseverative errors seen here were a result of an inhibition 
problem, as opposed to limited working memory per se. 
That chimpanzees did not perform at chance on their first A trial indicates they 
understood the contingencies of the task, and did not need to learn how to solve the task via 
associative learning or some procedural rule. However, although there is little indication that 
chimpanzees did not understand the task, we should consider habit formation as one reason we 
see a perseverative error. Research suggests that whilst behaviours may begin as goal-oriented 
responses (such as ‘reach to the location of the grape’), there may be a gradual crossover from 
this action-outcome responding (model based), to more habitual responding (model free). Smith 
and Graybiel (2016) highlight that while initially the brain prefers to engage in more flexible 
behaviour to afford learning of the task contingencies, over repeated, reinforced responding, 
solutions gradually come under the control of a system responsible for more automatic, goal -
insensitive behaviour. This may serve to reduce the cognitive or computational demands of goal-
oriented actions, which require holding in mind multiple representations of actions and 
outcomes, but at the expense of flexible responding as the individual is not ‘thinking’ about their 
behaviour. The interplay between habit formation and executive function processes (such as 
inhibition and working memory) in relation to chimpanzee behaviour is an important avenue of 
future research. 
Another consideration, and avenue for research, is how the number of A trials 
administered affects error rate on the B trial. We have not systematically investigated this here, 
setting a minimum criterion of prepotency. However, Marcovitch and Zelazo (2006) found an 
‘inverted U shape’ relationship between number of A trials and error response on the B trial in 
children: instead of the likelihood of error increasing in a liner fashion with A trials, it was found 
that a perseverative error was more likely to occur with a moderate number of A trials, but less 
likely when too few or too many A trials were administered. Marcovitch and Zelazo reasoned 
this may be because as A trials increase, children begin to consciously reflect on their decisions, 
affording improved performance on the B trial. This would be a fascinating area to explore 
comparatively with chimpanzees to determine if they, like children, show this pattern of response. 
3.1 CONCLUSION 
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Inhibitory control is a vital component of behavioural flexibility. While this A not B task 
examined flexibility of search patterns in a relatively simple way, our results suggest that 
chimpanzees are likely to perseverate with a highly-practiced response in the face of a more 
optimal alternative. This draws parallels with research showing that chimpanzees will continue to 
use sub-optimal behaviours despite witnessing more productive (Hrubesch et al., 2009; Marshall-
Pescini & Whiten 2008) or efficient alternatives (Davis et al., 2016). Although behavioural 
conservatism is often suggested to be explicable through low-fidelity copying of witnessed 
behaviours (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009), or suboptimal social learning heuristics (Dean et 
al., 2012), it may also be that conservatism arises through executive function processes, such as 
difficulties with inhibiting a well-established behaviour. Interestingly, here we found evidence of 
an order effect, where individuals performed worse on their second presentation of the A not B 
task (i.e. were more likely to make a perseverative search error on the B trial). This suggests that 
there was a lasting effect from the first task, with response prepotency to reach for A further 
heightened during the second presentation. Given that some cultural behaviours in chimpanzees 
are well-practiced solutions to foraging problems, which persist over time (e.g. Mercader et al., 
2007), these results indicate that such behaviours may be particularly difficult to flexibly modify. 
We propose cognitive accounts of behavioural flexibility may help explain the relative stasis of 
chimpanzee culture.  
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ABSTRACT 
Cumulative culture is rare, if not altogether absent in non-human species. At the foundation of 
cumulative learning is the ability to flexibly modify, relinquish or build upon prior behaviors to 
make them more productive or efficient. Within the primate literature, a failure to optimize 
solutions in this way is often proposed to derive from low-fidelity copying of witnessed behaviors, 
sub-optimal social learning heuristics, or a lack of relevant socio-cognitive adaptations. However, 
humans can also be markedly inflexible in their behaviors, perseverating with, or becoming 
fixated on outdated or inappropriate responses. Humans show differential patterns of flexibility 
as a function of cognitive load, exhibiting difficulties with inhibiting sub-optimal behaviors when 
there are high demands on working memory. We present a series of studies on captive 
chimpanzees which indicate ape behavioral conservatism may be underlain by similar 
constraints; chimpanzees showed relatively little conservatism when behavioral optimization 
involved the inhibition of a well-established but simple solution, or the addition of a simple 
modification to a well-established but complex solution. In contrast, when behavioral 
optimization involved the inhibition of a well-established but complex solution, chimpanzees 
showed evidence of conservatism. We propose that conservatism is linked to behavioral 
complexity, potentially mediated by cognitive resource availability, and may be an important 
factor in the evolution of cumulative culture.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Human culture is extraordinarily flexible in nature, exemplified by extensive 
diversification in technology and social practices. Behavioral flexibility forms not only the 
bedrock of this diversity but is a vital prerequisite for cumulative culture, affording the ability to 
build on established behaviors by modifying old solutions, and flexibly switching to more 
productive or efficient ones. Yet, our closest living relatives, chimpanzees, are reported to show 
difficulty in changing their solutions despite the availability of superior alternatives.  Behavioral 
conservatism, whereby prior knowledge appears to block or delay adoption of an alternative 
behavior (Lehner, Burkart, & Schaik, 2011; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008), may help explain 
the relatively static and simple nature of chimpanzee culture. 
1.1 BEHAVIORAL INFLEXIBILITY IN HUMANS AND CHIMPANZEES  
Given the adaptive advantage of behavioral flexibility in solution optimization 
(convergence on the most productive or efficient behaviors), one might wonder why any species 
would exhibit highly conservative tendencies. Strikingly though, inflexibility in action or thought 
is well documented in human children (e.g. Carr et al., 2015; Defeyter & German, 2003; Jordan 
& Morton, 2012; Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003; Zelazo, Müller, Frye, & Marcovitch, 
2003), as well as in human adults (e.g. Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008a; Bilalić, McLeod & 
Gobet, 2008b; Chrysikou et al., 2013; Diamond, 2005; German & Barrett, 2005; Gopnik, 
Griffiths, & Lucas, 2015; Luchins, 1942; Pope, Meguerditchian, Hopkins, & Fagot, 2015; Wiley, 
1998). Within this human literature, the phenomenon is more often referred to in relation to 
concepts of perseveration, functional fixedness or mental set (aka Einstellung).  
We suggest that perseveration analyzed in the human literature and behavioral 
conservatism described in the non-human primate literature, exhibit parallels: both involve the 
continued use of outdated responses despite knowledge of a more appropriate alternative. 
Typically, studies with humans involve explicit instructions about the benefits of adopting a new 
response (or costs of maintaining the old one), whereas non-human primate research often 
employs visual demonstrations of improved solutions. In contrast, functional fixedness, or mental 
set, tends to be more closely linked with (lack of) innovation, creative thinking, or insight, 
specifically getting ‘stuck’ on the common usage of a tool or behavior pattern, blocking  solutions 
which would otherwise be easily generated (German and Defeyter, 2003), a blockage overcome 
once knowledge of an alternative becomes available.  
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 There are several mechanisms which may account for a lack of behavioral change in 
chimpanzees (see Brosnan & Hopper, 2014; Dean, Vale, Laland, Flynn, & Kendal, 2013 for 
relevant reviews), such as low-fidelity copying (Lewis & Laland, 2012), or lack of relevant socio-
cognitive adaptations (Tomasello, Carpenter, & Hobson, 2005). Here we examine behavioral 
conservatism, or perseveration with sub-optimal responses, by drawing from the human literature 
to advance a relatively unexplored cognitive account of why we observe behavioral inflexibility in 
our close primate cousins.  
1.2 COGNITIVE ACCOUNTS OF BEHAVIORAL INFLEXIBILITY IN HUMANS  
Changing behavior is a multi-faceted process, requiring attention to appropriate extrinsic 
or intrinsic cues indicating the costs/benefits of exploring alternative behaviors, the inhibition of 
the now outdated, inefficient or inappropriate response, and the ability to switch from this old 
response to a new one, which must be held in working memory (for a review see Bari & Robbins, 
2013; Diamond, 2013). 
 Much research suggests that flexibility of response is affected by executive functions, and, 
in particular, links perseveration to two important factors: response pre-potency and working 
memory load (Grandjean & Collette, 2011; Roberts, Hager, & Heron, 1994; Roberts & 
Pennington, 1996). Extensive practice causes behavior to become a prepotent response, that is 
“reflexive actions, either innate or well established through a great deal of experience.” (Miller, 
2000), making it more difficult for this behavior to be subsequently relinquished through 
inhibitory processes (e.g. Crooks & McNeil, 2009). Research also highlights how increased 
demand on working memory may negatively impact on the learning of effective problem solving 
strategies (Beilock & Decaro, 2007; See also Gathercole et al., 2008).  
Not only might these two factors affect behavioral flexibility, but they may also interact 
through shared neural and cognitive resources (Barber, Caffo, Pekar & Mostofsky, 2013; Bunge, 
Ochsner, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 2001; Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009 (for a 
review); Hester, Murphy, & Garavan, 2004; McNab et al., 2008; Mostofsky et al., 2003) ; for 
example, it has been found that increased demand on working memory creates greater difficulties 
in successfully inhibiting behaviors or adopting alternatives (Berger, 2004, 2010; Chmielewski, 
Mückschel, Stock, & Beste, 2015; Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001; Davidson, Amso, 
Anderson, & Diamond, 2006; Grandjean & Collette, 2011; Hester & Garavan, 2005; Roberts et 
al., 1994; Stedron, Sahni, & Munakata, 2005; see also Kane & Engle, 2003; Marton, Kelmenson, 
& Pinkhasova, 2008; Redick, Calvo, Gay, & Engle, 2011). Taken together, these studies indicate 
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that the more complex the behaviors involved, the greater the difficulty in relinquishing an 
established response and adopting another, especially if an existing response is highly prepotent  
(Houghton and Tipper, 1994; Munakata, 2001). 
1.3 COGNITIVE ACCOUNT OF BEHAVIORAL INFLEXIBILITY IN CHIMPANZEES 
Increasingly, some studies do report a measure of behavioral flexibility in chimpanzees 
(Hopper, Kurtycz, Ross, & Bonnie, 2015; Manrique, Völter, & Call, 2013; Van Leeuwen, 
Cronin, Schütte, Call, & Haun, 2013), raising the prospect that behavioral conservatism may not 
explain the limited nature of chimpanzee culture. Such studies have often been reporting on only 
simple behavioral change, and initial behaviors which may not be considered as well-established 
or reliable solution strategies (e.g Horner & Whiten, 2005; Yamamoto, Humle, & Tanaka, 2013). 
However, chimpanzees appear to show difficulties in adopting, relinquishing and building upon 
behaviors when higher levels of complexity are involved (Davis, Vale, Schapiro, Lambeth, & 
Whiten, 2016; Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012; Hrubesch, Preuschoft, & van 
Schaik, 2009; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008). Interestingly, increased cognitive load, as in 
humans, has also been observed to affect behavioral optimization in chimpanzees (Evans, 
Perdue, & Beran, 2014; Seed, Call, Emery, & Clayton, 2009; see also Seed, Seddon, Greene, & 
Call, 2012), with perseverative responding in chimpanzees linked to human-like executive 
functions, namely, difficulties with inhibition (Vlamings, Hare, & Call, 2009; see also Beran, 
Washburn, & Rumbaugh, 2007). Given these findings, we propose that chimpanzee behavioral 
flexibility may be context dependent, with factors such as response pre-potency and complexity 
of behavior affecting the likelihood of behavioral change, and thence behavior optimization.   
1.4 THE PRESENT STUDY 
To explore the hypothesis that chimpanzee behavioral conservatism may be underlain 
by cognitive constraints similar to those demonstrated in human research, we presented captive 
chimpanzees with solution optimization puzzles. We first trained captive chimpanzees to adopt 
sub-optimal techniques. Solution optimization then required inhibiting these techniques to adopt 
a more productive alternative. One puzzlebox (the ‘Biways box’) involved only simple behaviors, 
whereas a second (‘Pitfall box’) involved a mixture of complex and simple solutions. We assumed 
that complex behaviors would be associated with a higher cognitive load, and thus expected 
chimpanzees to show greater difficulties with inhibition in that case.  
There is no unitary concept of what makes one behavior complex and another simple,  
but we propose two metrics for which we might reasonably assume complexity. The first concerns 
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the learning of new behavioral processes; for example, individuals familiar with simple 
mechanics, such as levers, or sliding doors, do not need to relearn how to pull or slide when 
confronted with novel problems requiring these responses. They must only learn the particular 
affordances of the new problem and then apply known behaviors (Byrne & Russon, 1998). In 
contrast, solutions which require novel action elements must be learnt through some form of 
process learning. Therefore, in these studies, we class simple behaviors as those which are already 
well within the capabilities of the participants, and easily discovered by novices. Second, we might 
assume behaviors which require holding in memory several relations (or sources of variation) 
between objects, such as solutions involving multiple, non-arbitrary, steps, are more complex 
than behaviors which require fewer steps, with the former placing higher demands on cognitive 
resources (Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998). As such, we consider these solutions, which are 
not easily adopted by novices, and which require relatively long periods of learning before 
mastery, as complex.  
With a focus on the effects of solution complexity on behavioral flexibility, we aimed to 
answer the following questions: 
I. Study 1.1 Biways box: Will chimpanzees relinquish an established but simple solution 
and switch to a simple alternative to increase reward pay-off?  
II. Study 1.2. Biways box: Did having an established but simple solution hinder adoption of 
this simple, more productive alternative? 
III. Study 2.1. Pitfall box: Will chimpanzees add a simple element on to an established but 
complex solution to increase reward payoff?  
IV. Study 2.2. Pitfall box: Does having an established but complex solution hinder adoption 
of a simple, more productive alternative? 
2. STUDY 1.1. Will Chimpanzees Relinquish An Established But Simple Solution And Switch 
To A Simple Alternative To Increase Reward Pay -Off? 
2.1 STUDY 1.1 METHODS 
The Biways box could be solved via use of one of two handles, which were distinguished 
by both location and coloring, as well as the action required to successfully operate them (Figure 
1). Operating the top handle (slide handle) delivered one peanut, whereas the bottom handle 
(pull handle) delivered a higher value payoff, the peanut plus 2-3 grapes, the latter being a high 
value food reward for chimpanzees. Both methods were single-stepped and well within the 
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participant’s repertoires. Accordingly, we denote these as relatively ‘simple solutions’: they do 
not require learning of new behavioral processes, or holding multiple relations in mind. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chimpanzees across five groups first learned the slide solution. In three of these groups, 
a conspecific model then demonstrated the more productive pull technique (Increased payoff 
with social information – IPSI – groups). In the remaining two groups, a model also introduced 
the pull technique, but the pull solution produced the same reward as the slide solution (i.e. there 
was no payoff incentive to change to this new technique – same payoff with social information – 
SI - groups). This was to determine if behavioral change was motivated by payoff.  
Fig. 1  
The Biways box is shown in a and b. In a, the black arrows indicate the direction the handles 
can be moved, with the top handle slid to the right to produce the small reward, and the bottom 
handle pulled outwards to produce the larger reward, as shown in b. 
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Given the importance of social learning for the propagation, maintenance, and 
accumulation of culture (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Legare & Nielsen, 2015), we examined the 
effects of social information on behavioral optimization through the inclusion of an asocial 
control condition. Here, individuals experienced the same puzzlebox configuration as the IPSI 
group, but no social information was available regarding the more productive pull technique 
(increased payoff but no social information - IP - individuals). Group conditions are summarized 
in Table 1. 
  
Participants 
Thirty-three chimpanzees participated (9 males; average age: 31.7 years; range: 13.09 – 
50.39) and were group housed at the National Center for Chimpanzee Care at the Michale E. 
Keeling Center for Comparative Medicine and Research of The University of Texas MD 
Anderson Cancer Center in Bastrop, Texas, U.S.A. See Appendix 3 Table S1 for further 
participant details. 
Apparatus  
The Biways box, originally designed for a comparative social learning study (Wood, 
Kendal, & Flynn, 2013), was re-purposed by SJD for the current study. It was transparent with 
the two handles protruding from the front. When the slide handle was slid to the right, it knocked 
a peanut off a shelf inside the apparatus, and down a chute, where it could be retrieved by the 
participant. Alternatively, the pull handle could be used to displace the entire shelf so that all of 
Table 1 
Group characteristics 
Group Group ID Participants Increased payoff Social info 
Increased payoff with 
social info 
IPSI 8 Yes Yes 
Same payoff with social 
info 
SI 6 No Yes 
Increased payoff but no 
social info 
IP 5 Yes No 
Participants: Number of individuals in each group meeting criterion for inclusion; Increased payoff 
= Did the pull method result in a higher payoff than the slide handle? Social info = Was there 
social information available about the pull method? 
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the greater reward (nut + grapes) fell down the chute. The reward on the shelf was always visible 
to the participant. 
Training phase 
Increased payoff with social information (IPSI) groups ( 3 groups, N= 25) Groups 
received five hours of training where a trained, mid-high ranking, female conspecific 
demonstrated the slide solution to produce one peanut. The pull handle was locked so that it 
was immovable (thus making the grapes unobtainable).  Participants were considered to have 
established the slide technique when they slid the handle fifty times over three separate training 
sessions, with no more than two touches to the pull handle (with the count reset at every third 
touch). Such a strict criterion ensured that not only was the slide solution a well-established 
response, but that any pull responses in subsequent testing were unlikely to be spurious, or 
‘accidental’. If an individual showed interest in participating, but was unable to complete training 
to criterion within the five hours, they were offered the opportunity to voluntarily enter their 
indoor enclosures and separate for further training.  
Same payoff with social information (SI) group (2 groups, N= 13) Training followed that 
as outlined above, with the exception that the Biways box was baited with only one peanut. 
Increased payoff but no social information (IP) group (N=5) Individuals were offered the 
opportunity to separate for training, with criterion for inclusion as outlined above. The box was 
baited with one peanut and three grapes, but only the peanut could be retrieved via sliding the 
handle. The pull handle was locked shut. Human demonstrations of the slide technique were 
given. 
Testing phase 
Increased payoff with social information (IPSI) group (3 groups, N=8) The pull handle 
was unlocked. Following model retraining, over ten hours of testing, the model now 
demonstrated the pull solution. Participants could thus solve the Biways box by sliding the slide 
handle (for one peanut) or could switch to pulling the more productive pull handle. When the 
participant removed the reward from the chute, the apparatus was immediately pulled away, reset 
and rebaited.  
Same payoff with social information (SI) groups (2 groups, N=6) Testing followed the 
procedure above, with the exception that the pull handle resulted in the same reward as the slide 
handle (one peanut). 
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Increased payoff but no social information (IP) group (N=5) Testing was terminated after 
participants had completed 115 solutions. This number was chosen as this was more than 100 
beyond the average number taken before switching in the IPSI group (median = 13.5), and 
exceeded the maximum number taken by any IPSI individual before switching to the pull handle 
(range of 1-114). 
Coding and analyses  
Training and testing phases were narrated and visually recorded using a HC-920 
Panasonic camcorder, with responses coded through video analysis. A slide or pull behavior was 
coded when a participant manipulated only the slide or pull handle respectively.  Manipulation 
of both handles was coded as ‘both’. Convergence on the pull handle occurred when an 
individual used the pull technique on three consecutive occasions. Reversions were using the 
slide handle or both handles once a participant had switched to the pull technique.  
Data were analyzed using Bayesian methods generated by the ‘rethinking’ package in R 
(McElreath, 2016), which was used for analyses throughout the studies reported. Appendix 3 
describes the analyses in detail, and reports the results of alternative methods of statistical 
analyses, including a frequentist approach. Throughout analyses, a 95% confidence (or credible) 
interval is reported. This is the interval between which 95% of plausible values lie. The average 
value reported is the most probable of all these. Predictions generated by modelling procedures 
are also reported. These predictions are based off the sample data and attempt to capture 
population level behaviors. How much these predictions deviate from the sampled data is 
reported in Appendix 3. Model comparison techniques are also used to construct and choose 
between different models of the data. This involves inputting different combinations of 
parameters and seeing how well each predict the data in comparison to one another. We report 
here on the models which carry most of the Akaike weight (i.e. best predict the data).  
Here, the model was fitted as the proportion of pull solutions out of the total number of 
responses (pull, slide and both), as predicted by the absence or presence of social information 
and higher payoff. 
2.2 STUDY 1.1 RESULTS 
Participant inclusion  
Eight individuals in the IPSI groups met criterion for inclusion, six in the SI groups and 
five in the IP group.  
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Solutions used  
In the IPSI groups, all chimpanzees switched to using pull on the median 14th solution 
attempt (range 1-114). During the transition of switching, individuals used both handles per 
solution a median of two times (range 0-9). There was little to no reversion to the original slide 
method, with only two individuals ever using the slide handle after switching (Cr used the slide 
method once in his subsequent 81 solutions, and Cea on three of her 84). Use of both handles 
per solution was rare post-switch (median = 2.4% of total post switch solutions, range = 0 - 4.8).  
In the SI groups, where the pull handle resulted in the same reward as the slide, four of the six 
individuals never manipulated the pull handle. Chu used the pull handle once on her first trial. 
Ga used both the pull handle and the slide handle, but with a strong preference for his original 
slide technique (sliding in 199/328 solutions). In the IP group, who had not witnessed a model 
perform the more productive pull solution, no individual discovered it. Testing data are 
summarized in Appendix 3 Table S2. 
Regression model 
The expected proportion of pull solutions for each group is summarized in Table 2 and 
Figure 2, with only IPSI groups predicted to use the pull solution (see Appendix 3 for further 
results). Results indicate a clear interaction effect of increased payoff and social information, with 
no important main effects of either factor alone. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Proportion of expected pull responses for groups.  
Information Median 2.5% 97.5% 
Payoff increase only (IP) 0 0 0 
Social info only (SI) 0 0 0 
Payoff increase and social info (IPSI)  0.81 0.55 0.99 
The median is the expected median proportion of pull response, and 2.5% and 97.5% 
represent the 95% confidence intervals of the expected proportion.  
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2.3 STUDY 1.1 DISCUSSION 
IPSI chimpanzees relinquished a highly established, but simple foraging behavior in favor 
of an alternative, simple solution. Comparison with the two other conditions showed 
chimpanzees required both a payoff incentive (cf Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello, 2014) and social 
information regarding the availability of this more productive alternative, in order to change their 
behavior. However, although there is a strong effect of social information, the lack of discovery 
in the asocial controls (IP individuals) is most likely due to an insight issue, not an inability to 
perform the pull technique; that is, participants likely just did not realize (and did not explore to 
discover) that the pull handle was an available solution. This suggests that having a highly 
practiced working solution may hinder exploration of alternatives (cf Bonawitz et al., 2011; 
Wood et al., 2013), and results are perhaps akin to functional fixedness or Einstellung.  However, 
 
Fig. 2  Proportion of pull responses for individuals in the IP, SI and IPSI groups, with N number 
of participants shown for each group. The line is the mean of the predicted proportion of pull 
responses, with the shaded area showing 95% confidence intervals. The grey circles are the 
proportion of pulls for each participant based on their experienced conditions. These have been  
‘jittered’ around the proportion value of zero for illustrative purposes.  
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when social information is available, this may be capitalized upon to encourage exploratory 
behavior, and more productive solutions thus subsequently found (Montague, King-Casas, & 
Cohen, 2006; Toelch, Bruce, Meeus, & Reader, 2011).  
Most chimpanzees used both handles during any transition of switching to the pull 
technique. This may be a result of trial and error learning, or of some failure to completely inhibit 
use of the slide handle in the first instances of using the pull technique. Although reversion to 
using the slide handle was rare, participants occasionally employed use of both handles post-
switch. The use of both handles during transition and reversions draws parallels with suggestions 
that children, when learning new problem solving strategies, have competing representations of 
these strategies, which overlap and compete not only during periods of transition, but over 
extended periods of time (Siegler, 1996). 
While participants showed a ready ability to change their method of solution, it remained 
to be determined if having a well-established but simple prior solution hindered behavioral 
optimization through delaying convergence on the pull technique. It would appear this was the 
case for asocial control (IP) individuals but, as discussed above, this is perhaps due to a lack of 
exploratory behavior. In contrast, behavioral conservatism and perseveration are more often 
framed in conditions where individuals have knowledge of an alternative solution, and yet 
continue with an outdated or inappropriate response.  
3. STUDY 1.2. Did Having An Established But Simple Solution Hinder Adoption Of The 
Simple, More Productive Alternative? 
Although the previous study showed that chimpanzees could relinquish a sub-optimal 
behavior in favor of a more productive one, it was unclear if having a prior solution delayed 
behavioral optimization. In study 1.2, the numbers of solutions performed before converging on 
the more productive pull technique were compared between the IPSI individuals of study 1.1 
and new, solution naïve participants: chimpanzees who had no prior, sub-optimal, solution to the 
Biways box. 
3.1 STUDY 1.2 METHODS 
Increased payoff but solution naïve (SN) groups (Groups=2, N=9).   
The box was presented to two groups, with both the slide and pull solutions open to 
discovery, with the slide technique resulting in one peanut, and the pull producing one peanut 
plus 2-3 grapes. A high ranking model trained on the pull technique was present in each group. 
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Testing was terminated when participants had converged on the pull technique (pulling on 
three consecutive occasions)   
Analysis  
 The number of attempts taken to converge on the optimum solution was compared 
between IPSI participants in Study 1.1 and SN individuals using a log-linear regression model. 
Further details on this model and addtitional analyses using Bayesian estimatation and frequentist 
methods are reported in the Appendix 3.  
3.2 STUDY 1.2 RESULTS  
 It had taken a median of 13.5 (range 1-114) solutions for experienced individuals (IPSI 
group) to optimize their behaviour by using the pull solution, but a median of only 1 (range 1-
43) solutions for naïve individuals. Analysis revealed that the lower limit of the 95% confidence 
interval of the effect of expereince with a prior, alternative solution was close to 0 (see Appendix 
3). Naïve individuals were predicted to converge on the pull behavior a median of 10 solutions 
earlier (95% confidence interval 1-29; Table 3). However model comparison suggests having a 
prior solution may not have had a credible effect, as models with and without prior solution as a 
variable were given similar weight, i.e. describe the data almost equally as well (Appendix 3 Table 
S6). This indicates a potentially weak effect of having a prior solution. As analysis was conducted 
on a small sample size, alternative analyses were run (See Appendix 3) and did not change this 
conclusion. 
3.3 STUDY 1.2 DISCUSSION 
Having a prior solution resulted in a predicted median of almost 10 more solutions to 
converge on the optimum behavior than those without a prior solution; however, this may not 
have credibly delayed behavioral optimization, with some expected overlap in the predicted 
behaviors of naïve and experienced individuals. This indicates that having a well-established, but 
Table 3  
Model predictions 
Knowledge Median 2.5% 97.5% 
Naive (SN) 3 1 6 
Experienced (IPSI) 13 3 28 
Median solution on which naïve and experienced individuals are expected to converge on the 
optimum solution, with 95% confidence interval 
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simple solution may nevertheless not have a strong impact on behavioral conservatism, or 
perseveration, with a well-known, but sub-optimal foraging behavior.  
To further examine the causes of behavioral conservatism, the complexity of the initial 
solution was increased in study 2. 
4. STUDY 2.1. Will Chimpanzees Add A Simple Element On To An Established But 
Complex Solution To Increase Reward Payoff?  
As perseveration within the human literature is linked to cognitive load and solution 
complexity, chimpanzees were trained to extract a small reward from the Pitfall box described 
below, using a complex solution. Following this, a mid-high ranking, female conspecific 
introduced a simple addition to the solution, which improved productivity. Behavior was 
subsequently investigated over ten hours of testing. Unlike the Biways box, this solution involved 
a multi-stepped procedure, and was not one that could be readily discovered. In particular, 
chimpanzees showed difficulties in the learning of one novel action involving the removal of a 
defense block. Due to the incorporation of this novel element, and the multiple, non-arbitrary 
steps required, we propose that the initial solution for the Pitfall box was more complex than that 
needed for the Biways box.  
4.1 STUDY 2.1 METHODS 
Participants  
 Participants were group housed at the National Center for Chimpanzee Care (N=16, 4 
males, mean =31.9 years, range: 19.8 – 50.9; demographics in Appendix 3 Table S7). 
Apparatus  
A transparent foodbox (Fig. 2) was structured on two levels, with a small reward on the 
top level (half a peanut) and a larger reward on the bottom (two peanuts). This was placed in the 
center of a large, transparent apparatus (Pitfall box; Fig. 2 – only the right side of the apparatus 
was used in these studies). This foodbox could be progressed along the Pitfall box using fingers 
via an open access slot on the front (from the chimpanzee’s perspective). Three doors were 
located on the front of the apparatus (only Doors 1 and 2 were relevant to these studies), which 
could be opened to gain access to the reward within the foodbox. To progress the foodbox to 
Door 1, a block defense needed to be pushed out of the foodbox’s path. A pit (or trap) was 
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located between this block and Door 1, which could be opened or closed by the experimenter 
(Fig. 2) 
Doors can be 
slid up
Dashed line represents 
opening in the floor of 
the apparatus
Pit
Access point (always 
open) cut into door 1
Access strip (opening 
running the length of 
the apparatus) used for 
pushing foodbox
along the apparatus
Pitfall box: Front 
view (participant 
view) 
Door 1Door 2
Door 3
Upper level: small 
reward
Bottom level: Large 
reward 
Open floor
Peanut
Front view of foodbox (inside apparatus)
Solid wallAccess strip used for 
pushing foodbox along 
the apparatus: peanuts 
cannot be accessed via 
this strip
Foodbox
 
Training phase  
Increased payoff with social information (IPSI) groups (Three groups, N=30) 
Chimpanzees were trained to solve the task by ferrying the foodbox to Door 1, removing the 
block defense along the way. At Door 1, the participant could reach in via a small access point 
cut into the door, and take the small reward from the top shelf of the foodbox. The large reward 
was in view, but was inaccessible as all doors were locked shut. Further, the pit was closed, and 
all food reward passed safely over (See Fig. 4 for details). Participants had to perform this solution 
20 times to meet inclusion criterion.  
Fig 3 Foodbox and Pitfall box.   
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Start positon (participant view)
Doors locked 
shut
Pit closed (food 
passes safely over)
Small reward 
accessible
Large reward 
inaccessible
Access point
End positon 1 (participant front view)
Foodbox to be ferried this direction via access strip
Defence block 
pushed out
End positon (Top view)
Food box
Removable barrier: to 
prevent movement in 
opposite direction
 
 
Initially, the designated model displayed this complex method over one hour of training; 
however, it became apparent that chimpanzees were finding it difficult to learn this solution, and 
in particular, the removal of the block defense. Removal required a hard ‘poke’ to the block, 
which caused it to shoot out the back of the apparatus. Many failed to perform this action, instead 
repeatedly pushing the foodbox against the block to no effect. To help solution acquisition, 
willing participants were given the opportunity to voluntarily separate for further human 
demonstrations and scaffolding of the solution. No verbal praise or reward was given for any part 
of the solution, other than the final retrieval of reward from the foodbox at Door 1. This ensured 
that particular elements of the solution were not themselves associated with some reward. 
Once an individual had extracted the small reward, the apparatus was left against the 
mesh for a further 5 seconds. This extended time meant that there was opportunity to explore 
the apparatus in training, thus reducing spurious exploration in subsequent testing sessions 
Increased payoff with no social information (IP) group (N=6) To examine the effect of 
social information on behavioral change, six individuals were offered the opportunity to 
Fig 4. Trained solution to the Pitfall box   
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voluntarily separate for training, following the procedures above. If an individual did not wish to 
separate, they were trained in the presence of other group members, providing there was no 
interference by those individuals.  
Testing phase  
Increased payoff with social information (IPSI) group (N=10) Door 1 was unlocked. The 
model performed a new, more productive solution (Door 1 solution) in her group over ten hours 
of testing and open diffusion. This solution involved using the trained solution with the addition 
of pushing door 1 upwards, giving access to the previously inaccessible large reward (Fig. 5). Once 
the participant extracted any part of the reward, the apparatus was left against the mesh for 5 
seconds, allowing further exploration and ensuring that failure to use Door 1 was not due to a 
lack of opportunity.  
Increased payoff but no social information (IP) groups Individuals were offered the 
opportunity to separate for testing. Door 1 was unlocked and individuals were given up to one 
hour (over 20 minute sessions) to discover Door 1.  
Doors locked 
shut
All reward 
accessible 
Defence block 
pushed out
End positon  2: Successfully building on behaviours
Only small 
reward 
extracted
Defence block 
pushed out
End positon  1: Failure to build on behaviours
Start positon
Pit closed (food 
passes safely over)
Access point
Foodbox to be ferried this direction via access strip
Door 1
Door 2
 
Fig 5. Door 1 solution   
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Analysis  
 To investigte the effect of social information on behavioral optimization, the number of 
attempts taken to converge on the optimum solution was compared between IPSI individuals 
and IP individuals, using a log-linear regression model. Further details on this model and 
addtitional analyses using Bayesian estimatation and frequentist methods are reported in 
Appendix 3.  
4.2 STUDY 2.1 RESULTS 
Participant inclusion  
Ten individuals in the IPSI groups met criterion for inclusion, and six in the IP groups. 
Solutions used 
All chimpanzees in the IPSI groups quickly built on their behavior to improve 
productivity, doing so on their 3
rd
 trial (median; range 1-24). Reversions to the trained solution 
were rare (median 0, range 0-2). Five participants in the IP groups (asocial controls) discovered 
door 1 (median attempts to discovery = 18.5, range 5-84).  
Regression model : effect of social information 
It was found that social information facilitated acquisition of the more productive solution 
by reducing the number of solutions taken to converge on the Door 1 solution (expected median 
of 12 trials earlier, 95% confidence interval of 3-33 trials earlier; Table 4), with a model including 
social information as a variable affecting optimization carrying almost all of the Akaike weight, 
thus describing the data better than a model without an effect of social information (see Appendix 
3) 
 
 
Table 4  
Model predictions 
Group Median 2.5% 97.5% 
IPSI/Social info 3 1 6 
IP/No social info 17 5 33 
Solution attempt on which individuals with (IPSI) and without (IP) social information are 
expected to converge on the optimum solution. 
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General flexibility  
Chimpanzees employed variants of the same solution throughout testing, changing the 
order of the actions required for solution (Appendix 3 Table S10).  Participants also pre-
emptively removed defenses (the block and Door 1 - median of 8 number of pre-emptive moves, 
range 6-51).  
4.3 STUDY 2.1 DISCUSSION  
Little evidence of behavioral conservatism was seen on this task. Not only did 
chimpanzees in the IPSI groups readily build on their complex solution, but employed multiple 
variants of the same solution (see Appendix 3 Table S10), and often pre-emptively removed 
defenses to reward procurement. The accumulation witnessed here was very simple, involving a 
modification that was well within the behavioral repertoire of these chimpanzees, as 
demonstrated by asocial controls who also built on their solutions through individual discovery 
of Door 1. Social information facilitated acquisition of the more productive solution, but was not 
required for acquisition.  
One reason for the lack of conservatism seen here may be due to the simplicity of the 
modification; that is, knowing a complex behavior may not result in behavioral conservatism 
when modification to solutions are simple and do not require learning of new behavioral 
processes. Another reason may be that chimpanzees were not required to inhibit a complex 
solution, as the Door 1 solution incorporated all elements of the trained solution.  Human 
cognitive research has suggested that complex behaviors place a higher load on working memory, 
which interacts with inhibition processes (Diamond, 2013), potentially through ‘using up’ shared 
cognitive resources which may be required for successful inhibition. This results in perseverance 
with an outdated solution. 
5. STUDY 2.2. Does Having An Established But Complex Solution Hinder Adoption Of A 
Simple, More Productive One? 
To further examine potential causes of behavioral conservatism, and the interaction 
between solution complexity and inhibition, the apparatus was modified so that the pit was 
opened. This caused the large reward (but not the small one) to fall into the trap if the foodbox 
was progressed over this, as in the original Trained method and now extensively practiced Door 
1 solution. Door 2 was unlocked and could now be opened to retrieve all reward. Hence, 
individuals in the IPSI groups could perseverate with their old solution, which would result in a 
Chapter 5   85 
 
 
small reward, or they could inhibit their behaviors by not progressing the foodbox over the pit, 
and instead open Door 2 for all rewards. Door 2 was nearly identical to Door 1, which all 
participants had mastered in the previous testing session (study 2.1: median of 59 lifts, range 23-
102).  
The effect of social information on convergence on the Door 2 solution, and thus 
inhibition, was not examined here. The IPSI groups had ten hours of prior experience using the 
complex solution (Trained and Door 1 solutions), which would not have been possible with 
asocial controls, introducing a confound between the effect of social information and experience 
with the solution. We compared number of solutions taken by IPSI individuals against solution 
naïve chimpanzees (i.e. those with no prior knowledge of a sub-optimal solution) to converge on 
the Door 2 solution (evaluating the effect of prior solution on optimization). We also considered 
the number of solutions taken to converge on the Door 1 solution in Study 2.1 compared to the 
Door 2 solution here within IPSI individuals (looking at ease of incorporation of a simple 
modification to a solution when optimization requires building on, versus the inhibition of, a 
known solution). 
5.1 STUDY 2.1 METHODS  
Testing 
Increased payoff with social information (IPSI) groups The Door 2 solution was 
displayed by the model during ten hours of testing and open diffusion (Fig. 6). Convergence on 
the Door 2 solution was taken as three consecutive Door 2 solutions, with little or no later use of 
alternative solutions. 
Solution naïve (SN) group (Two groups, N = 8) A mid-high ranking, female conspecific 
was trained to display the Door 2 solution. Due to time constraints and monopolization of the 
apparatus by dominant individuals, groups had a 15 minute group-interaction period with the 
apparatus before interested participants were offered the opportunity to voluntarily separate  
(either on their own, or in small groups) until they converged on the Door 2 solution. 
Analysis  
To examine the effect of having a prior solution on behavior optimization, log -linear 
regression models compared the number of attempts taken to converge on the Door B solution 
between IPSI and SN groups, as well as between the number of solutions taken by IPSI 
individuals to converge on the Door 1 and Door 2 solutions (i.e. within subjects comparison). 
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Further details on these models and addtitional analyses using Bayesian estimation and 
frequentist methods are reported in the Appendix 3.  
Start positon
Pit open: food 
passes over and 
falls in
Access point
Food box to be ferried this direction via access strip
End positon  3: Successfully inhibiting behaviours
Only small 
reward 
available
Defence block 
pushed out
End positon  4: Failure to inhibit behaviours (Door 1 may be open or shut)
All reward 
accessible 
Doors 1 & 2 
unlocked
Large reward fallen 
into pit and is 
inaccessible 
 
5.2 STUDY 2.1 RESULTS 
Solutions used 
IPSI participants used their old solution a median of 29.5 times (range 3 - 105) and the 
Door 2 solution a median of 51 times (range 0 - 90). Solution naïve individuals used only the 
Door 2 solution, apart from individual Kg who used the ‘Trained’ solution once, before 
discovering the Door 2 solution. 
Reversions and redundant behaviors  in IPSI individuals  
The redundant lifting of Door 1, or removing the block when reward had already been 
extracted, were uncommon (median of 6 redundant actions, range 0-26). Reversions were also 
rare (median 4.5, range 0-8).  
Regression model: Effect of prior solution 
Fig 6. Door 2 solution   
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All IPSI chimpanzees, except individual Ci, converged on the optimum solution (median 
28th solution, range 4 - 99), and naïve individuals on their median 1st solution (range 1-2). 
Prior behavior credibly delayed adoption of the optimum behavior, with naïve individuals 
expected to take 14 fewer solution attempts (median, 95% confidence interval 8-24 fewer 
attempts; model predictions are presented in Table 5 and Figure 7). Model comparison gave all 
the Akaike weight to a model which included an effect of prior solution i.e. a model without prior 
solution as a factor does not adequately describe the data (see Appendix 3). 
IPSI individuals are expected to take credibly more solutions (median 12, 95% 
confidence interval of 4 to 26) to converge on the Door 2 solution than the Door 1 solution of 
Study 2.1. Predictions are summarized in Table 6 and Figure 8. 
Table 5  
Model predictions  
Group Median 2.5% 97.5% 
Naïve (SN) 1 1 2 
Experienced (IPSI) 16 9 24 
Solution on which individuals with (Experienced/IPSI) and without a prior solution 
(SN/Naive) are expected to converge on the optimum Door B solution. 
 
Fig 7. Model predictions for convergence on the optimum Door 2 solution for naïve and 
experienced participants. For Naïve individuals, points have been ‘jittered’ around the value of 
one for illustrative purposes.  
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Fig 8. Model predictions for solution taken till convergence on Door 1 and 2 for IPSI individuals. 
Grey circles connected by thin pink lines represents the actual observed solution number on 
which an IPSI individual converged on Door 1 and 2 respectively.  
Table 6 
Model predictions 
Solution Median 2.5% 97.5% 
Door 1 3 1 6 
Door 2 16 7 27 
Solution on which IPSI individuals are expected to converge on the optimum solution when 
they are building on a known solution (Door 1) versus inhibiting a known solution (Door 2).  
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6. BIWAYS AND PITFALL: SUMMARY 
We do not directly compare the number of solutions taken by those with a prior, sub-
optimal solution to converge on the optimum solution between the Biways and Pitfall 
participants. Although the manipulation of task complexity is our variable of interest, the effect 
of a prior solution can only be deduced from analysis that includes naïve individuals faced with 
the same task, rather than comparisons between tasks. In the Biways task, there is greater overlap 
in the predicted solutions taken until convergence between naïve and experienced individuals. 
There is no predicted overlap between these groups in the Pitfall task. In the Biways box, naïve 
chimpanzees (Biways-SN) did not converge on the optimum solution right away. This indicates 
that the behaviors seen in Biways-experienced individuals (Biways - IPSI) were perhaps similar 
to naive controls, and may not have been the result of perseveration. We cannot apply this 
reasoning to the Pitfall behaviors though, as the naïve individuals (Pitfall –SN) immediately 
converged on the optimum solution and so acted very differently from the experienced 
individuals (Pitfall – IPSI), who perseverated. We conclude there is a stronger and more credible 
effect of a complex prior solution. 
7. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Chimpanzees showed relatively little conservatism when behavior optimization involved 
the inhibition of a well-established but simple solution (Study 1.2), or addition of a simple 
modification to a well-established but complex solution (Study 2.1). Such changes were facilitated 
by viewing a model perform the improved solution (Studies 1.1 and 2.1). In contrast, when 
behavioral optimization involved the inhibition of a well-established but complex solution, 
chimpanzees showed evidence of conservatism (Study 2.2). This was indicated by two separate 
findings: 
 
I. Chimpanzees with a prior, sub-optimal solution (Pitfall -IPSI) took longer to converge on 
the optimum solution than chimpanzees who had no prior solution (Pitfall-SN); and 
II. Chimpanzees with a prior, sub-optimal solution (Pitfall-IPSI) quickly optimized their 
established behaviors when optimization required the addition of a simple behavior, 
lifting a door (Door 1), to their original solution. However, when optimization again 
required the lifting of a door (Door 2), but the inhibition of the established solution, 
chimpanzees took longer to optimize their behavior.  
Given that Door 1 and Door 2 were nearly identical, these findings cannot be explained 
by IPSI chimpanzees not recognizing the affordances of the apparatus, as they quickly converged 
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on opening Door 1 under the same conditions (with a pay-off incentive and social information). 
Nor can results be explained by chimpanzees not knowing how to open Door 2, as the opening 
process was the same as for Door 1, and readily discovered by solution-naïve chimpanzees. We 
therefore conclude that behavioral conservatism was caused in this case by a failure to inhibit a 
well-established solution. Further, given that chimpanzees did not show as strong an inability to 
inhibit their established solution when that solution was simple in nature (Study 1.2), we further 
propose that behavioral conservatism may be context dependent: behavioral conservatism is not 
due to an inhibition problem per se, but rather the inhibition of complex behaviors. Complex 
behaviors very likely place a higher demand on cognitive processes , such as working memory, 
which may limit the resources needed for inhibition. Thus, in line with human research, 
conservatism may be caused by limited cognitive resources. We suggest the consideration of task 
complexity may help account for the divergent findings within the primate literature on 
chimpanzees’ behavioral flexibility. 
7.1 HABIT FORMATION AND CHUNKING 
As an alternative view, it could be that the original behaviors in both Biways and Pitfall 
were so well practiced that they became habitual. In habit formation, complex action sequences 
may be ‘chunked’ into a single executable unit, potentially reducing the cognitive resources 
needed to employ the solution, as the relationships between actions and outcomes do not have 
to be held in mind, so potentially more resilient to outcome dependent change (see Smith & 
Graybiel, 2014, 2016 for a review). Building on a chunked solution may not be as difficult as 
interrupting or changing the intrinsic contents of the chunk. In the Pitfall study 2.2, participants 
would have had to do just this: stop halfway along a chunked sequence and insert a new behavior, 
something they were not required to do in Biways or Pitfall study 2.1. This suggests that 
complexity of behavior affects behavioral optimization not because of limited cognitive resources 
per se, but rather because mechanisms such as chunking may reduce cognitive resource use by 
making complex behavior less computationally demanding. 
Although we are not ruling out this alternative, we do suggest that the flexible use of 
multiple solution variants (Appendix 3 Table S10), as well as pre-dominant use of only outcome 
relevant actions, indicates that the participants may not have been on ‘auto-pilot’, but were goal-
oriented in their behavior.  
7.2 BEHAVIORAL COMPLEXITY AND CUMULATIVE CULTURE  
Chapter 5   91 
 
 
Cultural behaviors, especially with regards to technologies like those of wild chimpanzees  
(Boesch, Head, & Robbins, 2009; Sanz, Schöning, & Morgan, 2010), can be complex in nature. 
Cumulative change in these behaviors typically involves an increase in complexity, and outside 
of our own hominin line, such cumulative complexity is rare. Our findings suggest that this may 
be caused in part by difficulties in relinquishing elements, or interrupting the sequence, of 
complex routines. Complementary work (Davis et al., 2016) has found that chimpanzees exhibit 
yet higher levels of behavioral conservatism when behavioral optimization involves not only the 
partial inhibition of a complex solution (mirroring Study 2.2), but also the addition of a complex 
element, as opposed to a simple one. In fact, most chimpanzees in the earlier Davis et al. study 
were able to build on this complex solution only by first mastering the additive element as an 
independent solution, and then combining this with their original, complex solution.   
7.3 CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding other vital socio-cognitive adaptations, it is important to consider that 
whilst chimpanzees may possess some cognitive functions homologous with our own (Beran et 
al., 2016; Carruthers, 2013; Inoue & Matsuzawa, 2007; Manrique & Call, 2015; Martin-Ordas, 
Haun, Colmenares, & Call, 2010; Osvath, Kabadayi, & Jacobs, 2014; Osvath & Osvath, 2008; 
Vlamings et al., 2009), it is very likely that humans have a greater ability to hold on to and 
manipulate more information in working memory (Coolidge & Wynn, 2005; Haidle, 2010; see 
also Washburn, 2016). Thus, we can not only learn more complex sequences of behavior, but 
have more resources available to potentially facilitate behavioral flexibility. 
Taken together, and in conjunction with previous research reviewed above, our results 
suggest that chimpanzees’ conservatism is in part caused by complexities in the behaviors 
concerned, both when relinquishing such behaviors, or adding such behaviors to established 
ones, and this may be constrained by cognitive resource availability. We suggest that these 
behaviors are particularly relevant for cumulative culture, and may partially explain the relative 
stasis of chimpanzee compared to human culture.  
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CHAPTER 6: SERIALBOX 
FOUNDATIONS OF CUMULATIVE CULTURE IN APES: IMPROVED FORAGING 
EFFICIENCY THROUGH RELINQUISHING AND COMBINING WITNESSED 
BEHAVIOURS IN CHIMPANZEES (PAN TROGLODYTES) 
A version of this manuscript was published in Scientific Reports and included as Appendix 5 
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ABSTRACT 
 A vital prerequisite for cumulative culture, a phenomenon often asserted to be unique to 
humans, is the ability to modify behaviour and flexibly switch to more productive or efficient 
alternatives. Here, we first established an inefficient solution to a foraging task in five captive 
chimpanzee groups (N = 19). Three groups subsequently witnessed a conspecific using an 
alternative, more efficient, solution. When participants could successfully forage with their 
established behaviours, most individuals did not switch to this more efficient technique; however, 
when their foraging method became substantially less efficient, nine chimpanzees with socially-
acquired information (four of whom witnessed additional human demonstrations) relinquished 
their old behaviour in favour of the more efficient one. Only a single chimpanzee in control 
groups, who had not witnessed a knowledgeable model, discovered this. Individuals who 
switched were later able to combine components of their two learned techniques to produce a 
more efficient solution than their extensively used, original foraging method. These results 
suggest that, although chimpanzees show a considerable degree of conservatism, they also have 
an ability to combine independent behaviours to produce efficient compound action sequences; 
one of the foundational abilities (or candidate mechanisms) for human cumulative culture.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Culture has been defined as “group-typical behaviour patterns shared by members of a 
community that rely on socially learned and transmitted information” (Laland and Hoppitt 2003 
pg 151), The ability to build upon or ratchet up on such cultural behaviours, creating cumulative 
cultural change (Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993), can lead to substantial gains in productivity 
or efficiency, well exemplified in its elaboration in humans
 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1996). Whilst the 
ability to socially learn behaviours (defined as “learning that is influenced by observation of, or 
interaction with another animal (typically a conspecific) or its products” (Heyes 1994, pg 207) 
may be common across many animal taxa (Heyes & Galef, 1996; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; Galef 
& Whiten, 2017; Reader and Biro, 2010; Zentall & Galef, 1998), cumulative culture is limited 
or, according to some authors,  absent in non-human animals (Boyd and Richerson 1996; Tennie 
et al., 2009; Tomasello et al., 1993). This is most striking when we compare our human cultures 
with those of arguably the second most cultural species, our closest living relative, the chimpanzee 
(Pan troglodytes) (A Whiten et al., 1999). 
Chimpanzees exhibit the greatest number of traditions outside of the human species, 
across foraging, tool use and social behaviours, with each chimpanzee group distinguished by 
their own particular cultural profile
 
(Whiten et al., 1999). Yet, there is little evidence for cultural 
accumulation on these traditions (see Dean et al., 2013). Various factors may contribute to the 
stasis of chimpanzee culture, such as relevant socio-cognitive adaptations (Dean, Kendal, 
Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012), low fidelity social learning mechanisms (Call, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2005), or failure to employ appropriate learning heuristics
 
(Laland, 2004; Marshall-
Pescini & Whiten, 2008). However, cumulative culture ultimately requires the ability to change 
established behaviours in order to adopt more efficient or productive ones; that is, in order to 
upgrade solutions, an individual must possess the behavioural flexibility to relinquish, modify 
and build on prior solutions. Behavioural inflexibility may therefore, in and of itself, limit the 
evolution of culture. With behavioural flexibility defined as “the continued interest in and 
acquisition of new solutions to a task, through either innovation or social learning, after already 
having mastered a previous solution” (Lehner et al., 2011, pg 447),  a lack of such flexibility has 
been found in several experiments with chimpanzees. Marshall-Pescini and Whiten
16
 found that 
young chimpanzees failed to cumulatively modify their foraging efforts by building on their 
exisiting behaviours despite witnessing a more productive solution. Yet, the more complex 
behaviour could be acquired if participants had no prior knowledge of the less lucrative foraging 
technique. This led the authors to suggest that chimpanzees are behaviourally conservative, since 
Chapter 6  95 
 
reported in several further studies (Hrubesch et al., 2009; Price et al., 2009; Hopper et al., 2011; 
Dean et al., 2012; Bonnie et al., 2012; see also Haun et al., 2013) in simple terms, chimpanzees 
tend to become ‘stuck’ on  known behaviours despite availability of superior alternatives.  
These results appear inconsistent with other findings such as that of Horner and Whiten 
(2005), where chimpanzees ‘streamlined’ their behaviours after witnessing inefficient options 
used by others. However, this involved omitting elements (Flynn, 2008; Tennie et al., 2009a), as 
opposed to the additive, ratchet effect required for cumulative culture (Boyd & Richerson, 1996)
 
. Similarly, following social demonstrations in a juice acquiring task, Yamamoto, Humle and 
Tanaka
 
(2013) found that chimpanzees switched from using a straw as a dipping tool to exploiting 
a more efficient sucking function, but this also did not involve additive ratcheting. Such findings 
are in line with records of behavioural modification in the wild (Hobaiter, Poisot, Zuberbühler, 
Hoppitt, & Gruber, 2014; Luncz, Wittig, & Boesch, 2015; Sirianni, Mundry, & Boesch, 2015; 
Stokes & Byrne, 2001; Wilfried & Yamagiwa, 2014; see also Hockings et al., 2015) , as well as 
more recent experiments demonstrating payoff-related variation in simple behaviour, such as 
depositing ‘tokens’ in novel locations to increase food reward value (Hopper, Kurtycz, Ross, & 
Bonnie, 2015; Van Leeuwen, Cronin, Schütte, Call, & Haun, 2013). 
From studies examining behavioural change in humans, we might expect at least two 
factors to have differential effects on behavioural flexibility: the extent to which behaviour has 
been practiced, and the complexity of the behaviour involved
 
(Grandjean & Collette, 2011; 
Roberts, Hager, & Heron, 1994; Roberts & Pennington, 1996). As cultural traditions are often 
well-established and long-held behaviours, and are also sufficiently complex to necessitate social 
learning to acquire them, it may be important to consider how well-ingrained the behaviour to 
be modified is when extrapolating results to chimpanzees’ potential for cumulative culture. 
Evidence now exists that chimpanzees can recognise and adopt superior variants of behaviours 
which are simple and conceptually similar to existing routines (Hopper et al., 2015; Van 
Leeuwen, et al., 2013). Chimpanzees can also relinquish old solutions and build on very simple 
behaviours to form action sequences when these sequences are within most chimpanzees’ 
repertoires (Manrique, Völter, & Call, 2013), as well as relinquish behaviours that have been 
performed but not yet adopted as a reliable foraging strategy (Horner & Whiten, 2005; 
Yamamoto et al., 2013). However, the extent to which chimpanzees can modify, relinquish or 
build-upon well-established, cognitively more complex behaviours, those that perhaps mirror 
cultural behaviours more closely, remains to be established (Dean et al., 2012; Marshall-Pescini 
& Whiten, 2008). 
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In the present studies, we investigated chimpanzees’ ability to build upon socially 
acquired, complex behaviour in the context of improving efficiency. Of particular interest is 
whether a chimpanzee can benefit by witnessing a more efficient behaviour used by a conspecific 
compared to one they currently reliably employ to achieve the same goal, and flexibly switch to 
using this more efficient behaviour. 
A transparent puzzle box (Fig. 1) was used (hereafter ‘Serialbox’) from which a valued 
token could be extracted (later exchanged for a food reward) via either of two alternative 
operations differing in efficiency, with the inefficient method more labour intensive and taking 
longer to complete. The efficient method involved partial use of behaviours common to the 
inefficient method, along with the addition of a novel behaviour. The efficient method therefore 
involved not only streamlining the inefficient method by a subtractive process (noted in some 
studies of cumulative culture (Flynn 2008; Tennie, Walter, Gampe, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 
2014), but also the addition of a novel behavioural element to an established sequence, that is, a 
ratcheting up on behaviour
2
. Participants across five groups were initially trained to extract a 
valued token from the transparent Serialbox via a multi-stepped, repetitive, inefficient process 
(Fig. 1).  To strengthen ecological validity when assessing chimpanzees’ cumulative cultural 
capabilities, this extraction process was completed a minimum of 20 times over several sessions 
until it became a reliable and ingrained response. Three groups (‘social information’ groups) 
subsequently witnessed a conspecific model using the more efficient, solution described in Fig. 
1 and more fully in Methods below. Following repeated social demonstrations, the behaviour of 
participants was examined over ten hours of open diffusion, monitoring any spread of the more 
efficient technique, to better simulate the diffusion of behaviours in a culturally relevant context 
(Whiten & Mesoudi, 2008). 
We hypothesised that if chimpanzees could recognise a solution more efficient than the 
one they were currently employing and were able to switch to this, they should do so once they 
witnessed the actions of the model, regarded as a simulated ‘innovator’ (Whiten, McGuigan, 
Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). To assess how readily chimpanzees could themselves 
innovate and switch to the efficient method without the need for social information, we trained 
two control groups to use the inefficient method but did not expose them to the efficient method 
through a trained conspecific (‘non-seeded’ groups). To investigate how naïve chimpanzees might 
solve this extractive problem when they did not have an established solution to the puzzle, the 
Serialbox was introduced to one additional control group who were not initially trained to extract 
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via the inefficient method (‘naïve’ group). For this group, the problem could be solved by using 
either the efficient or inefficient strategy.  
Figure 1. Serialbox. Along the length of the transparent Serialbox were four compartments. Each 
compartment had a hinged lid on top which could be lifted open (coloured here in green for 
image clarity; in reality all parts were transparent). Under each lid were four finger holes that 
permitted an object (depicted as a purple cylinder) initially provisioned in the left-most 
compartment to be pushed the length of the apparatus. This object could then be extracted 
through an opening at the other end (‘Extraction point A’). This was the inefficient method in 
Experiments 1 and 3. A small door spanning two thirds of the first compartment (coloured here 
in red for clarity)  was fitted on the chimpanzee side of the apparatus and could be pulled open 
using a handle protruding from the outside of the box to give alternative and quicker access to 
the left-most compartment (‘Extraction point B’), where the token was initially positioned. This, 
in combination with lifting the lid of the left-most compartment and using the underlying holes 
to manoeuvre the token to extraction point B, was the efficient method in Experiments 1 and 3. 
The blue square shown in the left-most compartment depicts the indent in the floor in which the 
token was placed throughout Experiment 2. 
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2. EXPERIMENT 1: RELINQUISHING AN INEFFICIENT SOLUTION 
2.1 EXPERIMENT 1: METHODS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual Sex Age Group Wild/captive Rearing 
My F 49.26  Model Wild Unknown 
Ma F 48.26 Social info Wild Unknown 
Cea F 23.10 Social info Captive Mother 
Ze F 11.95 Social info Captive Mother 
Ta F 21.36 Social info Captive Mother 
Co F 30.24 Model Captive Mother 
Se F 15.40 Social info Captive Mother 
Hh F 23.93 Social info Captive Mother 
Cr M 18.78 Social info Captive Mother 
An M 22.86 Social info Captive Mother 
Mi F 24.69 Model Captive Mother 
Sa F 24.71 Social info Captive Mother 
Je F 24.96 Social info Captive Mother 
Si M 24.74 Social info Captive Mother 
Kt F 25.78 Non-seed Captive Nursery 
Na F 23.88 Non-seed Captive Nursery 
Ae F 39.39 Non-seed Wild Unknown 
Ai F 19.21 Non-seed Captive Nursery 
Gs M 22.41 Non-seed Captive Nursery 
Chu F 33.57 Non-seed Captive Mother 
Sha F 23.75 Non-seed Captive Mother 
Ka F 23.56 Non-seed Captive Mother 
Jy M 42.52 Naïve  Wild Unknown 
Ua F 50.53 Naïve Wild Unknown 
Cy M 24.41 Naïve Captive Mother 
Zy M 43.52 Naïve Wild Unknown 
Ha F 48.53 Naïve Wild Unknown 
Table 1. 
Participant Demographics meeting criterion for inclusion 
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From left to right: Individual: Initials of participant (individuals are organised by their groups with 
participants listed under their respective models); Sex: F = female, M = male; Age: Age in years 
at time of testing; Group: Social info = social information group; Non seed = non-seeded; Naïve 
= Naïve group; Captive/wild: Captive = born in captivity, Wild = born in the wild; Rearing: 
Mother = raised by mother, Nursery = raised by human caretakers. 
N = 43 individuals (18 males; average age: 29.1; range: 11.9 -50.5 years; Table 1) were 
group housed at the National Center for Chimpanzee Care Individuals were given the 
opportunity to voluntarily participate and separate from their group for further training and 
testing purposes in their inside enclosures for a period of no longer than 30 minutes. Participants 
were not food or water deprived during training or testing. 
Apparatus  
A transparent, elongated, Plexiglas ‘Serialbox’, measuring 61 centimetres long, five 
centimetres high and five centimetres wide, was attached to a mobile cart and pushed to the mesh 
of enclosures. Along the length of the transparent Serialbox were four compartments (Fig.  1). 
Each compartment had a hinged lid on top which could be lifted open. Under each lid were four 
finger holes (2.5cm in diameter) that permitted an object initially placed inside the box at the left -
most end from the chimpanzees’ perspective to be pushed the length of the apparatus. This 
object could then be extracted through an opening at the other end of the Serialbox (‘Extraction 
point A’ in Fig. 1). A small door spanning two thirds of the first compartment was fitted on the 
chimpanzee side of the apparatus and could be pulled open using a handle protruding outside 
the box to give alternative and quicker access to the left-most compartment (‘Extraction point B’ 
in Fig. 1), where the token was initially positioned.  
Procedure 
Training phase (5 groups, 38  chimpanzees)  
 Chimpanzees were initially trained to associate a small purple plastic token with a reward 
by trading this with experimenter SJD in exchange for one grape. The token was then placed 
inside the apparatus three quarters of the way along the first compartment (Fig. 1). The inefficient 
method of retrieving the token was demonstrated by SJD three times before participants 
interacted with the Serialbox. The inefficient method involved the lifting of each of the lids of 
the four compartments providing access to the finger holes. These holes were used to ferry the 
token along the compartments of the apparatus until it could be extracted from point A. 
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Following these demonstrations, the box was pushed to the mesh allowing all individuals in each 
group access. Once the token was extracted from the apparatus, it was exchanged with SJD for 
one grape. During the training phase, the efficient method was not available because the pull 
door was locked shut, preventing extraction from point B.  If an individual was not able to 
successfully retrieve the token after demonstrations, scaffolding of the solution was provided 
whereby the token was positioned adjacent to extraction point A until extraction from this point 
was mastered, with additional demonstrations given if necessary. The token was gradually placed 
further away until the chimpanzee was manoeuvring the token along the length of the apparatus 
by opening the lids and using the underlying finger holes. Participants were given the opportunity 
to engage with the Serialbox until all participating individuals had successfully retrieved the token 
a minimum of twenty times over no fewer than two training sessions. When an individual was 
successful in retrieving the token, the apparatus was pulled back from the mesh, reset and re-
baited. If an individual showed interest in operating the apparatus but was unable to gain access 
due to monopolisation by more dominant individuals, they were offered the opportunity to 
voluntarily enter their indoor enclosures and participate by themselves until they had reached 
criterion for inclusion in the study.   
Social information groups: Presence of social demonstrator (Three groups, N = 26)  
Model training phase. After all participating chimpanzees had reached criterion, a high 
ranking female chimpanzee voluntarily separated from her group and was trained on how to 
open the Serialbox using a more efficient method. This involved pulling the door open, and, due 
to the positioning of the token a short distance from the extraction point (Fig. 1), lifting one lid 
and using the underlying finger holes to manoeuvre the token towards point B for efficient 
retrieval. Training sessions lasted around twenty minutes.  
Social demonstration phase. The Serialbox was re-introduced to the entire group with 
the efficient method no longer locked. The token could now be retrieved via either extraction 
point A or B. The model was called by name and vocally encouraged to demonstrate the efficient 
method, which all models complied with. Following each extraction, the token was exchanged 
with SJD for one grape. After each participant had witnessed at least ten demonstrations of the 
more efficient method over no fewer than two separate testing sessions, the entire group was 
given the opportunity to interact with the Serialbox. A demonstration was taken to occur if an 
individual was within two metres of the model and the potential observer’s head was orientated 
towards the apparatus. If a participating individual did not come into proximity with the model 
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during the social demonstration phase, they were given the opportunity to voluntarily separate 
with the model and observe her actions. After the model had successfully retrieved the token, 
the apparatus was pulled away from the demonstrator, reset and re-baited.   
Testing phase (N = 11). The apparatus was presented over ten hours to all participating 
individuals with both the efficient and inefficient methods as viable strategies to extract the token. 
After each successful extraction, the apparatus was pulled away, reset and re-baited. To avoid 
cueing of responses, SJD occluded the apparatus and her hand movements with a sheet during 
interactions with the box. The apparatus was not made available to any non-participating 
chimpanzee (i.e. any individual who had not met criterion to be included in the study).  
 Non-seeded groups: No social demonstrator (Two groups, N = 12)  
Control groups experienced the Training phase and Testing phase as above, but no 
model seeded knowledge of the more efficient method.   
Naïve group (1 group, N = 5 chimpanzees)  
This control group was exposed to the apparatus with no prior knowledge of any solution 
over ten hours of open diffusion. Both the efficient and inefficient methods were viable extraction 
techniques.  
Analyses 
Records of the social demonstration and testing phases were both narrated and visually 
recorded using a HC-920 Panasonic camcorder. Responses were coded in situ for all groups, 
with ‘social information’ groups’ behaviour additionally coded through video analysis.  
2.2 EXPERIMENT 1: RESULTS 
Due to limited sample sizes, data were analysed using non-parametric methods with exact 
P values reported. Effect sizes were calculated using the Z score of the test statistic such that r = 
Z/√N, where N was the total number of observations included in the analysis. An analysis of 
interrater reliability using Cohen’s kappa found excellent agreement (κ = 1) between two coders’ 
judgement of whether the participant was extracting via the inefficient or the efficient method.  
Participant inclusion and extractions across training and test phase  
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Eleven individuals in the ‘social information’ groups and eight in ‘non-seeded’ control 
groups met criterion for inclusion in the study (a minimum of 20 inefficient extractions; see Table 
1 for participant demographics; Appendix 4 Table S1 for behaviours in the training and test 
periods; Appendix 4 Table S2 for relative efficiency of the two extraction techniques). There was 
no difference in the acquisition of the inefficient method between the ‘social information’ and 
‘non-seeded’ individuals in terms of number of extractions made during the training period 
(Mann Whitney U = 36, P = .529; Appendix 4 Table S1).  
Within the ‘social information’ groups, to analyse any growing behavioural proficiency, 
the mean time taken across the first ten extractions using the inefficient method were compared 
to the mean time taken across the last ten inefficient extractions, using a one-tailed Wilcoxon 
signed rank test. If an individual did not extract 20 times during the testing period, the mean time 
taken for inefficient extractions either side of the median extraction were calculated and 
compared. Individuals became significantly more proficient at the inefficient method over this 
test period (Z = -2.803, n = 10, P = 0.001, r = -0.63), with a median reduction in extraction latency 
from 47.5 to 26.2 seconds.  
Switching behaviours  
Across this testing period ( ‘E1’), nine of the 11 individuals in the ‘social information’ 
groups and all individuals in the ‘non-seeded’ groups continued to exclusively use the inefficient 
method established during the training period (‘E0’) to extract the token.  
To test for switching behaviour at the individual level, following van Leeuwen et al.
 
(2013), 
the number of inefficient and efficient extractions performed during E0 and E1 were compared 
using a one-tailed Fisher’s exact test. Two individuals (from separate groups) demonstrated a 
significant change of behaviour within this period, switching to using the efficient solution 
(Individual Se: E00,21, E110,16, P = .001; Individual Sa: E00,22, E1179,0, P < 0.0001: subscripts represent 
frequencies of efficient and inefficient methods respectively).  
‘Naïve’  group 
One individual, Jy, discovered and used the efficient method within two hours of 
interaction with the Serialbox. Individual Ua observed Jy’s efficient method five times; following 
three initial failed attempts to open the door, she successfully used the efficient method to extract 
the token in a subsequent test session. Before Ua witnessed use of the efficient method, she had 
unsuccessfully interacted with the apparatus, exploring only the holes and lids. Two other 
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individuals witnessed the use of the efficient method just one and five times each and never 
successfully extracted the token. There was no discovery of the elaborate, inefficient method.  
2.3 EXPERIMENT 1: DISCUSSION 
When chimpanzees used a well-established but laborious solution to successfully gain 
rewards, most were not seen to further explore alternatives, or to capitalise on social information 
available about a more efficient approach. The central finding from Experiment 1 was thus of a 
remarkable degree of conservatism, expressed in perseverance with a well -rehearsed routine 
despite witnessing a more efficient alternative modelled by another chimpanzee. Such 
conservatism has been documented in a series of other recent chimpanzee studies (Bonnie et al., 
2012; Dean et al., 2012; Hopper et al., 2011; Hrubesch et al., 2009; Marshall -Pescini & Whiten, 
2008; Price et al., 2009). By contrast, in the ‘naïve’ group, the efficient method was discovered, 
if by only a single persistent individual, and was later adopted by another chimpanzee. The results 
thus tentatively suggest that having a prior solution may in itself hinder adoption of a superior 
alternative (Hrubesch et al., 2009; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008). Such conservatism may 
have some adaptive value insofar as switching to an alternative may be costly, either through 
cognitive demands inherent to learning or potential loss of reward through lack of expertise in 
this method (Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007; Reader & Laland, 2003). In fact, chimpanzees, who 
at the start of the testing period were already well practiced at the inefficient method, effectively 
halved the time taken to successfully extract the token across the testing period. This indicates 
growing expertise and skill proficiency in their behaviour, and supports previous findings that 
skill mastery may hinder behavioural change (Hrubesch et al., 2009; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 
2008).  
To further investigate the limits of behavioural conservatism, in Experiment 2 the 
disparity in efficiency of behaviours was increased such that the inefficient method became not 
only an unreliable means of foraging but even when successfully employed, the latency to 
extraction from point A was typically far higher than for B. In addition, the alternative behaviour 
needed for extraction at point B was reduced to a single element and did not require use of parts 
of the inefficient method, so subjects had only to relinquish an established solution and adopt a 
novel one-stepped alternative with no ratcheting on prior behaviours.  
3. EXPERIMENT 2:  RELINQUISHING A HIGHLY INEFFICIENT SOLUTION  
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The movement of the token along the length of the apparatus to extraction point A was 
impeded by placing the token in an indentation in the floor, directly behind extraction point B 
(Fig. 1), so movement of the token towards A was more awkward to initiate. However, the token 
could now be extracted from point B solely by just pulling the door open. Raising lids and using 
finger holes was unnecessary. Accordingly, this experimental manipulation made the inefficient 
method more so, and the efficient method yet easier, enhancing the contrast between them 
(Appendix 4 Table S2). 
The 19 subjects who had met criterion for inclusion in the ‘social information’ and ‘non-
seeded’ groups were all given a further ten hours of opportunity for solution and open diffusion 
with the inefficient method partially blocked in this way. Following Yamamoto et al.
 
(2013), if 
individuals in the ‘social information’ groups failed to switch, they were provided with salient 
human demonstrations of the efficient method by SJD after this second period of open diffusion, 
because our question is not about chimpanzees offering such models, but rather how 
chimpanzees respond to such models when available.  The ‘naïve’ group was not included in 
Experiment 2 as not only were they already exclusively using the efficient method of extraction, 
but their initial inclusion was designed primarily to investigate how solution naïve chimpanzees 
would approach this problem. 
3.1 EXPERIMENT 2: METHODS 
Methods followed those outlined in the Testing phase of Experiment 1 Methods with the 
exception that the token was now placed in an indent in the floor located directly behind (from 
the chimpanzee’s perspective) extraction point B (Fig.1). This impeded movement of the token 
along the length of the apparatus. The ‘naïve’ group was not included in Experiment 2. Following 
Yamamoto et al.
 
(2003), if individuals within the ‘social information’ groups failed to switch, they 
were provided with salient demonstrations of the efficient method by SJD after this second period 
of open diffusion (one individual did not receive human demonstrations as she did not wish to 
separate from her group). To avoid unnecessary voluntary separation of participants from their 
group, so long as a participant was able to gain access to the Serialbox, human demonstrations 
were given in the presence of other group members. If instead the participant struggled to gain 
access, they were offered the opportunity to voluntarily separate and given additional 
demonstrations over a period lasting no more than 30 minutes.  After the participant attempted 
the inefficient method, SJD pulled the apparatus back and demonstrated use of the door. If 
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participants were still attempting to use the inefficient method, SJD provisioned the apparatus 
with the door already open, facilitating extraction via point B.  
3.2 EXPERIMENT 2: RESULTS 
Extractions within the test period 
In the ‘social information’ groups, the chimpanzee models demonstrated a 100% success 
rate of token extraction via the efficient method; in contrast, use of the inefficient method had a 
median success rate of only 25% (range 0 – 93%) (Appendix 4 Tables S1 and S2: a failed attempt 
was one in which a participant manipulated the Serialbox but subsequently left the apparatus 
without successfully extracting the token). Success rate became significantly lower in Experiment 
2 (E2) compared to Experiment 1 when using the inefficient method (One-tailed Wilcoxon 
Signed ranks test Z = -2.84, n = 10, P = 0.001, medianE1 = 100%, medianE2 = 25%, r = -.64). If 
participants were successful in extracting the token via the inefficient method, latency to 
extraction was almost two and a half times longer  than a successful extraction in Experiment 1 
(E1 median = 33.6 seconds, range = 24.5–51.8; E2 median = 83 seconds, range 66.1–556; See 
Appendix 4 Table S2 for comparisons with models’ efficiency).  
In the ‘non-seeded’ groups, one individual now discovered and used the easier efficient 
method (Individual Kt), and was witnessed by two other individuals, Na and Ae. These two did 
not then acquire the method; however, they had observed Kt only three and two times 
respectively. No other individual was observed to use the efficient method in the ‘non-seeded’ 
groups, with success rate dropping for all other participants (median success rate of 14.3%, range 
0 – 50%). Success rate was significantly lower in E2 than in E1 for those using the inefficient 
method in the ‘non-seeded’ groups (One-tailed Wilcoxon Signed ranks test Z = -2.38, n =7, P = 
0.008, medianE1 = 100%, medianE2 = 14.3%, r = -.64). Success rate for those using the inefficient 
method did not differ between the ‘social information’ and ‘non-seeded’ groups (Mann Whitney 
U = 28, n = 17, P = .494). 
Switching behaviours  
To assess switching behaviours in the ‘social information’ groups, the percentage of 
efficient extractions [efficient extractions/(efficient extractions + inefficient extractions) x 100] 
observed throughout E2 for each participant was compared with the percentage of efficient 
extractions observed during E0, using a one-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test. There was now a 
significant switch, with five individuals in the ‘social information’ groups switching from the 
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inefficient method to using the more efficient method that continued to be demonstrated by the 
model [Z = -2.023, n = 11, P = 0.031, medianE0 = 0% (mean = 0 %), medianE2 = 0% (mean = 
36.1%), r = -.43; Fig. 2].  
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage use of efficient method in Training and Experiments 1, 2 and 3 for 
individuals in the ‘social information’ groups. The line represents the median, the bottom and 
top of each box indicate the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile respectively, the whiskers show the minimum 
and the maximum values that are not considered outliers (i.e. values > 1.5 times the interquartile 
range from the 25
th
 or 75
th
 percentile), outliers are represented by circle with values over three 
times the 75
th
 percentile value. * indicates a P value of less than 0.05 and ** less than 0.01. 
Human demonstrations  
After additional human demonstrations (median demonstrations given = 12, range = 10-
17), four additional participants from the remaining six switched to using the efficient method in 
the ‘social information’ groups.  
Use of efficient method in ‘social information’ and ‘non -seeded’ groups:  
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To determine the role of social information in behavioural upgrading, a one-tailed 
Fisher’s exact test (applied due to expected values less than 5) compared the frequency of 
chimpanzees using the alternative method between those in ‘non-seeded’ groups and the ‘social 
information’ groups.  A significant association was found between exposure to sustained social 
information and whether or not individuals switched to using the efficient alternative (P = 0.005) 
(Fig. 3). Based on the odds ratio, the odds of switching were 31.5 times higher for those in the 
‘social information’ groups than those in the ‘non-seeded’ groups. As noted above, the two 
individuals who observed Kt in the ‘non-seeded’ group performing the efficient method did not 
acquire it, but they observed only three and two times respectively, whereas those in the ‘social-
information’ groups had a median of 31 observations before acquisition (range 15-169); 
Appendix 4 Table S3). 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of individuals within the ‘social information’ groups and’ non-seeded’ 
groups who used the efficient method across training and Experiment 2. ** indicates a P value 
of less than 0.01 
3.3 EXPERIMENT 2: DISCUSSION 
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In all, nine of the 11 chimpanzees in the ‘social information’ groups were eventually able 
to flexibly change their behaviours by relinquishing their mastered technique and switching to a 
novel one. We infer that this was due to the greater contrast between participants’, inefficient use 
of extraction at point A and the more efficient use of extraction at point B displayed by the model, 
a contrast that involved differences in both latency to extraction and proportion of successful 
extractions.  
An alternative possibility, that the changes occurred because of the extended time frame 
of adding E2 to E1, affording more observations of the model, can be rejected for several reasons. 
First, E1 involved a long period in which any switching at all was rare, and moreover , participants 
not switching in E1 persevered with their inefficient technique despite both multiple observations 
of the model (median 19 observations, range 11-57) and multiple token extractions using their 
inefficient method (median 18 attempts, range 4-119 among those that switched in Experiment 
2). In addition, among chimpanzees who did switch at some point, the number of observations 
of the model did not predict the number of manipulations they would take before switching (final 
two columns in Appendix 4 Table S3). Given these considerations and that (i) only two 
participants were seen to open the door at point B in E1, and critically, (ii) no other individual 
was observed to make any persistent attempts to open the door until their behaviours became 
highly inefficient in E2, we conclude that the switch in behavioural strategy in E2 can be ascribed 
to the change in the relative efficiency of the options that were experimentally engineered 
between E1 and E2.   
Five of the switching chimpanzees showed relatively low levels of behavioural 
conservatism, with two having previously upgraded their behaviours in E1, the other three 
adopting the alternative once their own approach became highly inefficient in E2. This was clearly 
facilitated by social information, as demonstrated by a lack of switching (bar one individual) in 
the ‘non-seeded’ groups. The social learning involved may have relied on only relatively simple 
processes such as stimulus enhancement (of token extraction at point B) or more complex ones, 
like emulation or imitation, and our study was not designed to discriminate among these. In any 
case, stimulus enhancement or any other social learning was insufficient for change despite 
extensive exposure in Experiment 1; it had effects only when the contrast in efficiency became 
more extreme. 
Other chimpanzees still displayed a high degree of behavioural conservatism, in line with 
previous research (Bonnie et al., 2012; Dean et al., 2012; Hopper et al., 2011; Hrubesch et al., 
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2009; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Price et al., 2009), showing a difficulty in inhibiting use 
of a highly inefficient established behaviour, with varying levels of perseveration. This was most 
evident in the ‘social information’ groups, where despite many observations of a far more efficient 
alternative, six individuals continued in their old behaviour for some time, with four only 
switching behaviours following salient social information engineered though human 
demonstrations, and the two remaining individuals never relinquishing their inefficient solutions.  
There was also very little exploratory behaviour in the ‘non-seeded’ groups, with only one 
individual discovering the efficient method. Despite witnessing the efficient solution, two 
individuals within the ‘non-seeded’ groups never attempted this alternative method. This was 
most likely due to their more limited and inconsistent exposure to demonstrations of this 
method, and highlights again the conservative nature of chimpanzee behaviour. Although there 
was no direct relationship between the number of observations of the model and number of 
manipulations taken before switching, no individual within the ‘social -information’ groups was 
seen to switch after as few demonstrations as experienced by these ‘non-seeded’ individuals, 
indicating the potential need for relatively sustained social information across repeated attempts 
to solve the Serialbox. This mirrors findings in humans whereby trial and error learning interacts 
with repeated exposure to socially available alternatives to produce behavioural change
 
(Wiley, 
1998).  
Whilst these results show some degree of behavioural flexibility, it remained to be seen 
whether chimpanzees could express such flexibility in a cumulative fashion; that is, could 
chimpanzees “add an existing technique used in a different context, or an entirely novel 
technique, to an existing technique, and integrate them functionally” (Pradhan, Tennie, & van 
Schaik, 2012, pg 181): could they now integrate the efficient method they had acquired (door 
pull and extraction at point B) with behavioural elements common to the inefficient method (lid 
lifting and hole poking) to cumulatively produce the efficient solution demanded by the scenario 
used in Experiment 1? In Experiment 1 only two chimpanzees were observed to do this, with 
the majority instead sticking to their known behaviours despite potential gains in extraction 
efficiency. Now however, seven additional chimpanzees within the ‘social information’ groups 
and one from the ‘non-seeded’ groups had mastered use of an alternative, independent solution 
(door pull and extraction at point B), which could potentially be combined with other known 
behaviours (elements of the inefficient solution) to produce a compound technique that they 
were previously not seen to use when some of these elements were novel. 
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4. EXPERIMENT 3: MODIFYING, INHIBITING AND BUILDING ON EXISTING 
BEHAVIOURS 
To investigate chimpanzees’ potential for such accumulation, the token was repositioned 
in the same location as in Experiment 1 (i.e. it was removed from the indent in the floor so its 
movement was no longer impeded), and could now be successfully extracted at either point A 
using the methods of E0, or from point B (Fig. 1).  To extract from point B, individuals had to 
employ initial elements from their learned, inefficient technique (lid lifting and hole poking) but 
inhibit the remainder of the sequence resulting in extraction at point A and instead combine lid 
lifting and poking with the element unique to efficient extraction (the door pull at point B). 
Alternatively, individuals could now revert back to using their earlier well-practiced inefficient 
technique, with this method reliably yielding the token, but much more slowly. 
4.1 EXPERIMENT 3: METHODS 
The token was again placed inside the apparatus three quarters of the way along the first 
compartment (as in Experiment 1). The apparatus was presented over five hours to all 
participating chimpanzees (19 individuals across the ‘social information’ and ‘non-seeded’ 
control groups), with both the efficient and inefficient methods as viable strategies to extract the 
token, following the procedure outlined in the Testing phase of Experiment 1 Methods.   
4.2 EXPERIMENT 3: RESULTS 
Extractions within the test per iod 
One individual in the ‘social information’ groups and three individuals in the ‘non-
seeded’ groups chose not to participate during the test period (‘E3’ –Appendix 4 Table S1). 
Switching behaviours  
In the ‘social information’ groups, there was a significant change of behaviour from use 
of the earlier, trained inefficient method, with seven individuals now using the more efficient 
compound solution needed (One-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test comparing percentage use of 
efficient behaviours: Z = -2.410, n = 10, P = .008, medianE0 = 0%, medianE3 = 88.2%, r = -.54; Fig, 
2). In the ‘non-seeded’ groups, one individual, Kt, also built on her prior solution to use the more 
efficient method. No additional individuals in the ‘non-seeded’ group used the efficient method 
of extraction, with four exclusively sticking with the inefficient solution. 
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At the individual level, of those with personal experience of the efficient method (n = 9 
‘social information’ participants and n = 1 ‘non-seeded’ participant), seven showed a significant 
change of behaviour from their initial inefficient method to using the efficient compound solution 
(one-tailed Fisher exact tests with Bonferroni corrected P value = 0.005), whilst three reverted 
back to preferentially using the inefficient method (P > 0.005). In sum, five exclusively used the 
efficient method, three flexibly switched between using both methods, and two exclusively 
returned to the inefficient method (Fig. 4; Table 2). 
Figure 4. Percentage use of the inefficient and efficient solution of token extraction in 
Experiment 3 for each individual with prior experience of extraction via point B during 
Experiment 2. The ‘non-seeded’ individual Kt is underlined, with all other individuals being 
‘social-information’ participants. 
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4.3 EXPERIMENT 3: DISCUSSION 
Seven chimpanzees in the ‘social information’ groups now displayed the efficient solution 
employed by the models. Only two of these individuals had previously been seen to use this 
efficient solution, when this required the addition of a novel element, in E1. The other five, along 
with the innovator Kt in the non-seeded’ group, displayed a cumulatively built combination of 
elements they had learned in E0 and E2. From the results of E3 we conclude that accumulation 
involved the combination of behaviour routines already in the repertoire. One of these, opening 
the door at point B (even if it was the case that this was acquired only by affordance learning 
about the significance of this door, but also if it involved copying the action sequence involved), 
Table 2. 
Summary of participant’s behaviour in the ‘social information’ groups as well as the innovator 
(Kt) in the ‘non-seeded' group.  
 Exp 1 Exp 2  Exp 3 
Individu
al 
Old solution 
somewhat inefficient 
Old solution highly 
inefficient 
Human 
Demos 
Old solution somewhat 
inefficient 
Sa Build Switch N/A Build 
Se Build/revert Switch N/A Build 
Ma Stay Switch N/A Build 
Cea Stay Switch N/A Build 
Ze Stay Switch N/A Build 
Kt Stay Switch N/A Build 
Cr Stay Stay Switch Build 
Je Stay Stay Switch Build 
Hh Stay Stay Switch Revert 
An Stay Stay Switch Revert 
Ta Stay Stay  N/A Stay 
Si Stay Stay Stay N/A 
‘Build’ denotes building on the inefficient solution. ‘Stay’ denotes maintaining use of the 
inefficient solution. ‘Revert’ denotes reverting back to the inefficient solution after having 
efficiently extracted through point B. ‘Switch’ denotes relinquishing the inefficient solution in 
favour of using the door and extraction at point B. ‘N/A’ represents no participation in this 
phase. The non-seeded innovator (Kt) is highlighted in grey. 
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gave rise to behavioural routines that could be combined with parts of an earlier -acquired 
procedure, of opening lids and poking, learned via training in E0. Chimpanzees’ successes in E3 
additionally displayed an ability to flexibly inhibit the remainder of the trained routine for 
extraction at point A. Such capacities for cumulative combination, although modest compared 
to full cumulative culture, could, we submit, provide important foundations for cumulative 
culture if present in ancestral states.  
5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Chimpanzees were trained to use a relatively laborious sequence of actions to extract a 
valuable food-token from a puzzle-box. This initial method was sufficiently complex to require 
socially-facilitated acquisition in most chimpanzees and we ensured it was then extensively 
practiced, to become routine, as in cultural behaviours in the wild. A different, more efficient 
alternative was then demonstrated by a high ranking female conspecific. This new solution 
involved partial use of behaviours in common with the established extraction technique as well 
as the addition of a novel element.  
When chimpanzees could still successfully forage with their established method (in E1), 
only a small minority relinquished this and flexibly upgraded to the more efficient alternative 
witnessed. The predominant failure to switch to the more efficient technique is consistent with 
earlier reports of chimpanzee conservatism (Bonnie et al., 2012; Dean et al., 2012; Hopper et 
al., 2011; Hrubesch et al., 2009; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Price et al., 2009) and may 
offer a partial explanation for the relative stasis of chimpanzee culture. However, when their 
established behaviours were made considerably more inefficient in E2, most chimpanzees 
observing a knowledgeable individual were able to relinquish their inefficient behaviour and 
flexibly switch to using an alternative strategy. When in E3 they were again challenged by the task 
configuration of E1, the majority of these chimpanzees showed an ability to build on prior 
behaviours by combining already acquired elements of their learned use of the door for 
extraction at point B and parts of their earlier technique for extraction at point A. They had not 
achieved this earlier in E1, when success required the addition of a novel behaviour to the 
sequence. The cumulative combinations recorded in E3 thus stand in contrast to the findings of 
previous studies where chimpanzees appear behaviourally inflexible (Dean et al., 2012; Marshall-
Pescini & Whiten, 2008). Our results suggest that in certain contexts at least, chimpanzees may 
combine known behaviours to match an efficient compound technique demonstrated by others. 
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Although chimpanzees show a considerable degree of behavioural conservatism,  we 
suggest these results indicate that they also have an ability to combine independent behaviours to 
produce more efficient compound action sequences. Such an ability, while not yet truly 
cumulative, may be one of the foundational abilities (or candidate mechanisms) for human 
cumulative culture, through the ability to “add an existing technique used in a different context 
….to an existing technique, and integrate them functionally” (Pradhan et al., 2012, pg 181). This 
shares similarities with human studies in which recombination of behavioural variants is 
employed to move solutions closer to an optimum (Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011; Derex, 
Feron, Godelle, & Raymond, 2015; Enquist, Ghirlanda, & Eriksson, 2011; Kempe & Mesoudi, 
2014; Muthukrishna, Shulman, Vasilescu, & Henrich, 2014; Youn, Strumsky, Luis, Bettencourt 
& Lobo, 2015)
. 
that is, accumulation may commonly be brought about through novel 
recombination of existing behaviours creating “innovations without invention, creativity or trial 
and error learning” (Muthukrishna et al., 2014, pg 5).  
Whilst we offer evidence for a potential core prerequisite of cumulative culture, this is 
not evidence of cumulative culture itself, as the behaviours of interest were also produced 
spontaneously by one chimpanzee we studied, and they do not require the combination of multi -
generational contributions by several innovators, which is inherent to full-blown cumulative 
culture (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). Further, our study was not designed to dissect exactly 
how the chimpanzees were learning from the available social information, whereas advanced 
cultural accumulation is thought to depend on high fidelity transmission (Lewis & Laland, 2012), 
as well as cognitively complex learning heuristics (Laland, 2004; Tomasello, Carpenter & 
Hobson 2005). However, chimpanzees in our study were able to use multiple solutions as well 
as to build on and combine prior behaviours to efficiently solve an extractive foraging problem, 
indicating greater potential for cumulative change than found in many earlier studies and 
emphasized in recent reviews (e.g.
 
Henrich, 2015). The accumulation observed here lends 
support to the plausibility that some behaviour exhibited by wild chimpanzees is actually the 
result of a cumulative process, even if elementary compared to that observed in human culture 
(Boesch, 2003; Boesch, Head, & Robbins, 2009; Humle, Snowdon, & Matsuzawa, 2009; Sanz, 
Call, & Morgan, 2009; Sanz, Schöning, & Morgan, 2010).  
 
 
Chapter 7  115 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
Hypothesis 1: behavioural optimisation (use of Solution B) is hindered by having 
knowledge of an alternative solution (A) i.e. behavioural inflexibility limits cultural evolution 
Hypothesis 2: behavioural optimisation (use of Solution B) is hindered by some other 
factor that prevents learning of solution B, but not Solution A i.e. another factor limits cultural 
evolution  
1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Taken together, my results suggest that chimpanzees’ conservatism is in part caused by 
complexities in the behaviours concerned, both when relinquishing such behaviours, or adding 
such behaviours to established ones, and this may be constrained by cognitive resource 
availability. Chapter 4: A not B and Chapter 5: Biways & Pitfall, largely support a Hypothesis 1 
interpretation of suboptimal behaviour, with evidence for both Hypothesis 1 and 2 apparent in 
Chapter 6: Serialbox. I suggest that these findings are particularly relevant for cumulative culture, 
and may partially explain the relative stasis of chimpanzee compared to human culture.  
In Chapter 5: Biways, I found chimpanzees had little difficulty relinquishing prepotent, 
simple behaviour (Solution A) in favour of a simple, more optimal alternative (Solution B). This 
is consistent with some prior research (Hopper, Kurtycz, Ross, & Bonnie, 2015; Van Leeuwen, 
Cronin, Schütte, Call, & Haun, 2013; Yamamoto, Humle, & Tanaka, 2013). Building on some 
of these previous studies, I included controls to find a clear effect of social information and payoff 
on the likelihood of adopting Solution B. Indeed, the extent of behavioural flexibility exhibited 
by these chimpanzees exceeds that of previously tested chimpanzees in a social setting; for 
example, van Leeuwen et al. (2013) found only three of the six chimpanzees modified simple 
behaviour in the presence of social information to adopt a more productive and simple Solution 
B, whereas in Chapter 5: Biways, all chimpanzees did.  This may be due to methodological 
differences: van Leeuwen et al. used a token task, which involves some level of abstraction for 
participants. There were also quite a few instances of reversions whereby having sampled solution 
B, participants reverted to solution A. This may indicate a poor understanding of the task 
contingencies. In contrast, there were very few reversions to Solution A in the comparable Biways 
study. 
In Chapter 5: Pitfall Study 2.1 & Chapter 6: Serialbox Experiment 3, similar to Manrique 
et al. (2013), I found chimpanzees would readily build upon behaviours when all elements of 
accumulation were within their repertoire. However, Solution A in these cases may be 
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considered more prepotent and complex than those in Manrique et al., requiring long periods 
of learning before mastery.  In contrast, when building upon complex behaviours required the 
partial inhibition of Solution A, chimpanzees showed behavioural conservatism, perseverating 
with a suboptimal response in favour of a superior alternative (Serialbox Experiment 1 and Pitfall 
Study 2.2 (cf Hrubesch et al. 2009). This was especially apparent when accumulation involved 
incorporating a novel/complex element (Serialbox Experiment 1). Similarities between Serialbox 
Experiment 3 and Marshall-Pescini and Whiten (2008) exist in that both involved a prepotent, 
complex solution A and a complex B solution, and both saw high levels of preservative 
behaviour; however, it is unclear if inhibition of Solution A was required to use Solution B in 
Marshall-Pescini and Whiten.  
Finally, Chapter 4: A not B sits as something of the odd one out, in that it is a purer 
measure of executive function, and not necessarily representative of the myriad of cognitive 
processes that affect decision-making in real-world situations. It followed to me that if 
chimpanzees do have reduced inhibitory control, we might expect to see this in the A not B 
paradigm; however, it would have also been possible to find chimpanzees performed well on this 
task, as children over one year of age do not tend to commit perseverative errors in A not B 
despite making errors on more complex tasks (e.g. Zelazo 2006). That being said, if children 
experienced the same level of A trials as chimpanzees in Chapter 6, we might expect to see 
greater perseverative errors than on the traditional three A followed by one B trial format 
(Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2009). It is important to note that I did not continue to test chimpanzees 
on the B trial to investigate for how long they would perseverate with solution A. It would be my 
estimation that they would have rectified their solution choices within a few trials, and, like the 
Biways study, not shown high levels of conservatism. Overall, Chapter 4 signals that inhibitory 
control is compromised in chimpanzees, and lends support to a Hypothesis 1 interpretation of 
suboptimal behaviour; that is, solution A directly impacts upon adopting Solution B  
Executive function and inhibition are central themes throughout all chapters, and while 
I comment on how cognitive load likely taxes working memory, and detracts from resources 
required for inhibition, I do not directly say how. It is possible that increasing the load on working 
memory detracts from the ability to amplify relevant information within working memory, or 
alternatively, leaves less cognitive resources to suppress irrelevant information. I do not attempt 
to disentangle the nature of inhibition with the work I have presented in this thesis; however, in 
the next section, I will attempt to draw together different threads of research to speculate as to 
how cognitive load is related to cognitive control, habit formation, social learning and decision-
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making heuristics. These are all important and interrelated factors affecting the optimisation of 
behaviour. Given that cumulative culture is usually associated with gains in productivity or 
efficiency, factors which affect behavioural optimisation are thus highly relevant to cumulative 
culture, if not the same. 
2. CAUSES OF SUBOPTIMAL BEHAVIOUR 
2.1 EXPLORE VERSUS EXPLOIT DECISIONS HEURISTICS 
A key component of behavioural change lies in the heuristics guiding when to stop 
exploiting a known solution and begin exploration for a new, potentially better one (Cohen, 
McClure, & Yu, 2007; Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Dolan, & Seymour, 2006; Montague, King -
Casas, & Cohen, 2006; Holmes and Cohen, 2014). When an individual already has a working 
solution, they may be less likely to adopt alternatives (Strimling, Enquist, & Eriksson, 2009; see 
also Rendell et al., 2010). This may be because the current exploitative outcome of a known 
solution is more attractive than the investment of resources (both cognitive and energetic) in 
exploring alternatives (Holmes and Cohen 2014), which although potentially more beneficial in 
the long term, may also involve a period of trial and error learning during which there is no return 
(Rushworth, Kolling, Sallet, & Mars, 2012).  
This would be especially pertinent when alternative behaviours are complex, and so 
require a relatively long period of learning before mastery (Fang & Levinthal, 2009). Such costs 
of exploration may be offset by capitalising on social information (Montague et al., 2006; Toelch, 
Bruce, Meeus, & Reader, 2011) with more complex behaviours often adopted through socially 
facilitated acquisition (Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009); indeed, human 
culture may be transmitted through mechanisms which reduce the costs of exploration by 
allowing high-fidelity copying, perhaps even without insight into the underlying mechanics of the 
behaviour (Csibra & Gergely, 2011; Horner & Whiten, 2005). Interestingly, research also 
suggests that a potential driving force behind hominin cumulative culture is the recombination of 
behavioural variants (Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011; Derex, Feron, Godelle, & Raymond, 
2015; Enquist, Ghirlanda, & Eriksson, 2011; Kempe & Mesoudi, 2014), creating “innovations 
without invention, creativity or trial and error learning” (Muthukrishna, Shulman, Vasilescu, 
& Henrich, 2014, pg.5), which may be considered another low risk form of exploration (Youn, 
Strumsky, Luis, Bettencourt & Lobo, 2015). 
Additionally, research which focuses on learning heuristics and the trade-off between 
exploration and exploitation suggest a role for social learning in decision algorithms guiding 
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behaviour optimisation, with individuals incorporating an evaluation of their own behaviour’s 
outcome to that of observable others (Burke, Tobler, Baddeley, & Schultz, 2010; Montague et 
al., 2006). Such accounts help explain why social learning can facilitate the optimisation of 
behaviours (Rendell et al., 2010). One key social learning heuristic potentially underlying 
cumulative culture is a copy-when-better strategy (Laland, 2004; Mesoudi, 2011b). It has been 
suggested that animals may not be able to evaluate relative payoffs between their own actions and 
those of others, by, for example, employing ‘copy-when-dissatisfied’ strategies as opposed to a 
‘copy-when-better’ rule (Laland, 2004; Schlag, 1998). This may in turn hinder behavioural 
optimisation and accumulation (Marshall-Pescini & Whiten 2008). Chapter 5: Biways Study 1.1 
presents strong evidence of such an ability; that is, socially facilitated modification of behaviour 
for an increased payoff (also see Hopper et al., 2015; van Leeuwen & Call, 2016; van Leeuwen 
et al., 2013). Another key consideration is how social information is used. In Chapter 5: Biways 
and Pitfall, I suggested that individuals capitalised on the social information available, and 
because behavioural modification in these studies were already well within the repertoires of the 
participants, social information likely facilitated optimisation by providing insight into the 
affordances of the apparatus. What is also possible, beyond how information is extracted from 
observation, is that social information in and of itself encourages exploratory behaviours. By this 
I mean the cost of exploration is mitigated by witnessing another individual successfully using this 
alternative behaviour for, for example, a greater payoff, as this may not only yield some 
information about the affordances or processes involved, but also indicates there exists another 
solution which may be better than a currently held one (Toelch et al., 2011), Interestingly, Nedic 
et al. (2012) found human adults were able to optimise their behaviours using social information 
regarding the behavioural choices of others. However, when presented with only the results of 
these others’ choices (not the behavioural pathways to obtaining those results), this alone 
encouraged exploratory behaviour. This is perhaps because seeing these outcomes indicated that 
a more optimal behaviour existed than the participant’s own current one. Importantly, this 
unguided exploration was sometimes deleterious, with an overall reduction in final reward 
accrued. This highlights an important caveat of social information: In general, when behaviours 
are simple, and therefore easy to master, there is less cost to exploring alternatives as the 
individual will not have to engage in extensive trial and error learning. However, when behaviours 
are complex, and not easily converged upon, an inability to parse process information from social 
information may result in costly exploration, with a decrease in behavioural optimality. As such, 
an ability to engage in high-fidelity copying could be quite an important factor underlying cost 
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reduction when exploring alternative behaviours, and has been highlighted may times, likely one 
of the reasons humans have cumulative culture (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009) 
2.2 EXPLORE VERSUS EXPLOIT AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS  
I believe the Serialbox provides some insights into how chimpanzees optimise behaviour 
when both solution A and B are complex, encompassing support for both Hypothesis 1 and 2, 
and highlights the multi-faceted nature of behavioural change when examining behaviours which 
better approximate cumulative culture. From Serialbox Experiment 1, when chimpanzees could 
still successfully forage with their established method, only a small minority relinquished their 
old solution and flexibly upgraded to a more efficient alternative. Although two out of five naïve 
controls were able to perform Solution B, it took them around two hours before doing so. Three 
other individuals failed to solve either Serialbox Solution A or B despite interacting with the box. 
This is in contrast to Biways and Pitfall where Solution B was converged on much earlier, and 
by all participating chimpanzees. This makes it more difficult to conclude definitively that having 
a prior solution in and of itself hindered behavioural optimisation within the Serialbox task. 
Instead, alternative explanations (Hypothesis 2) may also explain suboptimal behaviour. When 
individuals had a working solution (Experiment 1) the majority did not use social information or 
exploratory behaviour to upgrade to a more efficient behaviour. We might consider that under 
certain circumstances, and as outlined above, when a known solution is still functional, 
chimpanzees may not be willing to invest in learning a new one. Specifically, within the Serialbox 
task, high levels of response prepotency and the complexity of solutions, may have militated 
against behavioural change, as whilst behaviourally the alternative method is more efficient, 
cognitively, it may be quite costly to relinquish an old solution through inhibition, and learn a 
new solution through what may be a lengthy trial and error process (Holmes & Cohen, 2014). 
Additionally, the benefit of this may have been minimal, with gains in response efficiency not 
motivating investment.  As we found no effect of social information on behaviour in Experiment 
1, we should also consider that having a working solution may decrease attending to relevant 
external cues; this is somewhat reminiscent of a ‘copy-when dissatisfied’ social learning strategy, 
whereby an individual is most attuned to social information when their personal strategy is 
unsatisfying (Laland, 2004; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Yamamoto et al., 2013 see also 
Braet et al., 2009; Hester et al., 2009 for related arguments relating to attention and behavioural 
inhibition in humans). However, given we found an effect of social information in both Biways 
and Pitfall, when chimpanzees also had working solutions, we should be cautious in that 
interpretation.  
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In Serialbox Experiment 2, by partially blocking the initial solution, we altered the nature 
of both solution A and B: The decreased reliability of established behaviour A perhaps reduced 
response prepotency. Although participants perseverated quite strongly with this now extremely 
inefficient response, with only a 25% success rate, it is highly likely that over time, response 
prepotency decreased due to repeated failure. The repositioning of the token meant that 
participants no longer had to build on Solution A to achieve Solution B. This may have simplified 
Solution B somewhat, although the action of pulling open the door still remained novel to 
participants. Again, in line with human studies, given the extensive practice chimpanzees had 
with their original inefficient solution, and the cognitive load of behaviours, it is perhaps expected 
that we see high levels of behavioural conservatism with emerging behavioural flexibility: with 
time, new solutions may be converged upon due to a combination of exposure to alternative 
solutions as well as the weakening of response prepotency (Wiley, 1998); that is, behaviour 
resulting from the combination of personal experience with social information (Derex et al., 
2015; Mesoudi, 2011a; Rieucau & Giraldeau, 2011; Whalen, Cownden, & Laland, 2015) . This 
style of learning has been suggested to underlie not only the acquisition of complex behaviours 
in wild chimpanzees but also technologies in our hominin line (Whiten, 2015). It is not possible 
to quantify exactly how social information was incorporated into the behaviour of the 
chimpanzees in Experiment 2, as this would be likely confounded with social information in 
Experiment 1; that is, we cannot say for certain that chimpanzees did not acquire knowledge 
about Solution B in Experiment 1. However, interestingly, studies with humans indicate a role 
for increased attentional control after failures on tasks (Braet et al., 2009; Hester, Madeley, 
Murphy, & Mattingley, 2009).  
This highlights an important consideration of how social information is used. The open 
diffusion methodology in Chapters 5 and 6 is such that continued use of Solution A by 
participants in our experimental groups (IPSI in Biways and Pitfall, social information groups in 
Serialbox), will positively correlate with the number of observations of Solution B by the model: 
both increase as a function of time. To avoid confusion within analyses, I coded social 
information in a binary fashion: you either have it or you do not. However, to paraphrase a 
reviewer who critiqued the Serialbox study during the publication process, it could be that 
chimpanzees reached what may be considered a ‘threshold of information’ which then resulted 
in behavioural change. This is a possibility, and additionally, it may also be that with time, we 
should expect some spurious exploration. However, I would argue that the variability we see in 
chimpanzee perseveration across tasks, not only in my own work but in that reviewed in Chapter 
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2,  may complicate this picture; for example, Marshall-Pescini and Whiten (2008) found most 
chimpanzees did not adopt Solution B despite witnessing over 180 demonstrations. To examine 
if results could be explained by some information threshold, I compared the number of solutions 
taken to converge on solution B between Biways and Pitfall study 2.1, where no or relatively 
minimal perseveration was seen, with solutions taken in Pitfall Study 2.2, where evidence of 
perseveration were found (note that this topic has already been specifically addressed for the 
Serialbox in Chapter 6). If behavioural change is underlain by reaching some threshold of 
information, we should expect to see adoption of Solution B at similar rates across these studies, 
and that perseveration is a result of not having reached that critical threshold. Analyses show this 
is not the case, with individuals within Biways and Pitfall Study 2.1 (no effect of prior solution) 
adopting solution B after an average of 26 (range 3-54) and 7 (1-18) witnessed solutions 
respectively. In contrast, those in Pitfall study 2.2 (effect of prior solution) witnessed Solution B 
10 (range 1-20) times before adopting it. Naïve individuals converged on solution B in both the 
Biways and Pitfall 2.2 studies after 4 (range 0 – 14) and 5 (range 0-10) social observations 
respectively. This indicates that social information as measured on a continuous scale does not 
easily explain the pattern of perseveration seen, and ultimately, very little information was needed 
about Solution B to adopt it. In general though, the methodology I have used does not lend itself 
to this form of analysis: a dominant female always modelled Solution B, with lower ranking 
chimpanzees having to wait until she moved away from the apparatus before they could 
participate. Typically this resulted in a high number of observations of the model, with relatively 
fewer opportunities to personally interact with the task. Overall however, data is most consistent 
with perseveration being linked to the complexity of solutions.  
 I believe the picture changes when we consider behaviour where solution complexity 
precludes either complete innovation by a single individual (as in true cumulative culture), or 
behaviours which are only within the capabilities of a rare innovator (Whiten et al., 2009). Here 
we might expect an interaction effect between having a prior solution and exposure to social 
information considered on a continuous scale (as opposed to the binary analyses I employ). As 
highlighted in Chapter 1, when attempting to learn a complex behaviour, there are likely to be 
repeated learning attempts, which should incorporate both social and trial and error learning  (e.g. 
Whiten, 2015). Therefore, when looking at behavioural flexibility which involves a complex 
Solution A and a complex Solution B, it is hard to disentangle the effects of social information 
from the effects of prior solution on adoption of Solution B, as here social information may be 
needed for acquisition (as opposed to only facilitating it as in both Biways and Pitfall). Further, 
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other considerations that I’ve highlighted above need to be minded, such as how likely an agent 
is to invest resources in learning a complex behaviour, especially if they already have a working 
solution, and how that will be affected by the way in which information is extracted from 
observations (i.e. is process information necessary). This suggests we need to consider 
explanations that incorporate both Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Returning to the Serialbox, Experiment 3 mirrors Pitfall Study 2.1, where chimpanzees 
were tasked with combining known behaviours (or those well within their innovative capabilities) 
to optimise outcome. In both these studies, chimpanzees readily built on behaviours, indicating 
that chimpanzees have little problem with accumulation when composite elements  are known to 
them (cf Manrique et al., 2013). Interestingly though, note that in both these conditions, 
chimpanzees were not necessarily having to inhibit a prepotent response. This is in contrast to 
both Serialbox Experiment 1 and Pitfall study 2.2, where inhibition of a well-practiced complex 
action sequence is required, and where perseveration was evident. Further, both Serialbox 
Experiment 1 and Pitfall 2.2 not only involve a higher level of complexity than Biways (where 
inhibition was also required) but they also differ on another feature; the optimum behaviour 
(Solution B) involves only a partial inhibition of Solution A, and incorporates components of A 
(lift lid in Serialbox and slide box in Pitfall). This is reminiscent of some technological 
accumulation, whereby, for example, the construction process is interrupted at some mid-point 
and modified, as opposed to building onto the end or fully relinquishing the variant. It may be 
that using elements of Solution A primes the full expression of A, making inhibition at some 
intermediate point more difficult than if no elements of Solution A had been employed 
(Houghton & Tipper, 1994). For example, Cragg and Nation (2008) found on closer inspection 
of a Go/No-go task that a substantial amount of inhibitions involved first initiating the response 
and then successfully terminating it before completion, with older children (9-11 years versus 5-
7 years) being better at this i.e. successful inhibition may not be necessarily characterised by totally 
relinquishing a response, but rather, an ability to terminate a response part way through, and this 
may be dependent on cognitive resources (as evidence by the effect of age). Interestingly, this 
draws parallels with research in habit formation, where evidence suggests that in chunked 
behaviours, execution of the initial element of the chunked sequence is a powerful predictor of 
whether or not the full habitual response is expressed (Smith & Graybiel, 2016). These parallels 
raise an interesting question of how we define responses in these tasks: are they goal oriented or 
are they under habitual control? I address this in the next section. 
2.3 SUMMARY 
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In summary, behavioural inflexibility is not caused by just one factor. It is very likely that 
not only are there multiple variables affecting behavioural optimisation, but that they are highly 
interconnected; for example social learning strategies (when to engage in social learning and from 
whom to learn (Laland, 2004)) are an extension of learning heuristics and explore versus exploit 
decision algorithms. These in turn are likely linked to the types of behaviours involved, with 
behavioural complexity affecting decisions, as well as the use of social information. Both of these 
are dependent on cognitive resources, such as selective attention to environmental and internal 
cues signalling the potential cost/benefits of behavioural change (Braet et al., 2009; Hester, 
Madeley, Murphy, & Mattingley, 2009; Padmala & Pessoa, 2010; Rushworth et al., 2012; 
Theeuwes, 2010), holding in memory representations of both past and potential behavioural 
variants, identifying the relevant action sequences, and successfully inhibiting or adding action 
elements to these sequences.  
3. EXPERTISE AND HABIT FORMATION 
When a chimpanzee performs a behaviour many times, and reliably exhibits this 
response, I have commonly referred to this as a prepotent response throughout these studies; 
however, it may be argued that establishing a high level of prepotency is the same as  establishing 
a habit. Both convey a sense of automaticity, of responding without really thinking about the 
response itself. However, perseveration in the context of a habit results not from a lack of 
inhibitory control, but rather because habits are insensitive to outcome.  
Are prepotent responses habits? In one sense, this may be the same as asking is solution 
A learnt through stimulus-response associations. As Heyes (2012) has highlighted, we should be 
cautious in attributing either insight or associative learning to behaviour when we have no clear 
evidence either way; but given that much of this thesis focuses on the underlying cognition of 
behaviour, I will address the possibility that chimpanzees had little insight or understanding of 
the solutions they were performing, and relied on purely associative learning. This is important 
because associative learning can lead to habit formation. Within neuroscience, two forms of 
associative learning are distinguished: action-outcome (A-O) learning, and stimulus response (S-
R) learning. The former reflects learning that underlies goal-oriented responding. It is the latter 
that is associated with habit formation within the historical neuroscientific literature, with agents 
(commonly rats or monkeys) responding to a stimulus with a set behaviour to obtain a reward. 
There is no connection between performing the behaviour and this behaviour having an effect 
on gaining a reward i.e. the outcome (Thorndike 1898). These S-R pathways are thought to be 
simpler than those needed for A-O learning, involving less computational power. However, the 
Chapter 7  124 
 
 
trade-off is that these S-R associations are not sensitive to reward outcome; indeed, the metric 
used to establish an S-R association is this insensitivity to reward depreciation.  
So, are prepotent responses habits? Solution A was not learnt under the conditions 
normally needed to form S-R associations. S-R associations are generally learnt within a 
framework of causal opacity and often under some interval learning schedule which decreases 
the likelihood of recognising a causal connection between behaviour and outcome. This learning 
environment is remarkably different from the environments in which Solution A was learnt by 
participating chimpanzees. Instead, it is more likely, especially in intelligent animals, that if 
chimpanzees lacked insight, then some form of action-outcome learning (trial and error) was 
involved. So in this traditional sense of habit formation, prepotent responses studied here are 
unlikely to have been learnt through an S-R association. However, it may be possible for A-O 
associations to become more like S-R associations with repeated exposure, leading to habitual 
behaviours (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Smith & Graybiel, 2014, 2016). Smith and Graybiel 
(2014, pg 4) state 
“Useful hallmarks for the formation of skills and habit-like behaviours include 
increased speed to start and complete tasks, more stereotypic and routed 
movements through a task environment, fewer deliberations at decision points, 
reduced distractibility, indifference to negative feedback, and increased 
performance accuracy” 
Many of these traits mirror skill mastery, making it somewhat difficult to disentangle the 
difference between expertise and habit. Although the exact mechanisms are still a source of 
investigation, with increasing practice of a behaviour, neural activity may shift from areas 
associated with goal-directed behaviour, to those associated with habitual behaviour (Smith & 
Graybiel, 2016). This is thought to reflect an efficient decision-making framework whereby 
behaviours are initially learnt through trial and error, which allows flexible responding, but with 
reliable reinforcement (i.e. reward), come under control of the habit system (See Tricomi, 
Balleine, & O’Doherty (2009) for an example in humans). This behaviour can be expected to 
remain under habitual control as long as this response is at least partially reinforced (note that 
both Biways and Pitfall experiments saw behavioural change even when Solution A was 
reinforced). This may serve to reduce the computational demand of behaviours, as the 
relationships between actions and outcomes (A-O responding) no longer have to be held in 
working memory; instead the presentation of the problem itself (the stimulus, or cue) leads to an 
automatic response, with no representation of the underlying associations between actions and 
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their effects required (S-R like responding). However, it seems to me we might expect crucial 
differences between behaviours which are learnt through S-R associations versus those which are 
first learnt through A-O associations, but become more like S-R behaviours: If a behaviour learnt 
through trial and error becomes habitual, it is unclear whether this  sort of ‘habit’ would be 
insensitive to outcome, or for how long this insensitivity would be expected to last (Eric Bowman, 
personal communication). As Solution A was not learnt under S-R associative learning, what then 
happens to the action-outcome associations if a behaviour does progress to becoming habitual? 
Is it simply lost? It seems this would be unlikely. My own way of thinking is focused through the 
often used example of being on ‘automatic pilot’ when driving along a familiar route (Solution 
A); we may have decided that we needed to take a detour along this route for some reason 
beforehand (Solution B). What is not uncommon though is that when we end up travelling along 
the familiar route, and upon coming to the crucial junction, we take the most familiar turn (A), 
and not the one required for our detour (B). This is similar to a habit, where we have disengaged 
with the intricacies of the task, and rely on a well-rehearsed pathway. However, once we realise 
an error has been made, we re-engage with the elements of the travel route, and can easily correct 
our behaviour. Put another way, although we may be acting automatically, this does not mean 
that we forget action-outcome associations, or that we cannot re-engage these when we become 
aware that our established solution has yielded a suboptimal outcome (See Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 
2005; O’Doherty, Cockburn, & Pauli, 2017).  
3.1 SUMMARY 
These are important considerations as a main argument of mine is that cognitive load 
affects behavioural optimisation through detracting from resources required for inhibition of a 
prepotent response, and this is responsible for behavioural conservatism/perseveration. In 
contrast, habit formation reduces the cognitive load of behaviours, by, for example, chunking 
complex action sequences into a single executable unit (Graybiel, 1998). This suggests that 
complexity of behaviour affects behavioural optimization not because of limited cognitive 
resources per se, but rather because habit formation reduces cognitive resource use by making 
complex behaviour less computationally demanding. The cost of reducing computation cost 
could potentially be insensitivity to suboptimal outcomes marked by perseveration. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, while I cannot necessarily rule out that solution A has become habitual, flexible 
use of multiple solution variants as well as predominant use of only outcome relevant actions 
indicates behaviour is goal-oriented. However even if behaviour had become habitual, it is 
unclear whether this sort of habit would be insensitive to outcome, nor that we cannot 
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subsequently re-engage A-O associations when we become aware that our established solution is 
suboptimal. Once these are re-engaged, we are potentially back to our initial interpretation of 
complexity of solutions impacting on behavioural optimisation through cognitive load (see also 
Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2009 for a related account of competing systems). However, the neural 
underpinnings of decision-making and habit formation is a complex and evolving field, with 
much research still needed to clarify how habit systems and goal-oriented systems interact (Smith 
& Graybiel, 2014, 2016). Indeed, one of the most heavily researched brain areas in goal-directed 
behaviour is the prefrontal Cortex (PFC), which is thought to be at the centre of cognitive control.   
4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COGNITIVE CONTROL  
Due to its unique patterns of connectivity with many key regions of the brain, the PFC is 
thought to have “the ideal infrastructure for synthesising the diverse range of information needed 
for complex behaviour” (Miller, 2000, pg 59). The PFC as the centre of cognitive control, and 
may heavily influence the allocation of resources to executive functions, which increasingly come 
under top-down control with age (Best & Miller, 2010; Braet et al., 2009; Thompson-schill, 
Ramscar, & Chrysikou, 2009). Specifically, it is suggested that such top-down control is needed 
to override exploitative behaviours; that is, inhibiting the behaviours currently employed 
(Solution A), to enable more appropriate responses (Solution B) (Cohen et al., 2007; Daw et al., 
2006; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Crucially, the PFC is implicated in inhibitory processes when 
working memory demand is high (Reynolds, O’Reilly, Cohen, & Braver, 2012; Simmonds, 
Pekar, & Mostofsky, 2008). This would tie in with studies which suggest not only that response 
prepotency affects behaviour optimisation due to difficulties with inhibiting the exploit response, 
but so too does complexity (See Chambers et al., 2009 for a review). The demand placed on 
PFC resources may make it more difficult for top-down processes to override the exploitative 
tendency, resulting in perseveration. Thus when the PFC is not yet at full capacity, such as in 
children, perseveration is quite likely as there is limited control exerted over cognition and 
behaviour. Conversely, in certain circumstances where behavioural responses are not already tied 
too closely to a known solution (Defeyter & German, 2003), or under conditions of pedagogy 
(Bonawitz et al., 2011; Csibra & Gergely, 2011; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013) , this lack of 
control can actually afford greater flexibility.  
This highlights an important potential trade-off between weak and strong cognitive 
control: increased cognitive control allows for behavioural optimisation because it is associated 
with greater cognitive capacity in working memory and inhibition (e.g. Diamond & Doar , 1988), 
allowing the successful inhibition of suboptimal responses, and the subsequent enactment of 
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more optimal ones. That is, one of the main roles of the PFC is providing top-down control over 
behaviour, and specifically arbitrating between responses. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, 
increased cognitive control also appears to be associated with decreased creative thinking 
(Chrysikou et al., 2013; Gopnik, Griffiths, & Lucas, 2015; Thompson-schill et al., 2009), as well 
as negatively interfering with learning (Doll, Hutchison, & Frank, 2011). This is likely due to top-
down processing biasing cognition based on prior experience (Miller & Cohen, 2001). While 
this is an efficient problem solving strategy for the most part, and characterises complex cognition, 
relying on prior knowledge to guide behaviour (considered an exploit decision) may result in 
suboptimal use of external information. This external information may be capitalised on by 
agents engaging in exploratory strategies, such as novices (Luchins, 1942; Wiley, 1998), or those 
with compromised (Chrysikou et al., 2013) or limited cognitive control (Defeyter & German, 
2003). For example, while young children may not effectively use prior information to guide 
learning, a largely inefficient strategy in complex problem solving, it may be the very thing that 
allows them to acquire the foundational skills and knowledge that adult cognition is built upon, 
for example, language competence (Romberg & Saffran, 2010). 
As highlighted by Diamond (2013), a lack of creative thinking may be more closely linked 
to that of task switching or shifting, than difficulties with inhibition per se. This makes sense if we 
assume there may be some inverse relationship between inhibition and working memory, with 
task switching, such that with increasing cognitive control, there are differential effects on these 
executive functions. In this vein, controlling for age, Blackwell, Chatham, Wiseheart, & 
Munakata (2014)  found evidence that those children who switched on a card sorting task - where 
children are initially asked to sort cards along one dimensions (e.g. shape) before being asked to 
sort along another dimension (e.g. colour) - had better working memory than those who 
perseverated. So far, this picture fits well with the pattern of flexibility being underlain by cognitive 
resource availability; however, there appears to be a developmental period in children where 
inhibition and task switching exhibit this inverse relationship, with stronger inhibitory control on 
a card sorting task linked to weaker task switching performance on a Go/No go task (Blackwell 
& Munakata, 2014). These authors suggest that children who switch may be attempting to 
proactively remember relevant information, which gives them an advantage in switching tasks (as 
they remember the new rule/solution). This is computationally demanding and is likely an 
emerging ability that is correlated with an increase in cognitive capacity (Braver, 2012). In 
contrast, perseverators may rely on a reactive memory strategy, only recalling information on the 
spot when presented with cues. In a cord sorting task, there may be a lack of specificity about 
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which cue is associated with which rule, leading to poor performance (Blackwell et al., 2014; 
Chatham, Frank, & Munakata, 2009). However, on tasks which involve holding in mind multiple 
rules (such as Go/No-go) children who rely on proactive memory (top-down control) may 
overload their working memory system when trying to maintain and rehearse the different rules 
for responding or withholding a response. In contrast, as the Go/No-go task has unambiguous 
cues for going and stopping, reactive children may perform better, showing less perseverative 
errors and/or quicker reaction times.  
It is important to note that this inverse relationship between task-switching and inhibition 
may be developmental in nature, and that adults often show correlations between inhibition and 
task switching abilities (e.g. Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004). However, it has been suggested 
that this trade-off persists into adulthood, but that it is underlain not by limited cognitive 
resources, but rather powerful cognitive control: it may be that our ability to store and hold in 
mind strong representations of goal-directed problem solving strategies slows us down on task 
switching. Specifically, Herd et al. (2014) proposed while increased cognitive control is associated 
with both improved performance on inhibition and switching tasks, strength of goal 
representation negatively impacts upon switching. In this sense, we may be better able to 
understand how creative thinking is sometimes greater in children than adults. As highlighted in 
Chapter 2, a lack of creative thinking is not necessarily due to limited inhibition or working 
memory capacities. Einstellung and functional fixedness are caused by becoming stuck on 
Solution A and subsequently failing to generate Solution B, but should be overcome once the 
agent has knowledge of B (whereas perseveration occurs despite knowledge of B). It would stand 
to reason that the stronger the representation of A, the more stuck you are likely to be on it 
(Herd et al., 2014). Young children, and those with compromised frontal regions, may not 
represent Solution A with the same veracity as an adult due to limited cognitive control. This 
decreased cognitive capacity may lead to weaker representations of A, making it less difficult to 
clear A from mind, and subsequently generate B.  
Overall, if we are to consider task switching and inhibition processes as separable 
components,  the prepotency and complexity of A may affect how well an individual can inhibit 
A, but in addition, the strength with which A and B are represented may also impact upon 
solution choice. In other words, there may be two ways in which Solution A is affecting 
behavioural flexibility: (i) Solution A affects the ability to change behaviour due to solution 
complexity interfering with inhibition processes, and/or (ii) the strength with which A is 
represented may affect the ability to switch between solutions.  
Chapter 7  129 
 
 
5. THE EVOLUTION OF COGNITIVE CONTROL  
The above considerations make it somewhat difficult to compare cognitive control 
between chimpanzees and humans, insofar that we cannot say for certain that increases in control 
are associated with only quantitative increases in cognitive capacity. Evidence suggests that 
humans undergo key cognitive transitions during development (Munakata, Snyder, & Chatham, 
2012), progressing from reactive to proactive control.  At this point, it is unclear whether 
chimpanzees follow the same developmental trajectory as humans. Indeed, it may be that the 
transitions undergone throughout our development hold the key as to why humans are unique 
in their cognitive and cultural capacities. If this is true, which part then reflects the adaptation? Is 
it the fluid, exploratory, bottom-up processing seen in younger children, allowing the extensive 
acquisition of knowledge (Romberg & Saffran, 2010; Thompson-schill et al., 2009), with the 
associated difficulties in inhibiting learnt routines and representing goals? Or is it the strong 
cognitive control of adults that promotes effortful arbitration between competing goals, leading 
to blocks on creative thinking, but ultimately efficient problem solving and expertise? Do 
chimpanzees embody either of these or are they somewhere in between, using a mix of reactive 
and proactive strategies to navigate behaviour? Given that the nature of cognitive control in 
humans is still unresolved despite extensive research, it seems we are some way from being able 
to answer these questions. As a first attempt though, I would like to highlight an important 
consideration: chimpanzees are highly innovative animals (Reader & Laland, 2001), with little 
evidence so far that they actually show set or fixedness. I would tentatively suggest chimpanzees 
are similar to young children, exhibiting limited cognitive control over their behaviours, as 
evidenced by both innovative tendencies, as well as perseveration with learnt routines as a 
function of prepotency and complexity. The alternative view would be that chimpanzees may 
have the potential to strongly represent goals, and are more similar to human adults. If this is the 
case, difficulties with switching to B, instead of inhibiting A, may cause perseveration, and this 
may be linked to an inability to either clear A from mind, to encode information about solution 
B, or to arbitrate between solution A and B.  In my own work, response prepotency was always 
heightened as this better represents the investment made in cultural behaviours, and moreover, 
if a response is not prepotent, what exactly is being inhibited? This leads to the interesting 
question of how to disentangle the effects of response prepotency on inhibition versus the effects 
of prepotency on task switching. Whether these rely on separable components is at this stage 
unclear, but we should consider my results are complicated by the strength with which Solution 
A is represented. However, I remain unsure how solution complexity would impact upon goal 
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representation, and if we might expect to see the pattern of contextual chimpanzee flexibility I 
have outlined throughout my thesis if we were to attribute inflexibility to goal representation.  
6. CONCLUSION 
Cultural behaviours, especially with regards to technologies like those of wild 
chimpanzees, can be complex in nature (Boesch, Head, & Robbins, 2009; Sanz, Schöning, & 
Morgan, 2010). Cumulative change in these behaviours typically involves an increase in 
complexity, and outside of our own hominin line, such cumulative complexity is rare. My findings 
suggest that this may be caused in part by difficulties in relinquishing complex behaviours, or 
interrupting the sequence of complex routines. Furthermore, they indicate that high levels of 
conservatism are to be expected when behavioural optimization involves not only the partial 
inhibition of a complex solution but also the addition of a complex element to this solution. 
Taken together, and along with previous research, my results suggest that chimpanzee 
conservatism is in part caused by the complexity of behaviour concerned. I propose complexity 
affects behavioural optimisation through both Hypotheses 1 and 2. Complex behaviours tax 
limited cognitive resources, placing demands on working memory making it difficult to inhibit a 
prior solution (A). This is supported by findings that chimpanzees have compromised inhibitory 
control (Chapter 4: A not B), and more clearly by findings whereby naïve participants readily 
converge on B, but those with a complex prior solution perseverate with A (Chapter 5: Biways 
and Pitfall). Thus I propose that having a prior solution affects behavioural optimisation and this 
is linked to cognitive resource availability (Hypothesis 1). However, the level of perseveration is 
further heightened when solution B is itself complex. I suggest it is when both solution A and B 
are complex, and when solution A is highly prepotent, that such behaviours are the most relevant 
to the study of cumulative culture. This heightened perseveration is likely for several reasons, 
with the need to inhibit a complex solution, as well as learn a complex alternative, placing yet 
higher demands on resources, and likely posing a cognitive challenge to chimpanzees (Chapter 
6). The complexity of solution B may also militate against the decision to engage in the potentially 
lengthy trial and error learning needed for skill mastery. Further, the heuristics and mechanism 
underling the extent to which social information is capitalized upon may also affect the ability to 
adopt a complex solution B. These latter two considerations are in line with Hypothesis 2, and 
indicate that having a prior solution in and of itself is not the only reason as to why chimpanzees 
have limited or no cumulative culture.  
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Given that chimpanzees are arguably amongst the smartest of non-human primates, we 
might consider that other species, with more limited cognitive resources than a chimpanzee, 
would face even greater challenges than chimpanzees on similar tasks of behavioural change. 
While there have been comparative works completed explicitly examining behavioural flexibility 
through puzzlebox tasks in a range of primates (e.g. Huebner & Fichtel 2015; Manrique and Call, 
2015), the literature does not currently allow as extensive as a review for other primates as I have 
carried out in this thesis. It would be of great interest to begin testing other species on a range of 
behavioural flexibility tasks, especially with regards to abandoning a complex Solution A for a  
simple Solution B. It may be that chimpanzees and humans uniquely share similar executive 
function processes which give rise to the pattern of contextual flexibility presented throughout 
this thesis; or it may be that cognitive resources are a universal l imiting factor on behavioural 
flexibility, and consequently, the evolution of cumulative culture.  
Notwithstanding other vital socio-cognitive adaptations, it is important to consider that 
whilst chimpanzees may possess some cognitive functions homologous with our own (Beran et 
al., 2016; Carruthers, 2013; Inoue & Matsuzawa, 2007; Manrique & Call, 2015; Martin-Ordas, 
Haun, Colmenares, & Call, 2010; Osvath, Kabadayi, & Jacobs, 2014; Osvath & Osvath, 2008; 
Vlamings et al., 2009), it is very likely that humans have a greater ability to hold on to and 
manipulate more information in working memory (Coolidge & Wynn, 2005; Haidle, 2010; see 
also Washburn, 2016), whether resulting from quantitative or qualitative changes in cognitive 
control. Thus, not only can humans learn more complex sequences of behaviour, but have more 
resources available to facilitate behavioural flexibility. I tentatively suggest that chimpanzees may 
be child-like in their cognitive control, exhibiting perseveration as a result of limited cognitive 
resources in key executive functions. Like the weak cognitive control exhibited by children, what 
may appear to be a suboptimal version of a yet to be actualised system may actually be a highly 
adaptive framework. However, instead of weak cognitive control necessarily being adaptive in 
that it promotes creative thinking or language acquisition as in children, by considering 
conservatism from the perspective of expertise, it is easier to see how continually exploiting a  
known solution may be adaptive: it allows experts to efficiently navigate the problem, applying 
skills to find a solution that may be outside of the novice’s capability. With complex solutions, 
involving hard won expertise, we might expect there to have been long periods of learning, and 
thus large investments in this known solution. While innovation may be common in 
chimpanzees, even exhibiting a human like progression from highly exploratory young to more 
reserved adults (Reader & Laland, 2001), exploring for a new solution when you already have 
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one may be a largely inefficient strategy. In this sense, we can perhaps understand why selection 
has not necessarily favoured strong control in chimpanzees. Unlike our own nomadic hominin 
ancestors, chimpanzees live in relatively stable environments (and this is likely true of their 
ancestors), perhaps militating against the pressures needed for the expensive cognitive machinery 
underlying complex control, with subsequent impacts on cumulative cultural ability.  
At some point within our distinct hominin evolutionary past, our ancestors may have 
overcome a conservative tendency, engaging in exploration, creating new technologies and 
accumulated artefacts, adaptively employing behavioural flexibility to relinquish, modify and 
adopt solutions. This may have initially been facilitated through recombination of existing skills 
and technology “creating innovations without invention, creativity or trial and error learning” 
(Muthukrishna et al., 2014, pg 5). Thus accumulation may have originated through a mechanism 
which ultimately reduced the costs of exploration, with these more complex behaviours creating 
selection for a suite of other adaptive functions (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Herrmann, Call, 
Hernàndez-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007; Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Pradhan, Tennie, & 
van Schaik, 2012; Reader, Hager, & Laland, 2011; van Schaik & Burkart, 2011; Whiten, Hinde, 
Laland, & Stringer, 2011; Whiten & van Schaik, 2007). Given what we know about modern 
humans, in an increasingly complex world, selection may have favoured a developmental 
trajectory that initially affords flexible learning vital to the acquisition of core information or 
constructs, (Gopnik et al., 2015; Thompson-schill et al., 2009), such as language (Romberg & 
Saffran, 2010), perhaps capitalising on an already existent system shared with a common ancestor 
with chimpanzees. This then gives way to a more tightly controlled problem solving framework 
(Munakata et al., 2012). This heightened cognitive control ultimately allows for the efficient 
acquisition, arbitration and use of information, which may be necessary for the complex problem 
solving inherent to true technological accumulation.  
 Table 1  
Summary of research findings 
Chapter - Study Solution A Action on A Solution B Conservatism Hypothesis  
5 - Biways Prepotent Simple Inhibit Simple Low - 
5 – Pitfall (Study 2.1) Prepotent Complex Build Complex Low - 
5 – Pitfall (Study 2.2) Prepotent Complex Inhibit Simple Moderate 1 
6 - Serialbox Prepotent Complex Inhibit/Build Complex High 1 & 2 
Solution A: Original solution used with two levels, Solution A prepotency, and Solution A complexity. Action on A: describes if Solution A 
needed to be inhibited and/or built upon to use Solution B. Solution B: Solution B complexity. Conservatism gives a basic description of how 
readily chimpanzees changed behaviours, with low levels of conservatism linked to high behavioural flexibility and high l evels of conservatism 
linked with marked perseveration with Solution A. Hypothesis is which hypothesis I interpret these results to lend support to 
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APPENDIX 1: COMPARATIVE SERIALBOX
Behavioural flexibility in children and chimpanzees:
Improving solution efficiency through relinquishing and
combining witnessed behaviours
Sarah J. Davis, Cristine H. Legare, Jennifer M. Clegg, Rachel E. Watson-
Jones, Daniel Ikejimba, Steven J. Schapiro, Susan P. Lambeth, Andrew
Whiten (in prep)
Phase 1: Acquiring an inefficient solution
•8 Adult chimpanzees housed
at the National Center for
Chimpanzee Care
•Children aged 3-5 years
•Participant observes an adult human use an inefficient extraction
technique to remove a valuable token from the Serialbox
•Participant must perform the inefficient method twice
•Participants are given up to three trials to switch to the more efficient
method (High switch score of 7 if switching on first trial, 6 on second, 5
on third trial)
• If the participant continues to use the inefficient method, they witness
another demonstration of the inefficient method following each inefficient
solution they use (up to three demonstrations total)
•Participant watches the same
human demonstrator use a more
efficient extraction technique
•Both methods reliably result in
successful extraction
Phase 2: Relinquishing a working inefficient solution
Phase 3: Relinquishing an extremely inefficient solution
• Only efficient method a reliable means of extraction
• Token placed in dip inside of apparatus, introducing a partial
block to using the inefficient method (switch scores of 4 through
2)
• If no switching, the efficient method is scaffolded (Score of 1)
7 = switching on phase 2, trial 1
6 = switching on phase 2, trial 2
5 = switching on phase 2, trial 3
4 = switching on phase 3, trial 1
3 = switching on phase 3, trial 2
2 = switching on phase 3, trial 3
1 = switching after scaffolding
0 = never having switched
High
Low
Behavioural
flexibility
Prior solution
somewhat inefficient
Prior solution
highly inefficient
Coding
Results
Boxplot showing latency to switch across children aged 3-5 years and chimpanzees. A switch
score of 7 indicates an immediate switch to an observed, more efficient method, with lower
scores indicating increased latency to switch, and the origin representing no switch to the
efficient method. The red bar represents point at which the inefficient method is partially blocked
Behavioural Conservatism in Chimpanzees
Results replicate those found in Davis et al., (2016), and are consistent
with prior work indicating chimpanzees are behaviourally conservative
(Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Hrubesh, 2009, Dean et al., 2013)
Chimpanzees will perseverate with a complex solution despite potential
gains in efficiency, exhibiting difficulties inhibiting this first learned
foraging technique to adopt a novel alternative
Perseveration in Children
While there is a lot of variability in the switching behaviours of children,
with the median switch scores following predictions generated from
increasing cognitive resources, a more subtle interpretation is needed
when we consider those who immediately optimise behaviour
Bar chart showing the percentage of participants within their respective age groups
who switched immediately after witnessing a demonstration of the more efficient
method.
Switch on First Trial
Executive Function
• Preliminary results show that younger children, who at an earlier
stage of cognitive development might be expected to perseverate with
their prior solution, are often quicker to optimize their behaviour
than older children.
• In fact, a quarter of the 29 five year olds so far tested were never
seen to switch to the more efficient method, despite repeated failures
to successfully solve the task
Indicative that a simple explanatory framework based on availability of
cognitive resources may not be adequate to wholly account for
suboptimal behaviour in children
Normative Behaviour
These results are not easily explained within a normative framework
• Children see the inefficient solution once but the efficient solution
up to 5 times
• We also avoid normative language, using a turn taking procedure
Overall, children do not display strong evidence of imitating the
efficient solution
• Less than 15% of children adopting this method after they first
witness it
• Even for those who do adopt the efficient solution relatively early in
the task, only around 50% faithfully replicate the witnessed action
sequence
Additional Behaviours of Interest
Almost 10% of children open the door in phase 3 to remove the block
within the apparatus (remove the token from the dip), close the door,
and then proceed to use the inefficient method (Insert video below)
APPENDIX 2: A NOT B 
BEHAVIOURAL FLEXIBILITY IN CHIMPANZEES (PAN TROGLODYTES): 
INHIBITORY CONTROL IS COMPROMISED FOR WELL-ESTABLISHED 
BEHAVIOURAL ROUTINES  
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PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS 
Table S1 Demographics of participants meeting criterion for inclusion. 
Individual Sex Age Wild/captive Rearing 
Al F 35.45 Captive Mother 
Hd M 23.62 Captive Mother 
Ty F 44.64 Wild Unknown 
Ta F 47.08 Wild Unknown 
Sn M 31.34 Captive Mother 
Cea F 24.35 Captive Mother 
Ze F 13.21 Captive Mother 
Ae F 40.68 Wild Unknown 
Bte F 37.56 Captive Mother 
Je F 25.36 Captive Mother 
Sy F 44.06 Wild Unknown 
Kt F 26.96 Captive Nursery 
Ae F 20.43 Captive Nursery 
Ka M 35.31 Captive Mother 
Co F 31.04 Captive Mother 
Jy M 43.95 Wild Unknown 
Mi F 25.09 Captive Mother 
Se F 16.25 Captive Mother 
Na F 25.12 Captive Nursery 
Gs M 23.64 Captive Nursery 
Ma F 49.51 Wild Unknown 
Ci F 24.69 Captive Nursery 
Hh F 24.65 Captive Mother 
Pr F 48.95 Wild Unknown 
Oi F 31.09 Captive Mother 
Da F 32.67 Captive Nursery 
Sa F 25.14 Captive Mother 
Hg F 17.62 Captive Mother 
Ca F 34.80 Captive Mother 
Tk F 35.45 Captive Mother 
Sba F 47.64 Wild Unknown 
Bn M 33.91 Captive Mother 
Mo M 26.92 Captive Mother 
My M 50.59 Wild Unknown 
Si M 25.11 Captive Mother 
Ti M 21.91 Captive Mother 
Ko M 24.39 Captive Nursery 
Wi F 33.11 Captive Mother 
 
From left to right: Individual: Initials of participant; Sex: F = female, M = male; Age: Age 
in years at time of testing; Captive/wild: Captive = born in captivity, Wild = born in the 
wild; Rearing: Mother = raised by mother, Nursery = raised by human caretakers. 
 
 
METHODS 
Model construction and choice 
Trial type was coded as 0 for A trials or 1 for B trials. Order was coded as 0 (No delay followed 
by Delay condition) or 1 (Delay followed by No delay condition). No Delay trials were coded as 
0 and Delay trials coded as 1. Models were generated through MCMC sampling. Regularising 
priors were used. As only two outcomes were possible (correct or incorrect reach), GLM models 
were based on a binomial distribution. Given multiple observations of each participant, partially 
pooled intercepts where used in some models to account for individual variation in response. 
Model choice was assessed with reference to Widely Applicable Information Criterion (WAIC), 
along with posterior predictive checks. 
GLMs took the form: 
 
1) 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ~ 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑝) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝑝) < − 𝑥 
With x including parameters based on: 
i) Order: Does performance decline or improve on the second presentation of task   
ii) Delay: Does a delay affect performance 
iii) An interaction between order and delay: Does the presence or absence of a delay 
interact with the order in which the tasks are presented  to affect performance 
iv) Trial type: Is performance on A trials different from performance on B trials 
 
RESULTS  
Performance on B trial 
The relationship between predictors and performance on B trial was modelled as 
1) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟~ 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑝) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑝) < −𝑎 + 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑 ∗ 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 +  𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑑 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 ∗ 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 
Where a is the value of the average intercept, bord is the value of the coefficient of the effect of 
order, bdel is the value of the coefficient of the effect of delaying presentation, and bdelord is the 
 
 
value of the coefficient of the interaction between delay and order (Coefficients are summarised 
in Table S2, along with their 95% credible intervals). Models which did not include a main effect 
of delay or an interaction effect were given most of the Akaike weight, indicating that delay did 
not have a credible effect on performance. However, most weight was given to a model including 
only the main effect of order, with participants doing slightly worse on their second go at the task 
(median change in probability of error of 0.18, 95% interval of -0.04-0.38; Table S3 and S4; 
FigureS1 and S2).  
 
Parameters Mean StdDev Lower 0.95 Upper 0.95 
Average intercept -0.91 1.06 -3 1.12 
Delay 0.01 1 -1.89 2.01 
Order 0.95 0.49 0 1.92 
Interaction -0.33 0.59 -1.44 0.88 
Model WAIC pWAIC dWAIC Weight SE dSE 
Order 86.5 1.8 0 0.71 2.9 NA 
Full 89.4 2 2.9 0.17 4.87 3.94 
Main 90.1 2.6 3.5 0.12 4.41 3.4 
Mean is the mean predicted value of the coefficient. StdDev is the standard deviation. Lower 
0.95 and upper 0.95 are the 95% credible interval boundaries for the coefficient values. 
Table S3 Model comparison 
Table S2 Coefficients of the model parameters for effect of order and delay on B trials 
‘Order’ is a model including only a main effect of order. ‘Full’ includes the main effects of order 
and delay and an interaction between those factors. ‘Main’ includes only effects of order and 
delay. WAIC is the Widely Applicable Information Criterion; pWAIC indicates the number of 
effective parameters; dWAIC is the difference in WAIC values; Weight is the Akaike weight and 
indicates the effectiveness of the model to describe the data; SE is the standard error of the 
WAIC estimate; dSE is the standard error of the difference in WAIC of models (McElreath, 
2016) 
Table S4 Probability of error on first and second presentation of task.  
Presentation Mean 2.5% 97.5% 
First 0.41 0.25 0.57 
Second 0.59 0.43 0.75 
 
Mean probability of error with 95% credible interval of the probability of error  
 
 
 
 
Fig. S2 Effect of Order. Probability of making an error on B trial on 1st and 2
nd
 task 
presentation. The line represents the mean probability of committing a perseverative error, 
with the shaded area showing the 95% credible interval of probability of error 
Fig. S1 Posterior distributions of error on all B trials. Light grey shading shows the 95% highest 
posterior density interval (HPDI)  
 
 
Errors on A trials versus B trials 
Trial type (A or B) was found to credibly affect the probability of error.  
 
𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ~ 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑝) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑝) < −𝑎 + 𝑎_𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟[𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑚𝑝] + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠 
 
 
Parameters Mean StdDev Lower 0.95 Upper 0.95 
Average intercept -3.09 0.21 -3.49 -2.68 
Effect of trial 3.05 0.3 2.48 3.64 
Sigma actor 0.92 0.18 0.6 1.27 
Trial type Median 2.5% 97.5% 
A 0.04 0.03 0.06 
B 0.49 0.35 0.64 
Table S5 Coefficients of the model parameters for effect of trial type (A or B)  
Fig. S3 Model predictions for trial type. Black circles represents the observed proportion of 
errors made by participants. The black line is the mean expected proportion of reaching errors. 
The dark grey area is the 95% credible interval 
Table S6 Model predictions for probability of error on A and B trials 
 
 
Frequentist analysis 
Comparing the proportion of errors made on A trials and B trials A with a within subjects t-test, 
it was found participants were significantly more likely (t = -6.7, P < .001) to make an error on B 
trials (mean =0.47, SD = 0.38) than they were A trials (mean = 0.06, SD = 0.08; Figure S4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. S4 Mean proportion of errors on A and B trial types. Error bars show the 95% confidence 
interval 
 
 
Error on A versus B trials including an order effect  
Analyses were conducted on a model of the form 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟~ 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑝) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝑝)~ 𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟[𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙] + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑 ∗ 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∗ 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 
Including an effect of order and interaction effect better predicted performance than including 
trial type alone. Model parameters are summarised in Table S7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameters Mean StdDev Lower 0.95 Upper 0.95 
Average intercept -2.83 0.21 -3.26 -2.42 
Trial type 2.45 0.39 1.7 3.2 
Order -0.63 0.25 -1.11 -0.12 
Trial type*Order 0.86 0.17 0.54 1.19 
Fig. S5 Posterior distributions for probability of error on A and B trials on 1
st
 and 2
nd
 presentation. 
Light grey shading shows the 95% highest posterior density interval (HPDI) for each group. Dark 
grey shading shows the overlap in expected solutions between groups. First presentation data is 
shown in black and 2
nd
 presentation data is shown in pink 
Table S7 Coefficients of the model parameters for effect of trial type by order 
 
 
Within task errors on First A trial versus B trial 
Looking at performance on the first trial, as modelled by 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑛 1𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙~ 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙 (1, 𝑝) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝑝)~ 𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟[𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙] + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 
First trial Median 2.5% 97.5% 
A 0.16 0.08 0.25 
B 0.49 0.38 0.61 
 
  
Fig. S6 Regression predictions for first A versus B trial.  
 
Table S8 Regression predictions for probability of error on first A and B trials 
 
 
Frequentist analysis for first A versus B trial 
Comparing the proportion of errors made on the 1st A trial and B trial within each task, a within 
subjects t-test found performance was significantly better on the A trails than on B (Figure S7). 
On the first task (t = 2.97, P = .004), there was a mean probability of error on the A trial of 0.18 
(SD = 0.39) and a mean probability of error of 0.39 on the B trial (SD = 0.49).  On the second 
task (t = 7.56, P < .001), there was a mean probability of error on the A trial of 0.13 (SD = 0.34) 
and a mean probability of error of 0.61 on the B trial (SD = 0.49).   
 
 
  
** 
** 
Fig. S7 Mean proportion of errors on 1
st
 A and B trial on 1
st
 and 2
nd
 presentations. Error bars 
show the 95% confidence interval. 
 
 
Errors on first A trial versus the B trial including an order effect 
A model including a main effect of trial type (A or B) and an interaction between trial type and 
an order effect was found to best predict the data 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟~ 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙 (1, 𝑝) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝑝)~ 𝑎 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∗ 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 
 
 
Parameters Mean StdDev Lower 0.95 Upper 0.95 
Average intercept -1.55 0.43 -2.4 -0.72 
Trial type 1.12 0.55 0.03 2.18 
Order -0.45 0.7 -1.89 0.87 
Trial type*Order 1.36 0.85 -0.25 3.07 
Fig S8 Regression predictions for trial type by order. The black line is the mean of the effect of 
trial type and order on the expected probability of a reaching error. The dark grey area is the 
95% credible interval 
Table S9 Coefficients of the model parameters for effect of first trial type (A or B) and order  
 
 
Age and Error on B  
Models were constructed with age to be predicted by reaching error 
𝐴𝑔𝑒~ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 (𝑚𝑢, 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎) 
𝑚𝑢~ 𝑎 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
 
While those who committed preservative errors tended to be older (median of 4.2 years, 95% 
credible interval of -1.65 to 10.12 years, this difference was not found to be credible (Tables 
S10 & S11; Figure S9) 
 
 
B Trial Median 2.5% 97.5% 
No Error 29.89 26.08 33.7 
Error 34.13 29.4 38.82 
 
Parameters Mean StdDev Lower 0.95 Upper 0.95 
Average intercept 29.88 1.95 26.76 32.72 
B (of error) 4.24 3.03 -0.61 9.09 
Sigma 9.63 1.1 7.86 11.39 
Fig S9 Posterior distributions of age for error on B trial.  
Table S11 Regression predictions for age and errors on B trials.  
Table S10 Coefficients of the model parameters for age and error on B 
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BIWAYS 
Individual Sex Age Group Wild/captive Rearing 
Ma F 49.39 Model Wild Unknown 
My F 50.39 IPSI Wild Unknown 
Cea F 24.23 IPSI Captive Mother 
Ze F 13.09 IPSI Captive Mother 
Co F 30.96 Model Captive Mother 
Hh F 24.64 IPIS Captive Mother 
Cr M 19.50 IPSI Captive Mother 
Mi F 25.09 Model Captive Mother 
Sa F 25.11 IPSI Captive Mother 
Je F 25.36 IPSI Captive Mother 
Ti M 26.08 IPSI Captive Mother 
Kt F 26.82 Model Captive Nursery 
Na F 24.92 SI Captive Nursery 
Ae F 40.43 SI Wild Unknown 
Ci F 24.48 SI Captive Nursery 
Ai F 20.25 Model Captive Nursery 
Gs M 23.46 SI Captive Nursery 
Chu F 34.62 SI Captive Mother 
Hg F 17.44 SI Captive Mother 
Bn M 33.85 IP Captive Mother 
Tk F 35.63 IP Captive Mother 
Sy F 43.97 IP Wild Unknown 
Bte F 37.83 IP Captive Mother 
Pr F 48.97 IP Wild Unknown 
Pe F 29.91 Naïve Captive Nursery 
Di F 30.47 Naïve Captive Mother 
Sn M 31.65 Naïve Captive Mother 
Ki M 34.30 Naïve Captive Mother 
Ka M 35.87 Naïve Captive Mother 
Mpa F 33.90 Naïve Captive Nursery 
Ta F 47.07 Naïve Wild Unknown 
Kg M 33.73 Naïve Captive Mother 
Ti M 21.98 Naïve Captive Mother 
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Group size ranged from 5-10 individuals. Chimpanzees were trained and tested in both their 
outside enclosures (ranging in size from corrals at 4,300 square feet to Primadomes
TM
 measuring 
approximately 34 feet in diameter and 25 feet high) and indoor dens (ranging in size from 6 feet 
deep by 15 feet wide to approximately 8 feet and 8 inches deep by 9 feet wide). Individuals were 
given the opportunity to voluntarily participate and separate from their group for further training 
and testing purposes in their inside enclosures for a period of no longer than 30 minutes. 
Participants were not food or water deprived during training or testing. 
STUDY 1.1: SUPPLEMENTARY METHODS 
Model choice 
The absence or presence of social information regarding the availability of an alternative solution 
was coded as 0 or 1 respectively. Models were generated through MCMC sampling (typically 
6000 iterations; warmup of 1000 iterations). Given the small sample sizes, Gaussian regularizing 
priors were used with mean of 0 and standard deviation of 10. As only two outcomes were 
possible (slide or pull), the GLMM was based on a binomial distribution. Given multiple 
observations of each participant, partially pooled intercepts where used to account for individual 
variation in response. Assessing the best model was done with Widely Applicable Information 
Criterion (WAIC), along with posterior predictive checks. 
GLMMs took the form: 
 
1) 𝑃𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ~ 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑝) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝑝) < − 𝑥 
With x including parameters based on: 
i. Payoff: does increasing payoff affect the proportion of pull responses   
Table S1  
Demographics of participants meeting criterion for inclusion. From left to right: Individual: 
Initials of participant (individuals are organised by their groups with participants listed 
under their respective models); Sex: F = female, M = male; Age: Age in years at time of 
testing; Group: Condition; Captive/wild: Captive = born in captivity, Wild = born in the 
wild; Rearing: Mother = raised by mother, Nursery = raised by human caretakers. 
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ii. Social information: Does having social information of an alternative solution (pull) affect 
the proportion of pull behaviors 
iii. An interaction between payoff and social information: Does the presence or absence of 
social information regarding an alternative solution (pull) interact with the  presence of 
an increased payoff to affect the proportion of pull behaviors 
Outcomes were thus modelled as comparisons between IPSI and SI groups to look for an effect 
of increased payoff on adopting that alternative solution (i above); as comparisons between IPSI 
and IP to look for an effect of social information of the availability of an alternative solution on 
adopting that solution (ii above); and as an interaction between social information of an 
alternative solution, and this solution having an increased payoff, on adopting this alternative 
solution (iii above); that is, is behavioral change dependent on both increased payoff and social 
information of an alternative solution. 
STUDY 1.1 SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS  
Behaviors in testing phase 
Individual Group IP SI Pull solutions Total solutions 
My IPSI Yes Yes 281 296 
Cea IPSI Yes Yes 81 97 
Ze IPSI Yes Yes 68 68 
Sa IPSI Yes Yes 134 193 
Je IPSI Yes Yes 21 29 
Ti IPSI Yes Yes 25 59 
Hh IPSI Yes Yes 58 60 
Cr IPSI Yes Yes 83 207 
Na SI No Yes 0 298 
Ci SI No Yes 0 87 
Ae SI No Yes 0 209 
Hg SI No Yes 0 158 
Chu SI No Yes 1 155 
Gs SI No Yes 55 328 
Bn IP Yes No 0 115 
Tk IP Yes No 0 115 
Sy IP Yes No 0 115 
Bte IP Yes No 0 115 
Pr IP Yes No 0 115 
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The relationship between predictors and outcome can be modelled as 
1) 𝑃𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ~ 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑝) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑝) < −𝑎 +  𝑎[𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙] + 𝑏𝑖𝑝 ∗ 𝐼𝑃 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝐼 +  𝑏𝑖𝑝𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝐼, 
Where a is the value of the average intercept, a [individual] is the intercept deviance for each 
participant (allowing partially pooled variance), bip is the value of the coefficient of the effect of 
increased payoff, bsi is the value of the coefficient of the effect of the presence of social 
information, and bipsi is the value of the coefficient of the interaction between the presence of a 
solution with an increased payoff (IP) and the presence of social information (SI) regarding the 
availability of an alternative solution (Coefficients are summarized in Table S3, along with their 
95% credible intervals). Models which did not include the main effects, that is, just the interaction 
effect, resulted in almost equal effectiveness, indicating that outcome is largely affected by only 
this interaction (Table S4). The full model was chosen as it gets most of the Akaike weight. This 
model closely retrodicted the observed data. This model also simulated data which matched 
observed data (Figure S1).  
 
 
 
Parameters Mean StdDev Lower 0.95 Upper 0.95 
Average intercept -10.40 5.63 -21.55 0.38 
bip -3.15 5.59 -14.06 7.83 
bsi  3.98 5.62 -6.68 15.18 
bipsi  11.3 5.64  0.06 22.39 
Table S3  
Coefficients of the model parameters for effect of payoff and social information. Mean is the 
mean predicted value of the coefficient. StdDev is the standard deviation. Lower 0.95 and 
upper 0.95 are the 95% credible interval boundaries for the coefficient values. 
Table S2  
Behaviours in testing phase. From left to right: Individual: Initials of participant; Group: IPSI 
= increased payoff with social information, SI = same payoff with social information, IP = 
increased payoff with no social information; IP: Did the pull solution result in an increased 
payoff? SI: Was social information about the alternative pull solution available? Pull: total 
number of pull solutions. Total: all solutions used, including pull, slide and both.  
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STUDY 1.2. SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS 
A log-liner regression model of the form 
Model WAIC pWAIC dWAIC Weight SE dSE 
Full model 1185.5 9.4 0 0.61 48.42 NA 
Interaction only 1186.4 9.8 0.9 0.39 48.7 0.78 
Fig S1. Simulated data. Proportion of pull responses for presence (1) or absence (0) of 
increased payoff (IP) and social information (SI) respectively. The line represents the mean 
effect of condition, with the shaded area showing the 95% credible interval where the mean 
could lie. The pink circles are the proportion of pulls for 50 simulated participants in each 
condition. 
Table S4 
Model comparison. WAIC is the Widely Applicable Information Criterion; pWAIC indicates 
the number of effective parameters; dWAIC is the difference in WAIC values; Weight is the 
Akaike weight and indicates the effectiveness of the model to describe the data; SE is the standard 
error of the WAIC estimate; dSE is the standard error of the difference in WAIC of models 
(McElreath, 2016) 
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log(𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) ~𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚( 𝑚𝑢, 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎) 
𝑚𝑢 < −𝑎 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 
produced the coefficients summarized in Table S5, where a is the expected solutions till 
convergence for naïve individuals, and b is the effect of having experience with a prior, sub-
optimal behavior on solutions taken. Due to small samples sizes, the prior start values for the 
parameters were set at values closely approximating the median and standard deviation of 
observed solutions before converging on the pull solution taken by the naive group (0 and 1 
respectively). The effect of experience is shown in Figure S2. Model comparison between models 
which include or exclude having a prior solution as a factor influencing convergence of the 
optimum solution is summarized in Table S6. 
Parameters Mean StdDev Lower 0.95 Upper 0.95 
Average intercept (a) 0.76 0.44 0.06 1.45 
Effect of experience (b) 1.71 0.67 0.64 2.78 
Sigma 1.45 0.25 1.05 1.85 
Table S5 
Coefficients of the model parameters for effect of experience. Mean is the mean predicted value 
of the coefficient. StdDev is the standard deviation. Lower 0.95 and upper 0.95 are the 95% 
credible interval boundaries for the coefficient values. 
Fig S2. Model predictions for solutions taken before converging on the optimum behaviour for 
naïve and experienced individuals. The line is the mean of the modelled effect, with the dark 
shaded area showing 95% credible interval of where the mean may lie. The light grey shading is 
where the model predicts 95% of solutions taken will lie in the population 
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Bayesian estimation. To examine if having a prior solution had an effect of behavioral 
optimization, the number of attempts taken to converge on the optimum solution (Pull) was 
compared between IPSI individuals and SN individuals using Bayesian Estimation (online 
software:   http://www.sumsar.net/best_online/ for a Bayesian version of the t-test developed by 
John Krueschke, 20000 burn in and 80000 iterations (Kruschke, 2013)).  
It was found that the 95% credible interval for differences between the mean number of solutions 
taken by experience and naïve individuals to converge on the solution crossed the boundary of 
zero (mean of 16.9 and range -7.54 - 46.3), indicating that having a prior solution may not have 
had an effect on behavioral optimization. 
Frequentist analysis. A Mann Whitney U test revealed no effect of having a prior solution on 
convergence on the optimum solution (Figure S3; U = 17, Wilcoxon W = 62, Z = -1.894; P=.064 
(two tailed). There was however a trend towards significance. The effect size is 0.46 (as given by 
Z/√N, where N is the total observations considered in the analysis) 
 
 
 
 
 
Model WAIC pWAIC dWAIC Weight SE dSE 
With prior exp 69.4 4.2 0 0.58 7.02 NA 
Without prior exp 70.1 2.2 0.7 0.42 4.64 6.2 
Table S6 
Model comparison for inclusion and exclusion of the effect of having a prior, sub-optimal 
solution on convergence on the optimum pull behavior.  
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Fig S3. Median solution on which IPSI (Exp) and SN (Naïve) groups converged on the optimum 
solution. Error bars show the 95% confidence interval. 
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PITFALL 
PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS 
Individual Sex Age Group Wild/captive Rearing 
Ma F 49.89 Model Wild Unknown 
My F 50.89 IPSI Wild Unknown 
Cea F 24.73 IPSI Captive Mother 
Al M 35.78 IPSI Captive Nursery 
Co F 31.22 Model Captive Mother 
Hh F 24.91 IPIS Captive Mother 
Cr M 19.76 IPSI Captive Mother 
Kt F 27.19 Model Captive Nursery 
Na F 25.29 IPSI Captive Nursery 
Ae F 40.81 IPSI Wild Unknown 
Ci F 24.86 IPSI Captive Nursery 
Ai F 20.74 Model Captive Nursery 
Gs M 23.94 IPSI Captive Nursery 
Sa F 25.28 IPSI Captive Mother 
Jy M 43.95 IP Wild Unknown 
Oi F 31.08 IP Captive Mother 
Ji M 25.28 IP Captive Nursery 
Tk F 35.60822 IP Captive Mother 
Pr F 48.94795 IP Wild Unknown 
Ta F 47.02466 IP Wild Unknown 
Ki M 34.22192 Naïve Captive Mother 
Mpa F 33.8274 Naïve Captive Nursery 
Di F 30.38904 Naïve Captive Mother 
Pe F 29.8274 Naïve Captive Nursery 
Sn M 31.57534 Naïve Captive Mother 
Kg M 33.71507 Naïve Captive Mother 
Ti M 21.95616 Naïve Captive Mother 
Eo M 20.27123 Naïve Captive Nursery 
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STUDY 2.1. SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS 
Coefficients of a log-linear regression model, with the inclusion of group (Social or asocial) are 
summarized in Table S8. Due to small samples sizes, the prior start values for parameters were 
set at values closely approximating the median and standard deviation (0 and 1 respectively) of 
the log of observed solutions before converging on the Door B solution taken by the IPSI (social) 
group. One IP (asocial control) individual (Oi) never discovered Door 1. It was assumed, given 
she was the only IP individual to fail to do so, that this may have been due to not being given 
enough time with the apparatus, and that it was likely she would have eventually done so. Due to 
this, Oi was conservatively assigned an estimate of when she may have discovered Door 1 as 
being on her next solution attempt, had this opportunity been provided. Model predictions for 
groups are shown in Figure S4. Model comparison between models which include or exclude 
social information as a factor influencing convergence on the optimum solution is summarized 
in Table S9. 
 
Model WAIC pWAIC dWAIC Weight SE dSE 
With social info 57.5 3.5 0 0.96 5.07 NA 
Without social info 63.9 2.5 6.6 0.04 5.61 5.25 
Table S7  
Demographics of participants meeting criterion for inclusion. From left to right: Individual: 
Initials of participant (individuals are organised by their groups with participants listed 
under their respective models); Sex: F = female, M = male; Age: Age in years at time of 
testing; Group: Condition; Captive/wild: Captive = born in captivity, Wild = born in the 
wild; Rearing: Mother = raised by mother, Nursery = raised by human caretakers. 
 
 
Parameters Mean StdDev Lower 0.95 Upper 0.95 
Average intercept 1.17 0.32 0.65 1.69 
Effect of social info 1.59 0.51 0.77 2.4 
Sigma 1.14 0.21 0.81 1.47 
Table S8  
Coefficients of the model parameters for effect of social information. Mean is the mean 
predicted value of the coefficient. StdDev is the standard deviation. Lower 0.95 and upper 0.95 
are the 95% credible interval boundaries for the coefficient values. 
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Bayesian estimation. To examine if having social information had an effect of behavioral 
optimization, the number of attempts taken to converge on the optimum solution (Door 1 
solution) was compared between IPSI individuals and SN individuals. It was found that the 95% 
credible interval for differences between the mean number of trials to converge on the solution 
did cross the boundary of zero (mean of 29 additional solutions for asocial; range - 15.1 and 
73.6), indicating that social information may not have had a credible effect on solution 
optimization. 
Frequentist analysis. A Mann Whitney U test found a significant effect of social information on 
solutions taken before converging on the optimum Door 1 solution (U = 7, W=62, Z = - 2.52, P 
=0.01, effect size = 0.63) 
Fig S4. Model predictions of solutions taken before converging on Door 1 solution for 
social/IPSI and asocial/IP individuals.  
Table S9.  
Model comparison for inclusion and exclusion of social information.  
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BEHAVIORAL VARIANTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Block   Block Door 1 Food order 
Individual Trained 
solution 
Sequence Pre-empt Door 1 
solution 
Sequence Pre-empt Sequence Pre-empt Small 
first 
Large 
first 
My 0 0 0 102 81 21 85 17 86 15 
Cea 0 0 0 35 29 6 34 1 31 4 
Al 23 19 4 94 90 4 93 1 20 71 
Na 17 2 15 78 47 31 73 5 61 9 
Ci 7 6 1 23 20 3 21 2 22 1 
Ae 1 0 1 53 48 5 53 0 27 26 
Sa 6 6 0 32 29 3 29 3 28 3 
Gs 1 1 0 54 42 12 49 5 44 8 
Hh 0 0 0 63 43 20 62 1 28 35 
Cr 1 0 1 78 74 4 76 2 67 4 
Table S10 
Solution variants during Study 2.1 testing. Table cells are colored pink for data relating to the Trained solution. From left to right: 
Individual: Initials of participants; Trained solution: Number of times the participant used the Trained solution; Block – Sequence: 
number of times the block defense was pushed out only once the foodbox arrived at the block’s location when using the Trained Solution; 
Block – Pre-empt: the number of times the block defense was pre-emptively removed before the foodbox arrived at the block’s location; 
Door 1 solution: Number of times the participant used the Door 1 solution; Block – Sequence: number of times the block defense was 
pushed out only once the foodbox arrived at the block’s location when using the Door 1 Solution; Block – Pre-empt: the number of 
times the block defense was removed pre-emptively; Door 1 – Sequence: the number of times Door 1 was opened only when the 
foodbox arrived at Door 1’s location; Door 1 – Pre-empt: the number of times Door 1 was pre-emptively opened before the foodbox 
arrived at Door 1’s location. Food order – Small first: the number of times the small reward was removed from the foodbox before the 
large reward; Food order – Large first: the number of times the large reward was removed from the foodbox before the small reward. 
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PITFALL: STUDY 2.2 
Converging on the optimum Door B solution for IPSI and solution naïve individuals. A log-
linear regression model, with the inclusion of group (naïve or experienced) produced the 
coefficients summarized in Table S11. Due to small samples sizes, the prior start values for 
parameters were set at values closely approximating the median and standard deviation of the log 
of observed solutions before converging on the Door B solution taken by the naive group (0 and 
1 respectively). The posterior densities for groups are shown in Figure S5, revealing an unlikely 
overlap in predicted values for the naïve and experienced groups. Model comparison between 
models which include or exclude having a prior solution as a factor influencing convergence on 
the optimum solution is summarized in Table S12. 
 
 
Parameters Mean StdDev Lower 0.95 Upper 0.95 
Average intercept 0.27 0.28 -0.17 0.72 
Effect of experience 2.47 0.37 1.87 3.07 
Sigma 0.83 0.14 0.6 1.06 
Table S11  
Coefficients of the model parameters for effect of experience. Mean is the mean predicted 
value of the coefficient. StdDev is the standard deviation. Lower 0.95 and upper 0.95 are the 
95% credible interval boundaries for the coefficient values. 
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Bayesian estimation. To examine if having a prior solution had an effect of behavioral 
optimization, the number of attempts taken to converge on the optimum solution (Door 2 
solution) was compared between IPSI individuals and solution naïve individuals. It was found 
that the 95% credible interval for differences between the mean number of solutions to converge 
on the optimum did not cross the boundary of zero (mean of 23.2 and range - 6.51- -39.2), 
indicating that prior solution had an effect on solution optimization. 
Frequentist analysis. A Mann Whitney U test found a significant effect of prior knowledge of a 
complex, sub-optimal solution on converging on the optimum solution (Figure S6; U=0, W = 36, 
Z= - 3, P<0.0001), with an effect size of 0.71. 
 
 
Model WAIC pWAIC dWAIC Weight SE dSE 
With prior exp 52.8 4.2 0 1 8.02 NA 
Without prior exp 73.34 1.9 20.5 0 4.84 7.39 
Fig S5. Posterior distributions of solutions taken before converging on the optimum solution 
for naïve (black) and experienced (pink) individuals. Light grey shading shows the 95% highest 
posterior density interval for each group. 
Table S12.  
Model comparison for inclusion and exclusion of prior solution.  
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Converging on the optimum Door 2 and Door 1 solution for IPSI individuals. A log-linear 
regression model, with the inclusion of door location (Door 1 or Door 2) produced the 
coefficients summarized in Table S13. Due to small samples sizes, the prior start values for 
parameters were set at values closely approximating the median and standard deviation of the log 
of observed solutions before converging on the Door B solution (0 and 1 respectively). The 
posterior densities for solutions are shown in Figure S7, revealing an unlikely overlap in predicted 
solutions taken before convergence on the Door 1 and Door 2 solutions. Model comparison 
between models which include or exclude door (1 or 2) as a factor influencing convergence on 
the optimum solution is summarized in Table S14. 
Parameters Mean StdDev Lower 0.95 Upper 0.95 
Average intercept 1.16 0.32 0.65 1.68 
Effect of door 1.55 0.45 0.84 2.26 
Sigma 1.13 0.18 0.84 1.42 
 
Fig S6. Median solution on which IPSI (Exp) and SN (Naïve) groups converged on the optimum 
solution. Error bars show the 95% confidence interval. 
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Bayesian estimation. To examine if having to inhibit a prior solution (Door 2 solution) versus 
having to build on it (Door 1 solution) had an effect on behavioral optimization, the number of 
attempts taken to converge on the optimum solution (Door 1 and 2 solutions) was compared 
within IPSI individuals.  It was found that the 95% credible interval for differences between the 
Model WAIC pWAIC dWAIC Weight SE dSE 
With door 68.6 3.2 0 0.97 5.02 NA 
Without door 75.9 1.8 7.3 0.03 4.69 5.93 
Table S13  
Coefficients of the model parameters for effect of door location.   
Fig S7. Posterior distributions of solutions taken before converging on the optimum solution 
of using Door 1 (black) and Door 2 (pink) for IPSI individuals.  
Table S14 
Model comparison for inclusion and exclusion of door location.  
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mean number of solutions taken to converge on the Door 1 and Door 2 solutions did not cross 
the boundary of zero (mean of -22; range –44.3 -  -1.11), indicating that the Door 1 solution was 
adopted after fewer solution attempts than the Door 2 solution by IPSI individuals. 
Frequentist analysis. A Wilcoxon signed rank test found a significant effect of door location 
(Door 1 (no inhibition required) and Door 2 (inhibition required)) on convergence rate (Z = -
2.8, P<0.001 (one tailed), indicating it took more solution attempts to begin using Door 2 than it 
did Door 1. 
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APPENDIX 4: SERIALBOX 
FOUNDATIONS OF CUMULATIVE CULTURE IN APES: IMPROVED FORAGING 
EFFICIENCY THROUGH RELINQUISHING AND COMBINING WITNESSED 
BEHAVIOURS IN CHIMPANZEES (PAN TROGLODYTES) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Group Total Efficient Median Range 
Training Social 254 0 21 20-32 
Non-seeded 202 0 23 20-37 
Test period 1 Social 496 189 22 2-179 
Non-seeded 299 0 39.5 4-81 
Test period 2 Social 440 362 15 2-194 
Non-seeded 235 144 15 2-145 
Test period 3 Social 418 324 13 0-117 
Non-seeded 154 84 9 0-84 
Supplementary Table S1. Extractions by participants across test periods. ‘Total’ is the sum of 
extractions made by all participants in the ‘social information’ and ‘non-seeded’ groups; 
‘Efficient’ is the sum of efficient extractions; ‘Median’ is the median number of extractions; 
‘Range’ is the range of extractions. 
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Model Total Median Range Efficiency 
Experiment 1 My 90 24 13-29 33.3 
Co 65 18 11-18 4.1 
Mi 134 46 34-56 11.9 
Experiment 2 My 97 24.5 11-37 70.1 
Co 8 1.5 1-4 90.2 
Mi 156 52 32-72 92.2 
Supplementary Table S2. Summary of models’ behaviours.  Extraction data is presented based 
on group observations of their respective models. Models are identified by their initials. ‘Total’ 
is the sum of participants’ observations of extractions made by their model. ‘Median’ is the 
median number of observed extractions made by the model. ‘Range’ is the range of the sum of 
participant observations of extractions made by the model. For Experiment 1, the total, median 
and range figures include extractions observed during the social demonstration phase in addition 
to those observed during Experiment 1 testing period. ‘Efficiency’ (in seconds) is the difference 
of the model’s mean latency to extraction relative to the median of participants’ mean investment 
in using the inefficient method (i.e. includes times spent performing the inefficient method 
whether the participant was successful or not in extracting the token), and reflects how much 
faster the efficient method was compared to the inefficient. 
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Individual Group Exp1: Obs Exp1: Extract Exp2: Obs Exp2: Extract HD: Obs HD: Extract Switch: Obs Switch: Extract  
Sa Social info 21 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 21 1 
Se Social info 15 6 N/A N/A N/A N/A 15 7 
Ze Social info 29 4 15 4 N/A N/A 44 9 
Cr Social info 11 10 2 3 17 16 30 30 
Ma Social info 27 33 15 2 N/A N/A 42 36 
An Social info 19 16 5 2 17 16 41 35 
Je Social info 57 18 102 14 10 9 169 42 
Kt Non-seed 0 81 0 1 N/A N/A 0 83 
Cea Social info 13 67 9 17 N/A N/A 22 85 
Hh Social info 18 119 1 19 12 11 31 150 
Si Social info 45 2 49 7 12 12 106 No switch 
Ta Social info 21 22 18 3 N/A N/A 39 No switch 
Na Non-seed 0 49 3 20 N/A N/A 3 No switch 
Ae Non-seed 0 4 2 7 N/A N/A 2 No switch 
Ai Non-seed 0 55 0 20 N/A N/A 0 No switch 
Gs Non-seed 0 58 0 2 N/A N/A 0 No switch 
Chu Non-seed 0 30 0 18 N/A N/A 0 No switch 
Sha Non-seed 0 6 0 12 N/A N/A 0 No switch 
Ka Non-seed 0 16 0 11 N/A N/A 0 No switch 
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Supplementary Table S3: Observation and extraction data for each individual. From left to 
right: ‘Individual’ is the participant represented by their initials and organised in ascending 
order of total number of inefficient extractions experienced before switching to the efficient 
solution (final column); Group: ‘Social info’ = ‘social information’ group; ‘Non-seed’ = ‘non-
seeded’ group. ‘Exp1: Obs’ and ‘Exp2: Obs’ are the number of observations of the efficient 
method for each individual before they switched to the efficient method in each experimental 
condition respectively. ‘Exp1: Obs’ includes observations from the ‘social demonstration 
phase’. ‘Exp1: Extract’ and ‘Exp2: Extract’ are the number of extractions in which a participant 
successfully extracted or attempted to extract the token before switching to use of the efficient 
method. ‘N/A’ denotes the data during this experimental phase are not applicable to the 
participant’s switching behaviour. ‘HD: Obs’ and ‘HD: Extract’ are the number of observations 
and extractions experienced in the ‘Human Demonstration’ phase of Experiment 2 
respectively. ‘Switch: Obs’ is the total number of observations across experimental phases 
before switching to the efficient method. These data include observations of the model, of other 
participants and, where applicable, human demonstrations of the efficient method. If the 
individual did not switch, this number is the total number of observations across experimental 
phases ‘Switch: Extract’ refers to the extraction attempt the individual switched on and includes 
extractions across all experimental phases. The experimental phase in which the participant 
switched is reflected with the emboldening and underlining of the number of efficient 
extractions observed and the number of extractions experienced pre-switch. 
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Foundations of cumulative 
culture in apes: improved foraging 
efficiency through relinquishing and 
combining witnessed behaviours in 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)
Sarah J. Davis1,2, Gillian L. Vale1,2, Steven J. Schapiro2, Susan P. Lambeth2 & Andrew Whiten1
A vital prerequisite for cumulative culture, a phenomenon often asserted to be unique to humans, is 
the ability to modify behaviour and flexibly switch to more productive or efficient alternatives. Here, 
we first established an inefficient solution to a foraging task in five captive chimpanzee groups (N = 19). 
Three groups subsequently witnessed a conspecific using an alternative, more efficient, solution. 
When participants could successfully forage with their established behaviours, most individuals did not 
switch to this more efficient technique; however, when their foraging method became substantially 
less efficient, nine chimpanzees with socially-acquired information (four of whom witnessed additional 
human demonstrations) relinquished their old behaviour in favour of the more efficient one. Only a 
single chimpanzee in control groups, who had not witnessed a knowledgeable model, discovered this. 
Individuals who switched were later able to combine components of their two learned techniques to 
produce a more efficient solution than their extensively used, original foraging method. These results 
suggest that, although chimpanzees show a considerable degree of conservatism, they also have an 
ability to combine independent behaviours to produce efficient compound action sequences; one of the 
foundational abilities (or candidate mechanisms) for human cumulative culture.
Culture has been defined as “group-typical behaviour patterns shared by members of a community that rely on 
socially learned and transmitted information” (p.1511). The ability to build upon or ratchet up on such cultural 
behaviours, creating cumulative cultural change2, can lead to substantial gains in productivity or efficiency, well 
exemplified in its elaboration in humans3. Whilst the ability to socially learn behaviours (defined as “learning 
that is influenced by observation of, or interaction with another animal (typically a conspecific) or its products” 
(p.2074) may be common across many animal taxa5–9, cumulative culture is limited or, according to some authors, 
absent in non-human animals2,3,10. This is most striking when we compare our human cultures with those of argu-
ably the second most cultural species, our closest living relative, the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes)11.
Chimpanzees exhibit the greatest number of traditions outside of the human species, across foraging, tool use 
and social behaviours, with each chimpanzee group distinguished by their own particular cultural profile11. Yet, 
there is little evidence for cultural accumulation on these traditions (see ref. 12). Various factors may contribute 
to the stasis of chimpanzee culture, such as relevant socio-cognitive adaptations13, low fidelity social learning 
mechanisms14, or failure to employ appropriate learning heuristics15,16. However, cumulative culture ultimately 
requires the ability to change established behaviours in order to adopt more efficient or productive ones; that is, in 
order to upgrade solutions, an individual must possess the behavioural flexibility to relinquish, modify and build 
on prior solutions. Behavioural inflexibility may therefore, in and of itself, limit the evolution of culture. With 
behavioural flexibility defined as “the continued interest in and acquisition of new solutions to a task, through 
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either innovation or social learning, after already having mastered a previous solution” (p.44717), a lack of such 
flexibility has been found in several experiments with chimpanzees. Marshall-Pescini and Whiten16 found that 
young chimpanzees failed to cumulatively modify their foraging efforts by building on their exisiting behaviours 
despite witnessing a more productive solution. Yet, the more complex behaviour could be acquired if participants 
had no prior knowledge of the less lucrative foraging technique. This led the authors to suggest that chimpanzees 
are behaviourally conservative, since reported in several further studies13,18–21 (see also ref. 22); in simple terms, 
chimpanzees tend to become ‘stuck’ on known behaviours despite availability of superior alternatives.
These results appear inconsistent with other findings such as that of Horner and Whiten23, where chimpanzees 
‘streamlined’ their behaviours after witnessing inefficient options used by others. However, this involved omitting 
elements24,25, as opposed to the additive, ratchet effect required for cumulative culure2. Similarly, following social 
demonstrations in a juice acquiring task, Yamamoto, Humle and Tanaka26 found that chimpanzees switched 
from using a straw as a dipping tool to exploiting a more efficient sucking function, but this also did not involve 
additive ratcheting. Such findings are in line with records of behavioural modification in the wild27–31 (see also 
ref. 32), as well as more recent experiments demonstrating payoff-related variation in simple behaviour, such as 
depositing ‘tokens’ in novel locations to increase food reward value33,34.
From studies examining behavioural change in humans, we might expect at least two factors to have differ-
ential effects on behavioural flexibility: the extent to which behaviour has been practiced, and the complexity 
of the behaviour involved35–37. As cultural traditions are often well-established and long-held behaviours, and 
are also sufficiently complex to necessitate social learning to acquire them, it may be important to consider how 
well-ingrained the behaviour to be modified is when extrapolating results to chimpanzees’ potential for cumula-
tive culture. Evidence now exists that chimpanzees can recognise and adopt superior variants of behaviours which 
are simple and conceptually similar to existing routines33,34. Chimpanzees can also relinquish old solutions and 
build on very simple behaviours to form action sequences when these sequences are within most chimpanzees’ 
repertoires38, as well as relinquish behaviours that have been performed but not yet adopted as a reliable foraging 
strategy23,26. However, the extent to which chimpanzees can modify, relinquish or build-upon well-established, 
cognitively more complex behaviours, those that perhaps mirror cultural behaviours more closely, remains to be 
established13,16.
In the present studies, we investigated chimpanzees’ ability to build upon socially acquired, complex behav-
iour in the context of improving efficiency. Of particular interest is whether a chimpanzee can benefit by witness-
ing a more efficient behaviour used by a conspecific compared to one they currently reliably employ to achieve the 
same goal, and flexibly switch to using this more efficient behaviour.
A transparent puzzle box (Fig. 1) was used (hereafter ‘Serialbox’) from which a valued token could be extracted 
(later exchanged for a food reward) via either of two alternative operations differing in efficiency, with the inef-
ficient method (Supplementary Video 1) more labour intensive and taking longer to complete. The efficient 
Figure 1. Serialbox. Along the length of the transparent Serialbox were four compartments. Each 
compartment had a hinged lid on top which could be lifted open (coloured here in green for image clarity; in 
reality all parts were transparent). Under each lid were four finger holes that permitted an object (depicted as 
a purple cylinder) initially provisioned in the left-most compartment to be pushed the length of the apparatus. 
This object could then be extracted through an opening at the other end (‘Extraction point A’). This was 
the inefficient method in Experiments 1 and 3. A small door spanning two thirds of the first compartment 
(coloured here in red for clarity) was fitted on the chimpanzee side of the apparatus and could be pulled open 
using a handle protruding from the outside of the box to give alternative and quicker access to the left-most 
compartment (‘Extraction point B’), where the token was initially positioned. This, in combination with lifting 
the lid of the left-most compartment and using the underlying holes to manoeuvre the token to extraction 
point B, was the efficient method in Experiments 1 and 3. The blue square shown in the left-most compartment 
depicts the indent in the floor in which the token was placed throughout Experiment 2.
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method (Supplementary Video 2) involved partial use of behaviours common to the inefficient method, along 
with the addition of a novel behaviour. The efficient method therefore involved not only streamlining the ineffi-
cient method by a subtractive process (noted in some studies of cumulative culture)24,25, but also the addition of a 
novel behavioural element to an established sequence, that is, a ratcheting up on behaviour2. Participants across 
five groups were initially trained to extract a valued token from the transparent Serialbox via a multi-stepped, 
repetitive, inefficient process (Fig. 1). To strengthen ecological validity when assessing chimpanzees’ cumula-
tive cultural capabilities, this extraction process was completed a minimum of 20 times over several sessions 
until it became a reliable and ingrained response. Three groups (‘social information’ groups) subsequently wit-
nessed a conspecific model using the more efficient solution described in Fig. 1 and more fully in Methods below. 
Following repeated social demonstrations, the behaviour of participants was examined over ten hours of open 
diffusion, monitoring any spread of the more efficient technique, to better simulate the diffusion of behaviours in 
a culturally relevant context39.
We hypothesised that if chimpanzees could recognise a solution more efficient than the one they were cur-
rently employing and were able to switch to this, they should do so once they witnessed the actions of the model, 
regarded as a simulated ‘innovator’40. To assess how readily chimpanzees could themselves innovate and switch to 
the efficient method without the need for social information, we trained two control groups to use the inefficient 
method but did not expose them to the efficient method through a trained conspecific (‘non-seeded’ groups). To 
investigate how naïve chimpanzees might solve this extractive problem when they did not have an established 
solution to the puzzle, the Serialbox was introduced to one additional control group who were not initially trained 
to extract via the inefficient method (‘naïve’ group). For this group, the problem could be solved by using either 
the efficient or inefficient strategy.
Experiment 1: Results
Due to limited sample sizes, data were analysed using non-parametric methods with exact P values reported. 
Effect sizes were calculated using the Z score of the test statistic such that r = Z/√ N, where N was the total number 
of observations included in the analysis. An analysis of interrater reliability using Cohen’s kappa found excellent 
agreement (κ = 1) between two coders’ judgement of whether the participant was extracting via the inefficient or 
the efficient method.
Participant inclusion and extractions across training and test phase. Eleven individuals in the 
‘social information’ groups and eight in ‘non-seeded’ control groups met criterion for inclusion in the study (a 
minimum of 20 inefficient extractions; see Table 1 for participant demographics; Supplementary Table S1 for 
behaviours in the training and test periods; Supplementary Table S2 for relative efficiency of the two extraction 
techniques). There was no difference in the acquisition of the inefficient method between the ‘social information’ 
and ‘non-seeded’ individuals in terms of number of extractions made during the training period (Mann Whitney 
U = 36, P = 0.529; Supplementary Table S1).
Within the ‘social information’ groups, to analyse any growing behavioural proficiency, the mean time taken 
across the first ten extractions using the inefficient method was compared to the mean time taken across the last 
ten inefficient extractions, using a one-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test. If an individual did not extract 20 times 
during the testing period, the mean times taken for inefficient extractions either side of the median extraction 
were calculated and compared. Individuals became significantly more proficient at the inefficient method over 
this test period (Z = − 2.803, n = 10, P = 0.001, r = − 0.63), with a median reduction in extraction latency from 
47.5 to 26.2 seconds.
Switching behaviours. Across this testing period (‘E1’), nine of the 11 individuals in the ‘social information’ 
groups and all individuals in the ‘non-seeded’ groups continued to exclusively use the inefficient method estab-
lished during the training period (‘E0’) to extract the token.
To test for switching behaviour at the individual level, following van Leeuwen et al.34, the number of inefficient 
and efficient extractions performed during E0 and E1 were compared using a one-tailed Fisher’s exact test. Two 
individuals (from separate groups) demonstrated a significant change of behaviour within this period, switching 
to using the efficient solution (Individual Se: E00,21, E110,16, P = 0.001; Individual Sa: E00,22, E1179,0, P < 0.0001: 
subscripts represent frequencies of efficient and inefficient methods respectively).
‘Naïve’ group. One individual, Jy, discovered and used the efficient method within two hours of interaction 
with the Serialbox. Individual Ua observed Jy’s efficient method five times; following three initial failed attempts 
to open the door, she successfully used the efficient method to extract the token in a subsequent test session. 
Before Ua witnessed use of the efficient method, she had unsuccessfully interacted with the apparatus, exploring 
only the holes and lids. Two other individuals witnessed the use of the efficient method just one and five times 
each and never successfully extracted the token. There was no discovery of the elaborate, inefficient method.
Experiment 1: Discussion
When chimpanzees used a well-established but laborious solution to successfully gain rewards, most were 
not seen to further explore alternatives, or to capitalise on social information available about a more efficient 
approach. The central finding from Experiment 1 was thus of a remarkable degree of conservatism, expressed in 
perseverance with a well-rehearsed routine despite witnessing a more efficient alternative modelled by another 
chimpanzee. Such conservatism has been documented in a series of other recent chimpanzee studies13,16,18–21. By 
contrast, in the ‘naïve’ group, the efficient method was discovered, if by only a single persistent individual, and 
was later adopted by another chimpanzee. The results thus tentatively suggest that having a prior solution may in 
itself hinder adoption of a superior alternative16,18. Such conservatism may have some adaptive value insofar as 
switching to an alternative may be costly, either through cognitive demands inherent to learning or potential loss 
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of reward through lack of expertise in this method41,42. In fact, chimpanzees, who at the start of the testing period 
were already well practiced at the inefficient method, effectively halved the time taken to successfully extract the 
token across the testing period. This indicates growing expertise and skill proficiency in their behaviour, and 
supports previous findings that skill mastery may hinder behavioural change16,18.
To further investigate the limits of behavioural conservatism, in Experiment 2 the disparity in efficiency of 
behaviours was increased such that the inefficient method became not only an unreliable means of foraging but 
even when successfully employed, the latency to extraction from point A was typically far higher than for B. In 
addition, the alternative behaviour needed for extraction at point B was reduced to a single element and did not 
require use of parts of the inefficient method, so subjects had only to relinquish an established solution and adopt 
a novel one-stepped alternative with no ratcheting on prior behaviours.
Experiment 2: Relinquishing a highly inefficient solution
The movement of the token along the length of the apparatus to extraction point A was impeded by placing the 
token in an indentation in the floor, directly behind extraction point B (Fig. 1), so movement of the token towards 
A was more awkward to initiate. However, the token could now be extracted from point B solely by just pulling 
the door open. Raising lids and using finger holes was unnecessary. Accordingly, this experimental manipulation 
made the inefficient method more so, and the efficient method yet easier, enhancing the contrast between them 
(Supplementary Table S2).
The 19 subjects who had met criterion for inclusion in the ‘social information’ and ‘non-seeded’ groups were 
all given a further ten hours of opportunity for solution and open diffusion with the inefficient method partially 
blocked in this way. Following Yamamoto et al.26, if individuals in the ‘social information’ groups failed to switch, 
they were provided with salient human demonstrations of the efficient method by SJD after this second period of 
open diffusion, because our question is not about chimpanzees offering such models, but rather how chimpanzees 
respond to such models when available. The ‘naïve’ group was not included in Experiment 2 as not only were they 
already exclusively using the efficient method of extraction, but their initial inclusion was designed primarily to 
investigate how solution naïve chimpanzees would approach this problem.
Individual Sex Age Group
Wild/
captive Rearing
My F 49.26 Model Wild Unknown
Ma F 48.26 Social info Wild Unknown
Cea F 23.10 Social info Captive Mother
Ze F 11.95 Social info Captive Mother
Ta F 21.36 Social info Captive Mother
Co F 30.24 Model Captive Mother
Se F 15.40 Social info Captive Mother
Hh F 23.93 Social info Captive Mother
Cr M 18.78 Social info Captive Mother
An M 22.86 Social info Captive Mother
Mi F 24.69 Model Captive Mother
Sa F 24.71 Social info Captive Mother
Je F 24.96 Social info Captive Mother
Si M 24.74 Social info Captive Mother
Kt F 25.78 Non-seed Captive Nursery
Na F 23.88 Non-seed Captive Nursery
Ae F 39.39 Non-seed Wild Unknown
Ai F 19.21 Non-seed Captive Nursery
Gs M 22.41 Non-seed Captive Nursery
Chu F 33.57 Non-seed Captive Mother
Sha F 23.75 Non-seed Captive Mother
Ka F 23.56 Non-seed Captive Mother
Jy M 42.52 Naïve Wild Unknown
Ua F 50.53 Naïve Wild Unknown
Cy M 24.41 Naïve Captive Mother
Zy M 43.52 Naïve Wild Unknown
Ha F 48.53 Naïve Wild Unknown
Table 1.  Demographics of participants meeting criterion for inclusion. From left to right: Individual: Initials 
of participant (individuals are organised by their groups with participants listed under their respective models); 
Sex: F = female, M = male; Age: Age in years at time of testing; Group: Social info = social information group; 
Non-seed = non-seeded; Naïve = Naïve group; Captive/wild: Captive = born in captivity, Wild = born in the 
wild; Rearing: Mother = raised by mother, Nursery = raised by human caretakers.
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Experiment 2: Results
Extractions within the test period. In the ‘social information’ groups, the chimpanzee models demon-
strated a 100% success rate of token extraction via the efficient method; in contrast, use of the inefficient method 
had a median success rate of only 25% (range 0–93%) (Supplementary Tables S1 and S2: a failed attempt was 
one in which a participant manipulated the Serialbox but subsequently left the apparatus without successfully 
extracting the token). Success rate became significantly lower in Experiment 2 (E2) compared to Experiment 
1 when using the inefficient method (One-tailed Wilcoxon Signed ranks test Z = − 2.84, n = 10, P = 0.001, 
medianE1 = 100%, medianE2 = 25%, r = − 0.64). If participants were successful in extracting the token via the 
inefficient method, latency to extraction was almost two and a half times longer than a successful extraction 
in Experiment 1 (E1 median = 33.6 seconds, range = 24.5–51.8; E2 median = 83 seconds, range 66.1–556; See 
Supplementary Table S2 for comparisons with models’ efficiency).
In the ‘non-seeded’ groups, one individual now discovered and used the easier efficient method (Individual 
Kt), and was witnessed by two other individuals, Na and Ae. These two did not then acquire the method; how-
ever, they had observed Kt only three and two times respectively. No other individual was observed to use the 
efficient method in the ‘non-seeded’ groups, with success rate dropping for all other participants (median success 
rate of 14.3%, range 0–50%). Success rate was significantly lower in E2 than in E1 for those using the inefficient 
method in the ‘non-seeded’ groups (One-tailed Wilcoxon Signed ranks test Z = − 2.38, n = 7, P = 0.008, 
medianE1 = 100%, medianE2 = 14.3%, r = − 0.64). Success rate for those using the inefficient method did not differ 
between the ‘social information’ and ‘non-seeded’ groups (Mann Whitney U = 28, n = 17, P = 0.494).
Switching behaviours. To assess switching behaviours in the ‘social information’ groups, the percentage 
of efficient extractions [efficient extractions/(efficient extractions + inefficient extractions) × 100] observed 
throughout E2 for each participant was compared with the percentage of efficient extractions observed during 
E0, using a one-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test. There was now a significant switch, with five individuals in 
the ‘social information’ groups switching from the inefficient method to using the more efficient method that 
continued to be demonstrated by the model [Z = − 2.023, n = 11, P = 0.031, medianE0 = 0% (mean = 0%), 
medianE2 = 0% (mean = 36.1%), r = − 0.43; Fig. 2].
Human demonstrations. After additional human demonstrations (median demonstrations given = 12, 
range = 10–17), four additional participants from the remaining six switched to using the efficient method in the 
‘social information’ groups.
Use of efficient method in ‘social information’ and ‘non-seeded’ groups. To determine the role 
of social information in behavioural upgrading, a one-tailed Fisher’s exact test (applied due to expected values 
less than 5) compared the frequency of chimpanzees using the alternative method between those in ‘non-seeded’ 
groups and the ‘social information’ groups. A significant association was found between exposure to sustained 
social information and whether or not individuals switched to using the efficient alternative (P = 0.005) (Fig. 3). 
Based on the odds ratio, the odds of switching were 31.5 times higher for those in the ‘social information’ groups 
than those in the ‘non-seeded’ groups. As noted above, the two individuals who observed Kt in the ‘non-seeded’ 
group performing the efficient method did not acquire it, but they observed only three and two times respec-
tively, whereas those in the ‘social-information’ groups had a median of 31 observations before acquisition (range 
15–169; Supplementary Table S3).
Figure 2. Percentage use of efficient method in Training and Experiments 1, 2 and 3 for individuals in 
the ‘social information’ groups. The line represents the median, the bottom and top of each box indicate the 
25th and 75th percentile respectively, the whiskers show the minimum and the maximum values that are not 
considered outliers (i.e. values > 1.5 times the interquartile range from the 25th or 75th percentile), outliers are 
represented by circles with values over three times the 75th percentile value. *Indicates a P value of less than 0.05 
and **less than 0.01.
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Experiment 2: Discussion
In all, nine of the 11 chimpanzees in the ‘social information’ groups were eventually able to flexibly change their 
behaviours by relinquishing their mastered technique and switching to a novel one. We infer that this was due 
to the greater contrast between participants’ inefficient use of extraction at point A and the more efficient use of 
extraction at point B displayed by the model, a contrast that involved differences in both latency to extraction and 
proportion of successful extractions.
An alternative possibility, that the changes occurred because of the more extended time frame of adding E2 to 
E1, affording more observations of the model, can be rejected for several reasons. First, E1 involved a long period 
in which any switching at all was rare, and moreover, participants not switching in E1 persevered with their 
inefficient technique despite both multiple observations of the model (median 18 observations, range 11–46) 
and multiple token extractions using their inefficient method (median 18 attempts, range 4–119 for those that 
switched in Experiment 2). In addition, among chimpanzees who did switch at some point, the number of obser-
vations of the efficient method did not predict the number of manipulations they would take before switching 
(final two columns in Supplementary Table S3). Given these considerations and that (i) only two participants were 
seen to open the door at point B in E1, and critically, (ii) no other individual was observed to make any persistent 
attempts to open the door until their behaviours became highly inefficient in E2, we conclude that the switch in 
behavioural strategy in E2 can be ascribed to the change in the relative efficiency of the options that were experi-
mentally engineered between E1 and E2.
Five of the switching chimpanzees showed relatively low levels of behavioural conservatism, with two having 
previously upgraded their behaviours in E1, the other three adopting the alternative once their own approach 
became highly inefficient in E2. This was clearly facilitated by social information, as demonstrated by a lack of 
switching (bar one individual) in the ‘non-seeded’ groups. The social learning involved may have relied on only 
relatively simple processes such as stimulus enhancement (of token extraction at point B), or more complex ones, 
like emulation or imitation, and our study was not designed to discriminate among these. In any case, stimulus 
enhancement or any other social learning was insufficient for change despite extensive exposure in Experiment 1; 
it had effects only when the contrast in efficiency became more extreme.
Other chimpanzees still displayed a high degree of behavioural conservatism, in line with previous 
research13,16,18–21, showing a difficulty in inhibiting use of a highly inefficient established behaviour, with varying 
levels of perseveration. This was most evident in the ‘social information’ groups, where despite many observations 
of a far more efficient alternative, six individuals continued in their old behaviour for some time, with four only 
switching behaviours following salient social information engineered though human demonstrations, and the 
two remaining individuals never relinquishing their inefficient solutions.
There was also very little exploratory behaviour in the ‘non-seeded’ groups, with only one individual dis-
covering the efficient method. Despite witnessing the efficient solution, two individuals within the ‘non-seeded’ 
groups never attempted this alternative method. This was most likely due to their more limited and inconsistent 
exposure to demonstrations of this method, and highlights again the conservative nature of chimpanzee behav-
iour. Although there was no direct relationship between the number of observations of the model and number 
of manipulations taken before switching, no individual within the ‘social-information’ groups was seen to switch 
after as few demonstrations as experienced by these ‘non-seeded’ individuals, indicating the potential need for 
relatively sustained social information across repeated attempts to solve the Serialbox. This mirrors findings in 
humans whereby trial and error learning interacts with repeated exposure to socially available alternatives to 
produce behavioural change43.
Whilst these results show some degree of behavioural flexibility, it remained to be seen whether chimpanzees 
could express such flexibility in a cumulative fashion; that is, could chimpanzees “add an existing technique used 
Figure 3. Percentage of individuals within the ‘social information’ groups and ‘non-seeded’ groups who 
used the efficient method across Training and Experiment 2. **Indicates a P value of less than 0.01.
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in a different context, or an entirely novel technique, to an existing technique, and integrate them functionally” (p. 
18144): could they now integrate the efficient method they had acquired (door pull and extraction at point B) with 
behavioural elements common to the inefficient method (lid lifting and hole poking) to cumulatively produce 
the efficient solution demanded by the scenario used in Experiment 1? In Experiment 1 only two chimpanzees 
were observed to do this, with the majority instead sticking to their known behaviours despite potential gains in 
extraction efficiency. Now however, seven additional chimpanzees within the ‘social information’ groups and one 
from the ‘non-seeded’ groups had mastered use of an alternative, independent solution (door pull and extraction 
at point B), which could potentially be combined with other known behaviours (elements of the inefficient solu-
tion) to produce a compound technique that they were previously not seen to use when some of these elements 
were novel.
Experiment 3: Modifying, inhibiting and building on existing behaviours
To investigate chimpanzees’ potential for such accumulation, the token was repositioned in the same location as 
in Experiment 1 (i.e. it was removed from the indent in the floor so its movement was no longer impeded), and 
could now be successfully extracted at either point A using the methods of E0, or from point B (Fig. 1). To extract 
from point B, individuals had to employ initial elements from their learned, inefficient technique (lid lifting and 
hole poking) but inhibit the remainder of the sequence resulting in extraction at point A and instead combine lid 
lifting and poking with the element unique to efficient extraction (the door pull at point B). Alternatively, indi-
viduals could now revert back to using their earlier well-practiced inefficient technique, with this method reliably 
yielding the token, but much more slowly.
Experiment 3: Results
Extractions within the test period. One individual in the ‘social information’ groups and three individ-
uals in the ‘non-seeded’ groups chose not to participate during the test period (‘E3’– Supplementary Table S1).
Switching behaviours. In the ‘social information’ groups, there was a significant change of behaviour from 
use of the earlier, trained inefficient method, with seven individuals now using the more efficient compound 
solution needed (One-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test comparing percentage use of efficient behaviours: Z = − 
2.410, n = 10, P = 0.008, medianE0 = 0%, medianE3 = 88.2%, r = − 0.54; Fig. 2). In the ‘non-seeded’ groups, one 
individual, Kt, also built on her prior solution to use the more efficient method. No additional individuals in the 
‘non-seeded’ group used the efficient method of extraction, with four exclusively sticking with the inefficient 
solution.
At the individual level, of those with personal experience of the efficient method (n = 9 ‘social information’ 
participants and n = 1 ‘non-seeded’ participant), seven showed a significant change of behaviour from their ini-
tial inefficient method to using the efficient compound solution (one-tailed Fisher exact tests with Bonferroni 
corrected P value = 0.005), whilst three reverted back to preferentially using the inefficient method (P > 0.005). 
In sum, five exclusively used the efficient method, three flexibly switched between using both methods, and two 
exclusively returned to the inefficient method (Fig. 4 and Table 2).
Figure 4. Percentage use of the inefficient and efficient solution of token extraction in Experiment 3 for 
each individual with prior experience of extraction via point B during Experiment 2. The ‘non-seeded’ 
individual Kt is underlined, with all other individuals being ‘social-information’ participants.
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Experiment 3: Discussion
Seven chimpanzees in the ‘social information’ groups now displayed the efficient solution employed by the mod-
els. Only two of these individuals had previously been seen to use this efficient solution, when this required the 
addition of a novel element, in E1. The other five, along with the innovator Kt in the non-seeded’ group, displayed 
a cumulatively built combination of elements they had learned in E0 and E2. From the results of E3 we con-
clude that accumulation involved the combination of behaviour routines already in the repertoire. One of these, 
opening the door at point B (even if it was the case that this was acquired only by affordance learning about the 
significance of this door, but also if it involved copying the action sequence involved), gave rise to behavioural 
routines that could be combined with parts of an earlier-acquired procedure, of opening lids and poking, learned 
via training in E0. Chimpanzees’ successes in E3 additionally displayed an ability to flexibly inhibit the remainder 
of the trained routine for extraction at point A. Such capacities for cumulative combination, although modest 
compared to full cumulative culture, could, we submit, provide important foundations for cumulative culture if 
present in ancestral states.
General Discussion
Chimpanzees were trained to use a relatively laborious sequence of actions to extract a valuable food-token from 
a puzzle-box. This initial method was sufficiently complex to require socially-facilitated acquisition in most chim-
panzees and we ensured it was then extensively practiced, to become routine, as in cultural behaviours in the 
wild. A different, more efficient alternative was then demonstrated by a high ranking female conspecific. This new 
solution involved partial use of behaviours in common with the established extraction technique as well as the 
addition of a novel element.
When chimpanzees could still successfully forage with their established method (in E1), only a small minority 
relinquished this and flexibly upgraded to the more efficient alternative witnessed. The predominant failure to 
switch to the more efficient technique is consistent with earlier reports of chimpanzee conservatism13,16,18–21 and 
may offer a partial explanation for the relative stasis of chimpanzee culture. However, when their established 
behaviours were made considerably more inefficient in E2, most chimpanzees observing a knowledgeable indi-
vidual were able to relinquish their inefficient behaviour and flexibly switch to using an alternative strategy. When 
in E3 they were again challenged by the task configuration of E1, the majority of these chimpanzees showed an 
ability to build on prior behaviours by combining already acquired elements of their learned use of the door for 
extraction at point B and parts of their earlier technique for extraction at point A. They had not achieved this ear-
lier in E1, when success required the addition of a novel behaviour to the sequence. The cumulative combinations 
recorded in E3 thus stand in contrast to the findings of previous studies where chimpanzees appear behaviourally 
inflexible13,16. Our results suggest that in certain contexts at least, chimpanzees may combine known behaviours 
to match an efficient compound technique demonstrated by others.
Although chimpanzees show a considerable degree of behavioural conservatism, we suggest these results 
indicate that they also have an ability to combine independent behaviours to produce more efficient compound 
action sequences. Such an ability, while not yet truly cumulative, may be one of the foundational abilities (or 
candidate mechanisms) for human cumulative culture, through the ability to “add an existing technique used in 
a different context … .to an existing technique, and integrate them functionally” (p.18144). This shares similarities 
with human studies in which recombination of behavioural variants is employed to move solutions closer to an 
optimum45–50; that is, accumulation may commonly be brought about through novel recombination of existing 
behaviours, creating “innovations without invention, creativity or trial and error learning” (p.549).
Individual
Exp 1 Exp 2
Human 
Demos
Exp 3
Old solution 
somewhat inefficient
Old solution 
highly inefficient
Old solution 
somewhat inefficient
Sa Build Switch N/A Build
Se Build/revert Switch N/A Build
Ma Stay Switch N/A Build
Cea Stay Switch N/A Build
Ze Stay Switch N/A Build
Kt Stay Switch N/A Build
Cr Stay Stay Switch Build
Je Stay Stay Switch Build
Hh Stay Stay Switch Revert
An Stay Stay Switch Revert
Ta Stay Stay N/A Stay
Si Stay Stay Stay N/A
Table 2.  Summary of participant’s behaviour in the ‘social information’ groups as well as the innovator 
(Kt) in the ‘non-seeded’ group. ‘Build’ denotes building on the inefficient solution. ‘Stay’ denotes maintaining 
use of the inefficient solution. ‘Revert’ denotes reverting back to the inefficient solution after having efficiently 
extracted through point B. ‘Switch’ denotes relinquishing the inefficient solution in favour of using the door and 
extraction at point B. ‘N/A’ represents no participation in this phase. 
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Whilst we offer evidence for a potential core prerequisite of cumulative culture, this is not evidence of cumula-
tive culture itself, as the behaviours of interest were also produced spontaneously by one chimpanzee we studied, 
and they do not require the combination of multi-generational contributions by several innovators, which is 
inherent to full-blown cumulative culture10. Further, our study was not designed to dissect exactly how the chim-
panzees were learning from the available social information, whereas advanced cultural accumulation is thought 
to depend on high fidelity transmission51, as well as cognitively complex learning heuristics15,52. However, chim-
panzees in our study were able to use multiple solutions as well as to build on and combine prior behaviours to 
efficiently solve an extractive foraging problem, indicating greater potential for cumulative change than found in 
many earlier studies and emphasized in recent reviews (e.g. ref. 53). The accumulation observed here lends sup-
port to the plausibility that some behaviour exhibited by wild chimpanzees is actually the result of a cumulative 
process, even if elementary compared to that observed in human culture54–58.
Experiment 1: Methods
Subjects and housing. N = 43 individuals (18 males; average age: 29.1; range: 11.9–50.5 years; Table 1) were 
group housed at the National Center for Chimpanzee Care at the Michale E. Keeling Center for Comparative 
Medicine and Research of The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center in Bastrop, Texas, U.S.A. Group 
size ranged from 5–10 individuals. Chimpanzees were trained and tested in both their outside enclosures (rang-
ing in size from corrals at 4,300 square feet to PrimadomesTM measuring approximately 34 feet in diameter and 25 
feet high) and indoor dens (ranging in size from 6 feet deep by 15 feet wide to approximately 8 feet and 8 inches 
deep by 9 feet wide). Individuals were given the opportunity to voluntarily participate and separate from their 
group for further training and testing purposes in their inside enclosures for a period of no longer than 30 min-
utes. Participants were not food or water deprived during training or testing.
Apparatus. A transparent, elongated, Plexiglas ‘Serialbox’, measuring 61 centimetres long, five centimetres 
high and five centimetres wide, was attached to a mobile cart and pushed to the mesh of enclosures. Along the 
length of the transparent Serialbox were four compartments (Fig. 1). Each compartment had a hinged lid on 
top which could be lifted open. Under each lid were four finger holes (2.5 cm in diameter) that permitted an 
object initially placed inside the box at the left-most end from the chimpanzees’ perspective to be pushed the 
length of the apparatus. This object could then be extracted through an opening at the other end of the Serialbox 
(‘Extraction point A’ in Fig. 1). A small door spanning two thirds of the first compartment was fitted on the 
chimpanzee side of the apparatus and could be pulled open using a handle protruding outside the box to give 
alternative and quicker access to the left-most compartment (‘Extraction point B’ in Fig. 1), where the token was 
initially positioned.
Procedure. Training phase (5 groups, 38 chimpanzees). Chimpanzees were initially trained to associate a 
small purple plastic token with a reward by trading this with experimenter SJD in exchange for one grape. The 
token was then placed inside the apparatus three quarters of the way along the first compartment (Fig. 1). The 
inefficient method of retrieving the token was demonstrated by SJD three times before participants interacted 
with the Serialbox. The inefficient method involved the lifting of each of the lids of the four compartments provid-
ing access to the finger holes. These holes were used to ferry the token along the compartments of the apparatus 
until it could be extracted from point A (Supplementary Video 1). Following these demonstrations, the box was 
pushed to the mesh allowing all individuals in each group access. Once the token was extracted from the appa-
ratus, it was exchanged with SJD for one grape. During the training phase, the efficient method was not available 
because the pull door was locked shut, preventing extraction from point B. If an individual was not able to suc-
cessfully retrieve the token after demonstrations, scaffolding of the solution was provided whereby the token was 
positioned adjacent to extraction point A until extraction from this point was mastered, with additional demon-
strations given if necessary. The token was gradually placed further away until the chimpanzee was manoeuvring 
the token along the length of the apparatus by opening the lids and using the underlying finger holes. Participants 
were given the opportunity to engage with the Serialbox until all participating individuals had successfully 
retrieved the token a minimum of twenty times over no fewer than two training sessions. When an individual 
was successful in retrieving the token, the apparatus was pulled back from the mesh, reset and re-baited. If an 
individual showed interest in operating the apparatus but was unable to gain access due to monopolisation by 
more dominant individuals, they were offered the opportunity to voluntarily enter their indoor enclosures and 
participate by themselves until they had reached criterion for inclusion in the study.
Social information groups: Presence of social demonstrator (Three groups, N = 26). Model training phase. After 
all participating chimpanzees had reached criterion, a high ranking female chimpanzee voluntarily separated 
from her group and was trained on how to solve the Serialbox using a more efficient method. This involved pull-
ing the door open, and, due to the positioning of the token a short distance from the extraction point (Fig. 1), 
lifting one lid and using the underlying finger holes to manoeuvre the token towards point B for efficient retrieval 
(Supplementary Video 2). Training sessions lasted around twenty minutes.
Social demonstration phase. The Serialbox was re-introduced to the entire group with the efficient method 
no longer locked. The token could now be retrieved via either extraction point A or B. The model was called by 
name and vocally encouraged to demonstrate the efficient method, which all models complied with. Following 
each extraction, the token was exchanged with SJD for one grape. After each participant had witnessed at least ten 
demonstrations of the more efficient method over no fewer than two separate testing sessions, the entire group 
was given the opportunity to interact with the Serialbox. A demonstration was taken to occur if an individual 
was within two metres of the model and the potential observer’s head was orientated towards the apparatus. If 
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a participating individual did not come into proximity with the model during the social demonstration phase, 
they were given the opportunity to voluntarily separate with the model and observe her actions. After the model 
had successfully retrieved the token, the apparatus was pulled away from the demonstrator, reset and re-baited.
Testing phase (N = 11). The apparatus was presented over ten hours to all participating individuals with both 
the efficient and inefficient methods as viable strategies to extract the token. After each successful extraction, the 
apparatus was pulled away, reset and re-baited. To avoid cueing of responses, SJD occluded the apparatus and 
her hand movements with a sheet during interactions with the box. The apparatus was not made available to any 
non-participating chimpanzee (i.e. any individual who had not met criterion to be included in the study).
Non-seeded groups: No social demonstrator (Two groups, N = 12). Control groups experienced the Training 
phase and Testing phase as above, but no model seeded knowledge of the more efficient method.
Naïve group (1 group, N = 5). This control group was exposed to the apparatus with no prior knowledge of 
any solution over ten hours of open diffusion. Both the efficient and inefficient methods were viable extraction 
techniques.
Experiment 2: Methods
Methods followed those outlined in the Testing phase of Experiment 1 Methods with the exception that the token 
was now placed in an indent in the floor located directly behind (from the chimpanzee’s perspective) extraction 
point B (Fig.1). This impeded movement of the token along the length of the apparatus. The ‘naïve’ group was not 
included in Experiment 2. Following Yamamoto et al.26, if individuals within the ‘social information’ groups failed 
to switch, they were provided with salient demonstrations of the efficient method by SJD after this second period 
of open diffusion (one individual did not receive human demonstrations as she did not wish to separate from her 
group). To avoid unnecessary voluntary separation of participants from their group, so long as a participant was 
able to gain access to the Serialbox, human demonstrations were given in the presence of other group members. 
If instead the participant struggled to gain access, they were offered the opportunity to voluntarily separate and 
given additional demonstrations over a period lasting no more than 30 minutes. After the participant attempted 
the inefficient method, SJD pulled the apparatus back and demonstrated use of the door. If participants were still 
attempting to use the inefficient method, SJD provisioned the apparatus with the door already open, facilitating 
extraction via point B.
Experiment 3: Methods
The token was again placed inside the apparatus three quarters of the way along the first compartment (as in 
Experiment 1). The apparatus was presented over five hours to all participating chimpanzees (19 individuals 
across the ‘social information’ and ‘non-seeded’ control groups), with both the efficient and inefficient methods 
as viable strategies to extract the token, following the procedure outlined in the Testing phase of Experiment 1 
Methods.
Analyses. Records of the social demonstration and testing phases were both narrated and visually recorded 
using a HC-920 Panasonic camcorder. Responses were coded in situ for all groups, with ‘social information’ 
groups’ behaviour additionally coded through video analysis.
Ethics Statement. Ethical approval was granted for this study by the UTMDACC Institutional Animal Care 
and Use Committee (IACUC approval number 0894-RN01) and the University of St Andrews’ Animal Welfare 
and Ethics Committee, and was carried out in accordance with approved guidelines.
References
1. Laland, K. N. & Hoppitt, W. Do animals have culture? Evol. Anthr. 12, 150–159 (2003).
2. Tomasello, M., Kruger, A. C. & Ratner, H. H. Cultural learning. Behav. Brain Sci. 16, 495–552 (1993).
3. Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. Why culture is common, but cultural evolution is rare. Proc. Br. Acad. 88, 77–93 (1996).
4. Heyes, C. M. Social learning in animals: categories and mechanisms. Biol. Rev. 69, 207–231 (1994).
5. Heyes, C. M. & Galef, B. G. Social Learning in Animals: The Roots of Culture (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1996).
6. Hoppitt, W. & Laland, K. Social Learning: An Introduction to Mechanisms, Methods, and Models (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2013).
7. Galef, B. G. Jr. & Whiten, A. The comparative psychology of social learning In APA Handbook of Comparative Psychology (APA, 
Washington, in press).
8. Reader, S. M. & Biro, D. Experimental identification of social learning in wild animals. Learn. Behav. 38, 265–283 (2010).
9. Zentall, T. R. & Galef, B. G. Jr. Social Learning: Psychological and Biological Perspectives (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, 
1988).
10. Tennie, C., Call, J. & Tomasello, M. Ratcheting up the ratchet: on the evolution of cumulative culture. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 364, 
2405–2415 (2009). 
11. Whiten, A. et al. Cultures in chimpanzees. Nature 399, 682–685 (1999).
12. Dean, L. G., Vale, G. L., Laland, K. N., Flynn, E. & Kendal, R. L. Human cumulative culture: a comparative perspective. Biol. Rev. 89, 
284–301 (2014).
13. Dean, L. G., Kendal, R. L., Schapiro, S. J., Thierry, B. & Laland, K. N. Identification of the social and cognitive processes underlying 
human cumulative culture. Science 335, 1114–1148 (2012).
14. Call, J., Carpenter, M. & Tomasello, M. Copying results and copying actions in the process of social learning: chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens). Anim. Cogn. 8, 151–163 (2005).
15. Laland, K. N. Social learning strategies. Learn. Behav. 32, 4–14 (2004).
16. Marshall-Pescini, S. & Whiten, A. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and the question of cumulative culture: an experimental approach. 
Anim. Cogn. 11, 449–456 (2008).
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
1 1Scientific RepoRts | 6:35953 | DOI: 10.1038/srep35953
17. Lehner, S. R., Burkart, J. M. & van Schaik, C. P. Can captive orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelii) be coaxed into cumulative build-up 
of techniques ? J. Comp. Psychol. 125, 446–455 (2011).
18. Hrubesch, C., Preuschoft, S. & van Schaik, C. Skill mastery inhibits adoption of observed alternative solutions among chimpanzees 
(Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn. 12, 209–216 (2009).
19. Bonnie, K. E. et al. Flexibility and persistence of chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) foraging behavior in a captive environment. Am. J. 
Primatol. 74, 661–668 (2012).
20. Hopper, L. M., Schapiro, S. J., Lambeth, S. P. & Brosnan, S. F. Chimpanzees’ socially maintained food preferences indicate both 
conservatism and conformity. Anim. Behav. 81, 1195–1202 (2011).
21. Price, E. E., Lambeth, S. P., Schapiro, S. J. & Whiten, A. A potent effect of observational learning on chimpanzee tool construction. 
Proc. R. Soc. B 276, 3377–3383 (2009).
22. Haun, D. B. M., van Leeuwen, E. J. C. & Edelson, M. G. Majority influence in children and other animals. Devel. Cogn. Neurosc. 3, 
61–71 (2013).
23. Horner, V. & Whiten, A. Causal knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children 
(Homo sapiens). Anim. Cogn. 8, 164–181 (2013).
24. Flynn, E. Investigating children as cultural magnets: do young children transmit redundant information along diffusion chains? Phil. 
Trans. R. Soc. B 363, 3541–3551 (2008).
25. Tennie, C., Walter, V., Gampe, A., Carpenter, M. & Tomasello, M. Limitations to the cultural ratchet effect in young children. J. Exp. 
Child. Psychol. 126, 152–160 (2014).
26. Yamamoto, S., Humle, T. & Tanaka, M. Basis for cumulative cultural evolution in chimpanzees: social learning of a more efficient 
tool-use technique. PloS One 8, e55768 (2013).
27. Hobaiter, C., Poisot, T., Zuberbühler, K., Hoppitt, W. & Gruber, T. Social network analysis shows direct evidence for social 
transmission of tool use in wild chimpanzees. PLoS Biol. 12, e1001960 (2014).
28. Luncz, L. V., Wittig, R. M. & Boesch, C. Primate archaeology reveals cultural transmission in wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes 
verus). Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 370, 20140348 (2015).
29. Sirianni, G., Mundry, R. & Boesch, C. When to choose which tool: multidimensional and conditional selection of nut-cracking 
hammers in wild chimpanzees. Anim. Behav. 100, 152–165 (2015).
30. Stokes, E. & Byrne, R. Cognitive capacities for behavioural flexibility in wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): the effect of snare injury 
on complex manual food processing. Anim. Cogn. 4, 11–28 (2001).
31. Wilfried, E. E. G. & Yamagiwa, J. Use of tool sets by chimpanzees for multiple purposes in Moukalaba-Doudou National Park, 
Gabon. Primates 55, 467–472 (2014).
32. Hockings, K. J. et al. Apes in the Anthropocene: flexibility and survival. Trends Ecol. Evol. 30, 215–222 (2015).
33. Hopper, L. M., Kurtycz, L. M., Ross, S. R. & Bonnie, K. E. Captive chimpanzee foraging in a social setting: a test of problem solving, 
flexibility, and spatial discounting. PeerJ 3, e833 (2015).
34. van Leeuwen, E. J. C., Cronin, K. A., Schütte, S., Call, J. & Haun, D. B. M. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) flexibly adjust their 
behaviour in order to maximize payoffs, not to conform to majorities. PloS One 8, e80945 (2013).
35. Grandjean, J. & Collette, F. Influence of response prepotency strength, general working memory resources, and specific working 
memory load on the ability to inhibit predominant responses: A comparison of young and elderly participants. Brain. Cogn. 77, 
237–247 (2011).
36. Roberts, R. J., Hager, L. D. & Heron, C. Prefrontal Cognitive Processes : Working Memory and Inhibition in the Antisaccade Task. 
J. Exp. Psychol. 123, 374–393 (1994).
37. Roberts, R. J. & Pennington, B. F. An interactive framework for examining prefrontal cognitive processes. Dev. Neuropsychol. 12, 
105–126 (1996).
38. Manrique, H. M., Völter, C. J. & Call, J. Repeated innovation in great apes. Anim. Behav. 85, 195–202 (2013).
39. Whiten, A. & Mesoudi, A. Review. Establishing an experimental science of culture: animal social diffusion experiments. Phil. Trans. 
R. Soc. B 363, 3477–3488 (2008).
40. Whiten, A., McGuigan, N., Marshall-Pescini, S. & Hopper, L. M. Emulation, imitation, over-imitation and the scope of culture for 
child and chimpanzee. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 364, 2417–2428 (2009).
41. Reader, S. M. & Laland, K. N. Animal Innovation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003).
42. Cohen, J. D., McClure, S. M. & Yu, A. J. Should I stay or should I go? How the human brain manages the trade-off between 
exploitation and exploration. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 362, 933–942 (2007).
43. Wiley, J. Expertise as mental set : The effects of domain knowledge in creative problem solving. Mem. Cognition, 26, 716–730 (1998).
44. Pradhan, G. R., Tennie, C. & van Schaik, C. P. Social organization and the evolution of cumulative technology in apes and hominins. 
J. Hum. Evol. 63, 180–190 (2012).
45. Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J. & Henrich, J. The cultural niche: Why social learning is essential for human adaptation. PNAS 108, 
10918–10925 (2011).
46. Derex, M., Feron, R., Godelle, B. & Raymond, M. Social learning and the replication process : an experimental investigation. Proc. 
R. Soc. B 282, 20150719 (2015).
47. Enquist, M., Ghirlanda, S. & Eriksson, K. Modelling the evolution and diversity of cumulative culture. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 366, 
412–423 (2011).
48. Kempe, M. & Mesoudi, A. An experimental demonstration of the effect of group size on cultural accumulation. Evol. Hum. Behav. 
35, 285–290 (2014).
49. Muthukrishna, M., Shulman, B. W., Vasilescu, V. & Henrich, J. Sociality influences cultural complexity. Proc. R. Soc. B 281, 20132511 
(2014).
50. Youn, H., Strumsky, D., Bettencourt, L. M. A. & Lobo, J. Invention as a combinatorial process: evidence from US patents. J. R. Soc. 
Interface 12, 20150272 (2016).
51. Lewis, H. M. & Laland, K. N. Transmission fidelity is the key to the build-up of cumulative culture. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 367, 
2171–2180 (2012).
52. Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M. & Hobson, R. P. The emergence of social cognition in three young chimpanzees. Monog. Soc. Res. Child 
Dev. 70, i+ vii+ 1–152 (2005).
53. Henrich, J. The Secret of Our Success: How Culture Is Driving Human Evolution, Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter 
(Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2015).
54. Boesch, C. Is culture a golden barrier between human and chimpanzee? Evol. Anthr. 12, 82–91 (2003).
55. Boesch, C., Head, J. & Robbins, M. M. Complex tool sets for honey extraction among chimpanzees in Loango National Park, Gabon. 
J. Hum. Evo. 56, 560–569 (2009).
56. Sanz, C., Call, J. & Morgan, D. Design complexity in termite-fishing tools of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Biol. Lett. 5, 293–296 
(2009).
57. Sanz, C. M., Schöning, C. & Morgan, D. B. Chimpanzees prey on army ants with specialized tool set. Am. J. Primatol. 72, 17–24 
(2010).
58. Humle, T., Snowdon, C. T. & Matsuzawa, T. Social influences on ant-dipping acquisition in the wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes 
verus) of Bossou, Guinea, West Africa. Anim. Cogn. 12, S37–S48 (2009).
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
1 2Scientific RepoRts | 6:35953 | DOI: 10.1038/srep35953
Acknowledgements
We thank the care staff for their invaluable expertise and assistance throughout the project and for the high 
standard of care and enrichment given to the chimpanzees, making this research possible. We are very grateful to 
Keith Haynes and Robert Mackenzie for the construction of the Serialbox and for designing Fig. 1, and William 
Nyberg for his technical and logistical support throughout this study. We thank Lisa Reamer for her advice and 
suggestion to use a token reward, Stuart Watson for providing interrater reliability and Richard Byrne for his 
constructive feedback on an earlier version of this manuscript. This research was funded by the John Templeton 
Foundation (Grant ID: 40128, to K. Laland and A. Whiten). Support for the chimpanzee colony came from NIH 
U42 OD-011197.
Author Contributions
S.J.D., A.W. and G.L.V. conceived the experiments. S.J.D. conducted the experiments and analysed the results. 
S.J.D. and A.W. wrote the manuscript. S.J.S and S.P.L provided essential logistical support. All authors reviewed 
the manuscript.
Additional Information
Supplementary information accompanies this paper at http://www.nature.com/srep
Competing financial interests: The authors declare no competing financial interests.
How to cite this article: Davis, S. J. et al. Foundations of cumulative culture in apes: improved foraging 
efficiency through relinquishing and combining witnessed behaviours in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).  
Sci. Rep. 6, 35953; doi: 10.1038/srep35953 (2016).
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. The images 
or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, 
unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative Commons license, 
users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to reproduce the material. To view a copy of this 
license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
 
© The Author(s) 2016

